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The following study examines the relationship between competing national
interests and the implementation of multilateral diplomacy as characterized by the United
Nations. Although primary attention focuses on the events Suez Crisis of 1956, the scope
of work analyzes this dichotomy from the Suez Canal’s construction to the post-Suez era
of the 1960s. Adopting a more comprehensive approach to understanding the crisis and
its impact on international diplomacy provides adds a new and timely perspective to
scope of the crisis and the complexities of conflict resolution.
In many respects, the diplomatic maneuvering of the nineteenth century remained
a constant in diplomatic exchange leading up to the Suez crisis. As the canal’s architect,
Ferdinand de Lesseps marginalized international differences in order to win support for
the fulfillment his own ambitions. De Lesseps’s tactics gained in popularity throughout
the remainder of the century as British politicians and early Zionists presented their
particular interests as broader, universal goals. This became the operational model for
many twentieth century leaders and diplomats. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev,
President Eisenhower, and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles used similar
methods to in order to enlist support for their Cold War agenda. Egyptian Prime Minster
Gamal Abdel Nasser and other nationalists usurped pluralistic initiatives to serve state

interests. Virtually all of these efforts heightened international tensions within and
between blocs of interests.
Concomitant with these developments, some members of the international
community engaged in more genuine multilateral diplomatic pursuits. International civil
servants inside the United Nations, including UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld,
advanced ideas that placed the international interest above the agenda of any single
country. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, and the Congo
Crisis of 1960, this diplomatic alternative helped defused tensions.
Rather than encourage independent multilateralism, national leaders established
closer relations with non-government organizations through which they could continue to
exercise influence without sacrificing control. After the Suez crisis, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), and the European Economic Community (EEC) all sought greater conformity.
The sense of interdependency was lost.

A multitude of masters is no good thing; let there be one master, one king . . . .
--Agamemnon from The Iliad
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Introduction

At various stages throughout international history, competing interests have
exerted themselves to influence a larger whole. World leaders during the Suez Crisis of
1956 and many historians since then have examined the event as a competition between
various spheres of influence or conflicting perspectives within like-minded blocs. While
insightful, these arguments often overshadow the United Nations and the pivotal role it
has played in quarantining crisis. The following study probes this relationship by
investigating the effects of intolerant interests throughout the history of the Suez Canal,
how the United Nations reversed these effects ever so briefly during the height of the
Suez crisis in 1956, and the return to the status quo ante bellum as national leaders
created new institutions supplanting the UN‘s success. Understanding the Suez crisis
from this perspective demonstrates the successful interaction of viewpoints inside the
United Nations that recognized the need for more inclusive diplomacy, how multilateral
dialogue resolved this particular conflict more effectively than traditional methods, and
the various lengths to which national leaders attempted to monopolize multilateral
diplomacy.
As United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld dedicated himself to
transforming the United Nations into an independent institution responsible for providing
an internationalist alternative in the mediation of crises. He stressed the monumental
discipline international civil servants required in order to maintain their objective
integrity. During a lecture at Oxford University in 1961, Hammarskjöld remarked that
the international civil servant must remain cognizant of his or her ―sympathies‖ and must
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prevent them from influencing the individual‘s actions. Should conflict arise from upholding this perspective, Hammarskjöld argued, then it would be the result of adhering to
neutrality rather than deviating from it. 1 The organization‘s success lay in the ability of
its member states to abide by similar principles. When he became UN Secretary General
in 1953, Hammarskjöld called for member states to subordinate national interests to
broader international interests.2 Operating from this premise required that vigilant
attention be paid to policing one‘s own interests and segregating them from influencing
the interests of the international community.
Instead of embracing this viable alternative, national leaders sponsored initiatives
portraying national interests as emblematic of a broader, multilateral agenda. As
historian A.G. Hopkins proclaims, ―Where international themes are recognized, they are
often treated as spare parts that have to be bolted on to the national story.‖ This leads to
―nationalizing internationalism, by treating the wider world as an extension of narrower
national interests.‖3 Many policy-makers from around the globe operated from this
presupposition. As John Ikenberry contends in his book, After Victory, America‘s postWorld War II policy-makers imbued multilateralism with an understanding of ―the
American experience and a thoroughgoing understanding of history, economics, and the
sources of political order.‖4

1

Taken from W.H. Auden, ―Forward,‖ in Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings, trans. Leif Sjöberg and
W.H.Auden (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. xix.
2
Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, ―Annual Report of the Secretary-General on
the Work of the Organization: 1 July 1952 – 30 June 1953,‖ 15 July 1953, Doc. A/2404, p. xi.
3
A.G. Hopkins, ―The History of Globalization—and the Globalization of History?,‖ in Globalization in
World History, ed. A.G. Hopkins (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 2002), p. 16.
4
John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major
Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 171-172. More specifically, American
officials labored to construct a world order that fulfilled the country‘s national security interests, free
market principles, and ardent anti-communist sentiments. As historian Melvyn Leffler put it, American
hegemony after WWII made many Americans want to ―refashion the world in America‘s image.‖ Melvyn
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National leaders from around the globe viewed international affairs from a similar
self-interested perspective. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and several of his
advisers maintained intrusive imperialist policies in the Middle East that preceded his
administration by roughly seventy-five years.5 Such intransigence stemmed from the
colonial possessions both British and French officials considered essential for economic
recovery following World War II. Meanwhile, emerging nationalists, such as Egyptian
Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, extended influence by nationalizing domestic
institutions and industries while simultaneously attempting to monopolize pan-Arab
organizations including the Arab League. During the Suez crisis, Israeli Prime Minster
David Ben-Gurion took a hard-line Zionist approach as adamant in its stance over the
Sinai region as Nasser‘s pan-Arab nationalism.

Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 3. See also John Ikenberry, ―Multilateralism and U.S.
Grand Strategy,‖ in Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick
and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 121. For America‘s specific
application of this mentality to the Middle East, see Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United
States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p.
3. Michelle Mart‘s wonderful assessment of America‘s equating Israel‘s situation in the 1950s to that of
the Puritan‘s plight in the New World epitomizes Leffler‘s point. See Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel: How
the United Sates Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 2006), p. 60. See also David Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United Sates and Rightwing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 3-5;
and David Reynolds, ―American Globalism: Mass, Motion, and the Multiplier Effect,‖ in Globalization in
World History, p. 253. See also Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding
Globalization (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), pp. 7-11.
5
Anthony Nutting makes the articulate argument that the Suez Crisis developed in part over the clash
between Britain‘s need to control Egypt and its compliance with allies to support Israel‘s existence.
Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1966), pp. 911. Peter Lyon reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of Britain‘s Commonwealth Relations Office
(CRO) during the 1950s. Lyon‘s suggests that British policy-makers expected greater loyalty with regard
to the Commonwealth in exchange for greater independence along the periphery. See Peter Lyon, ―The
Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis,‖ in Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, ed. William Roger
Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 262.
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I

In many respects, these leaders simply wished to create the best circumstances for
fulfilling their respective national interests. These motives are understandable and
continue to dominate the scope and scholarship of international relations. The competing
national interests involved in the Suez crisis have been thoroughly researched and
analyzed. Peter Hahn‘s investigation of U.S., British, and Egyptian relations addresses
the factors and personalities that directed U.S. foreign policy making in the Middle East
during the first decade of the Cold War. Hahn argues that the Eisenhower
administration‘s Cold War focus was responsible for failures in U.S. foreign policy in the
region.6 In her book Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy, Diane
Kunz discusses the interconnectivity between ―guns and butter‖ and uses various events
throughout the Cold War, including the Suez crisis, as case studies. With regard to
economic policies, Kunz concludes that British and Israeli economies were particularly
susceptible to U.S. sanctions while the Egyptian economy was ―totally immune.‖ The
successful resolution of the crisis, and the perceived role the U.S. played in it, left
Eisenhower‘s successors and their fellow Americans inflating the strategic value of
economic sanctions. As Kunz put it, ―Sanctions appeared to offer all the benefits of
military action with none of the disadvantages.‖7 Although Hahn and Kunz analyze
different aspects of the Suez crisis, both scholars agree that, the Cold War policies

6

Peter Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the
Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 3-5, 246-247.
7
Diane Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: The Free Press,
1997), pp. 5 and 92-93.
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initiated by the U.S. government bare some of the responsibility for the escalation of the
Suez crisis.
What has received less attention is the repeated efforts made by these competing
national interest and their attempts to represent a broader, international interest as it
relates directly to the Suez crisis. The prevailing context in which the Suez crisis
occurred was one where national leaders interchanged their specific national agendas
with international peace and security. As John Ikenberry points out in his study of the
U.S.‘s relationship to multilateralism, ―institution building‖ has served as a cornerstone in
U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy-making of the twentieth century. Ikenberry
concludes that U.S. policymakers understood the benefits of limiting their own ―policy
autonomy,‖ that membership in international organizations required, in order to ―[lock]
other states into enduring policy positions.‖ 8 The underlying assumption, as described
earlier, is that the ―other states‖ must adhere to the U.S.‘s perspective of multilateralism.
When states or organizations strayed from this underlying assumption, U.S.
policymakers reacted with considerable ambivalence, if not outright condemnation.
Given this highly-conditional context, U.S. foreign policy has worked at cross purposes.
As Stewart Patrick, Research Associate at New York University, surmised, ―the [U.S.]
has been the world‘s leading champion of multilateral cooperation and, paradoxically,
one of the greatest impediments to such cooperation.‖ 9 The Suez Crisis of 1956 exposed
this paradox not only with regard to U.S. policymakers, but also regarding the
policymakers of numerous other countries.

8

Ikenberry, ―Multilateralism and U.S. Grand Strategy,‖ p. 127.
Stewart Patrick, ―Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S.
Ambivalence,‖ in Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick
and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 7.
9

6
The divide emerging during the Suez crisis, between Hammarskjöld‘s
internationalist orientation and the dominant interests of particular national leaders, raises
provocative questions that deserve close attention. Placed within an international context
where national governments advertised their own brands of multilateralism, how could
Hammarskjöld and the United Nations play such an effective role in crisis resolution?
What were the competing visions of multilateral diplomacy and how convincing were
they in the eyes of the international community? What is the history behind these views
as they relate to the Suez crisis? What are the lasting effects of the Suez crisis as seen
from this internationalist perspective? These are some of the more pressing questions
that this examination addresses.
Attention to conformity, as expressed in matters of national security, wreaked
havoc with more popular matters promoting international opinion. After 1945, world
leaders adopted policies that desperately tried to disguise internationally unpopular
national agendas with internationally popular notions of interdependency. The Suez
crisis reflected this strategy. Writing in 1961, historian Daniel Boorstin described the
phenomenon as advancing a particular nation‘s ―‗prestige‘‖ by making the country‘s
worldview palpable to others.10 For example, British officials adjusted their post-1945
colonial policy-making to convey ―a benign imperial image [to] assuage the latent forces
of anti-imperial opinion.‖11 Clearly, such an approach hoped to undermine anti-imperial

10

Daniel Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1987),
25th Anniversary ed., p. 246. Other scholars interpret have commented on this subject matter in a variety of
ways. David Halberstam notes the rift occurring between the young presidential candidate John F.
Kennedy and the elder-statesman Chester Bowles. According to Halberstam, Bowles represented an
antiquated ―idealism of world opinion [and] of political morality;‖ whereas Kennedy and his close
associates favored realism and bi-polar ideological struggle. See David Halberstam, The Best and the
Brightest, 20th Anniversary ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992), p. 21.
11
William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ―The Imperialism of Decolonization,‖ in The Decolonization
Reader, ed. James LeSueur (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 50.
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sentiment around the globe—but equally important was the fact that this policy also
manipulated popular opinion to serve Britain‘s national interest.

II

Evidence supporting nearly universal attitudes of conformity date back to the
Suez Canal‘s construction; but post World War II events, including the Iranian crisis of
1953 and the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, directly contributed to the Suez crisis.
Mohammad Mossadegh‘s election as Iran‘s Prime Minister in 1951 signified that
country‘s impulsive desire for self-determination. Soon after taking office and hearing of
British business leaders‘ rejection of proposals calling for more equitable oil profitsharing, Mossadegh nationalized Iran‘s oil production, snatching oil industry possessions
from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company‘s (AIOC) control without compensation. The
frustration American officials felt towards their British counterparts yielded to urgent
fears over the effect Iranian nationalization might have on other oil-producing states
holding U.S. concessions. Truman and Eisenhower administration officials responded by
boycotting Iranian crude oil shipments and halting Justice Department investigations into
anti-trust activities within America‘s largest oil companies. 12 International criticism of
Western business practices led to greater domestic consensus in the United States
When Mossadegh attempted to bluff the West into ending its boycott by making
overtures to the Soviet Union, U.S. officials organized the overthrow of Mossadegh‘s
government. Iran‘s new and Western-friendly regime created a ―multinational [oil]

12

Little, American Orientalism, pp. 56-57.
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consortium‖ consisting of four countries: Iran, the United States, Britain, and France.
Together, the United States and Britain reconsolidated their control over 80% of Iran‘s oil
production.13 Using ―multinational‖ agreements as a front permitted great powers to
legitimize and protect national interests at the expense of the Iranian peoples‘ desire for
greater autonomy.
Formation of a regional security network served as the next opportunity for using
multilateral means to achieve unilateral ends. Installation of a nationalist-oriented regime
in Egypt, in which Nasser played a prominent role, led to a 1954 treaty requiring the
withdrawal of British forces from Egypt by 1956. Eager to compensate for its loss of
influence in the most powerful Arab country, British officials searched for alternative
allies in the Middle East. Attention centered on Iraq after U.S. officials looked to include
Iraq in a defensive military alliance designed to prevent communist infiltration into the
Middle East.14 Known as the Northern Tier, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan would form
the backbone of the Middle East Command (MEC). Within a month of its creation,
Britain joined what it referred to as the Baghdad Pact in the spring of 1955.15
Through this mutual defense agreement, British officials satisfied two key
security concerns. First, British military strategists retained the right to intervene in
Middle Eastern affairs. Any act of aggression against Britain‘s Middle East interests was
subject to legitimate retaliation under this agreement. Second, they could exert influence
without deploying their own military resources needed to enforce it. The Middle East
13

Little, American Orientalism, pp. 57-58.
According to historian Peter Hahn, ―Maintenance of stability was the sine qua non of American postwar
[World War II] policy in the Middle East.‖ See Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 19451956, p 1.
15
The alliance of these states goes by several names including the Northern Tier, the Baghdad Pact, the
Middle East Command (MEC), the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), and the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO).
14

9
Command was an American Cold War initiative; the United States was responsible for
providing it with the necessary military hardware. As a result, British officials could
execute strategic objectives without depleting their own military resources.
The British government‘s success in securing a continued presence in the Middle
East also succeeded in raising the stakes among competing national interests by
superseding international unity. In many respects, this strategy perpetuated the status
quo. Since the end of the First World War, British and French competition for power in
the region led British officials to encourage Arab protests against French rule while
simultaneously accentuating British benevolence in the region. 16 After the Second World
War, the British government yielded to U.S. and French demands for greater access to the
Middle East and its oil reserves. L.J. Butler, a scholar in contemporary British history,
contends that this realization strengthened amicable relations between Britain and the
Arab world. 17
The undermining of a regional collective security arrangement detracts from
Butler‘s conclusion, however. American allies cringed after hearing of British
participation in the Baghdad Pact. Old colonial relationships that had exploited Arabs
tainted efforts to construct new Cold War alliances.18 Under these circumstances,

16

David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the
Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1989), pp. 193-194.
17
L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p.
16.
18
Historians debate America‘s tolerance of the colonial policies of their Western European allies. John
Lewis Gaddis argues that Eisenhower and Dulles walked a tight-rope between imperialist and antiimperialist activity. ―The United States,‖ he writes, ―found itself . . . in the awkward position of having to
balance its anti-colonialism against its alliances [with imperial powers]. Tilting too far in either direction—
by alienating new friends in the Middle East or old friends in Western Europe—could create openings for a
Soviet threat that would endanger them both.‖ See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold
War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 165. Richard Immerman shares similar views
but sees the matter as one dominated by America‘s anti-communist interests. See Richard Immerman, John
Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources, Inc., 1999), p. 155. Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley draw similar conclusions by
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nationalists such as Nasser saw little incentive to endorse Cold War agendas or, more
importantly, to sacrifice his own interests in exchange for perceived British benevolence.
Apprehensive of Nasser‘s involvement in Algeria‘s war for independence and further
imperial erosion, French officials disapproved of any type of Middle East military
alliance. 19 British policy-makers may have addressed pressing security concerns, but
they did so at the cost of international clout among allies and adversaries alike.
French efforts to keep its North African colony of Algeria in 1954 only confirmed
Nasser‘s suspicions. Where British strategists perfected the art of subtle, diplomatic
maneuvering in the Arab world by the 1950s, French officials unleashed the full fury of
their military to rein in Algerian separatists. 20 As one historian put it, ―the Algerian War
was . . . a conflict of peculiar brutality which helped institutionalize torture in the armies,
police and security forces of countries that purported to be civilized.‖21 Evidence of

comparing the Republicans distain for supporting Western European allies via the Marshall Plan, yet
allocating funds for covert operations supporting anti-communist regimes in the Third World. See Stephen
Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 8th ed. (New
York: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 147-148. Other historians, such as H.W. Brands, see the Kennedy
administration as a true proponent for Third World independence movements. See H.W. Brands, The Devil
We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 87. Acting as a
summation of these divergent perspectives, Melvyn Leffler contends that ―Eisenhower and Dulles‖
disguised their ―nuanced‖ activities behind a boisterous rhetoric. See Melvyn Leffler, ―9/11 and American
Foreign Policy,‖ Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 3, (June 2005): p. 411. Regardless of perspective,
national self-interest dictated the Eisenhower‘s administration‘s degree of involvement in repudiating the
policies of its allies or those of anti-colonial independence movements often with little regard for
international opinion.
19
Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 58-66.
20
As several historians rightly contend, British imperial in the Middle East seemed to be the exception
rather than the norm. Caroline Elkins description of British repression of the Kenyan from 1952 to 1960
has expanded the scope of debate of colonial and postcolonial debate. Specifically, the corruption of power
included squalid detention camps, torture, sexual assault, interrogation, and indoctrination of Kenyans to
create, as one reviewer of Elkins‘s work put it, ―a procolonial new citizen.‖ See Caroline Elkins, Imperial
Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britian’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005). See also
Marshall Clough, reviewed work: Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britian’s Gulag in Kenya by
Caroline Elkins, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 885-886; and Kennell
Jackson, reviewed work, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britian’s Gulag in Kenya by Caroline
Elkins, The international Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2006), pp. 158-160.
21
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books,
1994), p. 220.
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Egyptian arms shipments to Algerian rebels further infuriated French commanders. In
addition to fulfilling Nasser‘s pledge to assist Arab neighbors in need, Egyptian weapons
shipments combined with French torture accelerated the pace with which French
strategists were losing control of the war.22 Faced with the news that Nasser agreed to
barter Soviet munitions for Egyptian cotton, French officials wrestled with the prospect
that the Algerian conflict could become a war of attrition.
The proliferation of conventional weapons in the Middle East added to the sense
of insecurity in the international community. Ever since Israel‘s independence in 1948,
policy-makers in Washington aimed to thwart moves towards a regional arms race
between Arabs and Israelis. Maintaining this precarious status quo proved illusive. As
early as 1950, American and British diplomats had tried unsuccessfully to create a
military alliance with Egypt. The prospect of Egypt‘s military acquiring modern,
Western weapons was tantalizing to Egyptian officials; but President Eisenhower‘s
insistence that Egyptian leaders place Cold War regional interests above national interests
made the proposed tripartite coalition untenable. 23 Eager to retaliate against Nasser for
Egypt‘s support of Algerian rebels and Egypt‘s securing Soviet munitions, the French
government—with American consent—authorized the selling of weapons to Israel in
early 1956. 24 Much like British policy, Washington‘s leaders experienced an ironic twist

22

For an articulate analysis of the Algerian War, consult Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution:
Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002).
23
Richard Saunders, ―Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency,‖ Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 1 , (Spring 1985), p. 100
24
Guy Laron‘s working paper on the Czechoslovakian Arms Deal offers detailed insight of the proceedings
from the perspective of Egyptian and Soviet negotiators. See Guy Laron, ―Cutting the Gordian Knot: The
Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal,‖ in Cold War International
History Project Working Paper Series, ed. Christian Ostermann, 55 (February 2007): 1-43.
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where American policies of enforcing an arms embargo conflicted with its attempts to
build regional alliances. 25
To their credit, American officials attempted to entice Nasser with modernization
projects such as providing funds for construction of the Aswan Dam. Infrastructural
improvements such as this one aimed to limit Soviet influence in Egypt while providing
humanitarian relief through socio-economic development. Regrettably, the terms
American, British, and World Bank officials applied to the loans undercut the proposal‘s
intent. Nasser welcomed the West‘s aid in advancing Egyptian self-sufficiency, but
could not agree to the West‘s intrusive terms. World Bank involvement in the affairs of
the Egyptian treasury resurrected disturbing memories of foreign domination. In order to
participate in socio-economic development, Nasser had to conform to Western standards
of international finance. Additional stipulations calling for an Arab-Israeli peace
agreement contributed to Nasser‘s distain. 26 While perhaps reasonable to Western
interests, interference in financial and security matters could not be interpreted by Nasser
as anything other than a loss of Egyptian sovereignty.
In both foreign and domestic matters, Eisenhower‘s chief concern was focused on
maintaining order. Much like his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, the president
operated from a mindset where enforcing order would be restrained so long as everyone
agreed to his brand of authority and amenable to his pace of change. With regard to the
process of decolonization, Eisenhower adopted a protracted approach. Although the
25

Historian John Lewis Gaddis draws similar conclusions. See footnote #8.
Although Douglas Little credits Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and Walt Rostow with wielding
development aid as an instrument to combat communism, it is easy to see that such policies stemmed from
the Eisenhower administration. Regardless of form, American initiatives remained fixated on self-interest
by making modernization synonymous with Cold War conformity. See Little, American Orientalism, pp.
169 and 195-196. Peter Hahn identifies how American officials continued ―subordinating‖ Egyptian
nationalism to the needs of U.S. regional security concerns, which persisted throughout the Suez crisis.
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956, pp. 243, 246-247.
26

13
president‘s pace of change differed from that of international allies, such as Britain and
France, and domestic ones, such as southern segregationists, Eisenhower afforded a
greater degree of leniency. Those provoking greater suspicion, including Nasser and
other members of the non-white world, were rebuked more readily. One reason for this
intolerance stemmed from the fact that, according to anti-colonist Aimé Césaire, Africans
and Asians requested modern facilities while the West remained noncompliant. ―The
colonized man [wanted] to move forward, and the colonizer [held] things back.‖ 27 Given
this context, the premise that Eisenhower required others to submit to his sense of order
and worldview, and the racial bias accompanying it, only perpetuated the protests of
those he alienated.28 As Albert Memmi wrote in his classic work The Colonizer and the
Colonized first published in 1957, ―racism . . . is the highest expression of the colonial
system and one of the most significant features of the colonialist.‖ 29 In an era defined in
part by the pace of decolonization, Eisenhower‘s actions were responsible in part for the
escalation of unrest.
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III

Failure to recognize and respond to the particular interests of other countries
exacerbated tensions and, therefore, the potential for conflict. By the spring of 1956,
American and British policy-makers began distancing themselves from Nasser. The
West‘s withdrawal of funds for the Aswan Dam project in mid-July showed a lack of
consideration for Nasser‘s concerns. With few resources at his disposal, Nasser
nationalized the Suez Canal. Redirecting canal tolls from the Universal Company of the
Maritime Suez Canal to the Egyptian treasury meant that Nasser could still prepare for
the Aswan Dam‘s construction, all while flaunting his authority as an Arab leader in the
face of European imperial impotence. For these reasons, the circumstances proved ideal
for Nasser. His public declaration on 26 July 1956 transformed the last monument to
British imperial authority into a symbol of Egyptian and Arab empowerment.
While Nasser‘s act may have appeared bold and rash, it served also as a
designation of the lengths to which world leaders went to guarantee their own interests.
In preparation for his socio-economic coup, Nasser kept his intentions even from his own
advisers. When he unveiled his plan, he did so not to invite debate but to enlist support.
Dissenting voices were quieted.30 Indeed, Nasser‘s governing philosophy left little room
for alternative perspectives. For example, in outlining his strategy for Egypt and its Arab
neighbors, Nasser‘s plea for greater Arab unity required a more homogeneous ―public
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opinion.‖31 Dissension from Nasser‘s pan-Arab ideology was impermissible.
Independence movements such as the ones in Algeria and Palestine became early
instruments of Nasser‘s pan-Arab cause. Arab institutions that competed against Nasser
became targets for reprisal. 32 Much like Eisenhower, Nasser was not alone in his desire
to consolidate consensus.
Rather than work towards peaceful accords, the initial rounds of diplomacy during
the Suez crisis operated from the presupposition that Egypt must relinquish control of the
canal. During a National Security Council meeting in early August 1956, Vice President
Richard Nixon suggested drafting ―management contracts . . . providing for Egyptian
sovereignty and Western management.‖ Citing evidence to support his case, Nixon
described how successful negotiations between the U.S. and the Philippine government
permitted U.S. use of military bases in the pacific archipelago in exchange for respecting
Philippine sovereignty. 33 Dulles broadened the scope of this idea by proposing that the
Suez Canal function as an international waterway, governed by the international
community.
The negotiations that endorsed Dulles‘s scheme, known as the First and Second
London Conferences, provided little hope of avoiding conflict. Interpreting any
collective administration of the canal as ―‗joint colonialism,‘‖ Nasser refused to
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participate in a conference that rejected Egypt‘s claims of unconditional ownership of the
canal. 34 When a diplomatic mission presented Nasser with the conferences‘
recommendations, tempers flared.
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden‘s decision to initiate military preparations
only compounded the degree of disingenuousness. Within a week of Nasser‘s seizing the
canal, Eden and his advisors began concentrating forces and supplies needed for an
invasion. 35 The coordination Israel‘s invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and Western
Europe‘s response calling for a cease-fire and deployment of military personnel to secure
the Suez Canal alarmed the international community. 36 The prospect of British and
French forces occupying the Canal Zone overshadowed and discredited their sense of
moral legitimacy of acting on the international community‘s behalf. Yet, this was
precisely the argument French and British delegations made in defense of their countries‘
actions.
Fearing a rapid escalation of hostilities, matters surrounding the Suez crisis
moved to the UN Security Council and then to the General Assembly. Ironically, the
34
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British and French delegations‘ posturing used diplomatic channels to legitimize the need
for military intervention rather than prevent it. Unconvincing as these arguments were,
French and British status as permanent members of the Security Council guaranteed
deadlock. The non-permanent Yugoslav delegate‘s motion to move debate to the General
Assembly marked a pivotal shift in the resolution of the crisis, however.
Decision-making shifted from smaller, exclusive groups, which the London
Conferences and UN Security Council characterized, to a larger, inclusive, and more
multilateral forum. As Uruguay‘s UN Representative Enrique Rodrigues Fabregat
opined during the General Assembly debates, ―We [UN member states] all thought that
after the signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco the use of force in the old arbitrary
way had become a thing of the past.‖ India‘s UN delegate Arthur Lall echoed his
colleague‘s views saying that ―this violent approach to the safeguarding of vital interests
is . . . plunging the world into chaos.‖37 These sentiments resonated throughout the UN
General Assembly during the emergency sessions pertaining to the Suez crisis. Besides
focusing attention on a renewed faith in international diplomacy, this popular perspective
challenged the subordinate status multilateral diplomacy played in advancing national
interests.

IV

This new role for the United Nations evolved from several sources that challenged
the prevailing trends preoccupied with securing self-interested conditions. For example,
37
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the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) of 1947 provided a forum whereby newly
independent Asian countries, including most notably India and China, discussed regional
security concerns free from their respective interpretations of world order. According to
historian A.W. Stargardt, attendees to the ARC voiced their own individual concerns,
enhancing the diversity within national delegations, while simultaneously diminishing
advocacy for a particular national interest. ARC‘s chairperson Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
understood nationalism‘s role but argued that ―it must not be allowed [to obstruct]
international development.‖38 Contemporary historians interpret these thoughts as the
earliest expressions of post-WW II ―globalization.‖39 In addition to enhancing
international dialogue, the mentality emerging from the ARC offered an alternative to the
rigid, doctrinal assumptions of states preoccupied with their own security concerns.
The goodwill emanating from the ARC helped inspire the Bandung Conference of
1955 and the launching of the non-aligned movement. This new collection of states
emerged independently from U.S. and Soviet Cold War paradigms, European
colonialism, and other contexts where national interest reigned supreme. While
susceptible to ideological bickering between communist and anti-communist
perspectives, the Bandung Conference represented more eclectic interests that challenged
Cold War or colonialist ambitions. 40 As Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon,
put it during his opening remarks at Bandung:
The pass to which humanity has been brought by the domination and
doctrine of force is the most vivid demonstration of the bankruptcy of
38
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force. Of what advantage is it to hold sway over vast territories, to have at
one‘s command innumerable armies, to be able at the touch of a button to
unleash the deadliest weapons science can invent, if, with all this, we are
unable to rid ourselves of fear and hysteria and despair?41
Put another way, the methods powerful nations used on weak ones were self-defeating.
Instead of assimilation, blind pursuit of national interests only bred international anxiety.
In many cases, international organizations such as the United Nations acted as a
counterweight combating these fears by intervening in crises on behalf of a more
collective set of interests.
The complexities surrounding the UN‘s mission also reflected those aspects of its
new leadership. After his election as United Nations Secretary General in the spring of
1953, Dag Hjalmar Agre Carl Hammarskjöld began moving the organization in the
direction of this new pluralistic philosophical approach. However, the transformation
was not as smooth as previous analysts have depicted. As so many scholars have
described, Hammarskjöld was somewhat of an enigma. 42 On the one hand, he entered
office with a dedicated sense of ―interdependent principles.‖ On the other hand, he based
these principles on his traditional European heritage of ―liberal democracy.‖
Unapologetic in wanting to assert UN authority, Hammarskjöld nevertheless respected
traditional avenues of direct diplomacy between states. He understood the United
Nations‘ paradoxical role as a forum where states willingly transferred power to the
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world body to pressure member states into obeying the principles of the UN Charter. 43
Hammarskjöld revered the Charter, proclaiming at one point that the principles within the
Charter eclipsed the organization responsible for enacting them. 44 As a result,
Hammarskjöld remained, on the one hand, a deeply committed international civil servant
who, on the other hand, seemed reluctant to seize the initiative yet wielded it skillfully
once invited to do so. While contradictory, these dynamic qualities contributed to
Hammarskjöld‘s uncanny ability to gain a multilateral understanding of international
conflicts.45
Hammarskjöld‘s upbringing and early career influenced his philosophical
approach to international affairs. As the son of Sweden‘s one-time Prime Minister and
accomplished scholar of law and economics, Hammarskjöld developed an early
sensitivity to politics and the diplomatic skills that came with it. His early professional
experience was a blend of serving as a ―nonpolitical [Swedish] civil servant‖ and as a
representative to international institutions including the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation. According to his biographer, Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld
struggled with an unfulfilled sense of self that was not satiated ―until he became [UN]
Secretary General.‖46 Hammarskjöld‘s apolitical mindset, spurred on by his sense
destiny, served him well as the world‘s leading international civil servant of the 1950s.
Evidence of Hammarskjöld‘s pioneering efforts to reform the United Nations
emerged within weeks of his taking office. Faced with Senator Joseph McCarthy‘s
43
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(Republican-Wisconsin) allegations of subversive conduct among the UN‘s American
staff members, Hammarskjöld trod delicately to win concessions allowing him to
evaluate UN employees according to an independent set of standards instead of one
dictated by UN member states.47 By 1955, Communist China‘s sentencing of American
airmen captured during the Korean War and Algeria‘s revolt against French colonial rule,
launched about the same time, provided Hammarskjöld and the UN with opportunities to
represent a broader diplomatic perspective. Indeed, Hammarskjöld‘s philosophy took
root within the UN‘s international bureaucracy precisely when national leaders were
pursuing doctrinal world order most earnestly.

V

Critics of UN effectiveness may argue that the United Nations‘ role during the
Suez crisis merely reflected the status quo remedies of national interests acting through
the General Assembly rather than the more traditional venue of the Security Council. To
the critics‘ credit, Hammarskjöld‘s initial reluctance to assume a leading role in
managing the crisis suggests that he wished for the Great Powers to resolve the dispute.
As debate progressed in the General Assembly, however, a more dynamic set of
delegates seized the initiative intent on galvanizing consensus. As Canada‘s Foreign
Minister, Lester Pearson negotiated with other UN delegations to enlist support for a
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to re-establish peace in the wake of the Suez
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War. While diplomatically creative, skeptics argue that Pearson‘s ulterior motives sought
to satisfy his national interests of repairing the breach in Anglo-American relations that
the war had precipitated.48 However, other historians point out that Canadian officials
disagreed with their British and American counterparts over the extent of UN
participation as early as February 1956.49
Equally important was the way in which Pearson campaigned for creating the
UNEF. Instead of presenting his idea as a fait accompli, Pearson canvassed delegates of
the General Assembly for their input.50 Additionally, India‘s representative to the UN,
Arthur Lall, along with representatives from over a dozen other UN member states,
championed the idea that Hammarskjöld organize cease-fire efforts in the Middle East.
These proposals enjoyed overwhelming support in the General Assembly. Once charged
with leading the peace effort, Hammarskjöld shed his hesitancy, committing his full
attention and energy to the task at hand.
These initiatives proved particularly effective. The degree of transference and
multilateralism exhibited in the peace agreements served as the main reason for
successful conflict resolution. The diligent efforts of Pearson and Lall as well as many
others oversaw deployment of the UN-sponsored emergency force designed to bring
48
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peace to Suez while vowing to respect Egyptian sovereignty. In return, Nasser agreed to
honor the canal‘s significance as an international artery of world trade. As a result, the
international community—including Britain and France—recognized Egypt‘s jurisdiction
while Egyptian officials enforced nearly unfettered access to the Canal Zone. In other
words, the differing parties labored to uphold the interests of each other, leading to a
more resilient peace agreement.
Steps taken towards enacting an Arab-Israeli peace agreement proved more
complex. Deployment of the UNEF meant that a considerable portion of Egyptian-Israeli
national security concerns became the UN‘s responsibility. 51 Though slow to withdraw
from the Sinai Peninsula, Israeli forces respected the UNEF mandate establishing a buffer
zone that separated the belligerents. UNEF diligence during its decade in the field
virtually eliminated the abundant number of border clashes that had contributed to the
heightening of Arab-Israeli tensions prior to the Suez crisis. The Arab-Israeli conflict
remained, but the presence of UNEF succeeded in providing a measure of regional
stability that has rarely been rivaled.
As the Suez crisis abated, leaders of the major powers moved rapidly to re-gain
the initiative. The first step in doing so returned the United Nations to its subordinate
status. The Eisenhower administration contributed to this effort when the president
issued his foreign policy doctrine authorizing U.S. intervention in any confrontation in
which Middle East countries requested assistance in defending against international
51
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communism. Besides shoring up the U.S.‘s national interests in the region, the
Eisenhower Doctrine conveyed a remarkable lack of confidence in the UN‘s ability to
handle international crises.
When tensions flared in Lebanon in the summer of 1958, Hammarskjöld and the
UN respected Eisenhower‘s lead. The opportunity for multilateral action was lost.
Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun could not afford to seem any less resolved
than his country‘s internal instability made him seem. Though beholden to UN principles
and wishing to remain independent from pan-Arab regional politics, Chamoun was forced
to request American intervention. Bound by its doctrine, the U.S. government could not
entertain the suggestion of ideological input other than its own. Hammarskjöld respected
these motives as he always had and—perhaps—as he should have; yet doing so
marginalized the good faith upon which multilateral diplomacy constituted itself.
Chamoun‘s first choice to remain independent of alliances with more powerful states who
could manipulate the Lebanese government was no longer an option. Had the United
Nations acted in a capacity similar to that of the Suez crisis, Chamoun may have had an
alternative that catered to his specific needs.
The United Nations enjoyed somewhat greater latitude in the Congo crisis of the
early 1960s. At the dawn of the new decade, the Congo‘s transition to independence was
becoming a more erratic affair. As Belgian bureaucrats relinquished control, internal
dissent between rival factions split the loyalties of the international community. 52 The
domestic and international rift posed new challenges for UN officials. Though successful
in securing peace, UN efforts led by Hammarskjöld and Ralph Bunche came at a tragic
cost. The organization‘s prestige declined with Hammarskjöld‘s unexpected death in
52
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1961 and the refusal of some UN member states to fulfill their fiscal responsibilities in
protest over the outcome of the Congo crisis. According to historian Jim Haskins, UN
member states appeared to be ―losing their commitment to world government.‖53 The
culmination of these circumstances makes the Congo crisis somewhat of a Pyrrhic victory
for the United Nations.

VI

With the loss of the UN‘s interdependent architect, world leaders turned their
attention to expanding their influence over intergovernmental and quasi-governmental
organizations in both domestic and international spheres. Domestically, Egyptian
President Nasser monopolized numerous professional associations in pursuit of his
monolithic, pan-Arab ambitions. Internationally, Nasser utilized the United Arab
Republic and the Arab League to minimize dissenting voices from within the Arab world.
By 1960, however, rival institutions such as the Organization for Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) succeeded in dividing the Arab world between oil-rich and oil-poor
states.54 France‘s leaders embraced their European neighbors during the 1957 Treaty of
Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC).
Numerous scholars have investigated the effects of private interests on
globalization. Several specialists, such as John Lonsdale, conclude that private sector
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exploitation has resulted in a ―decivilizing form of globalization.‖55 Like so many other
post-Suez organizations, the EEC championed greater economic, social, and cultural
unity among its members while simultaneously encouraging the integration of developing
countries into the world community. Acceptance in the ―world community‖ often
involved newly independent countries strengthening ties to their one-time imperial
overseers. For example, in 1958, French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle created the
French Community, where former French colonies were encouraged to seek
reconciliation with France. ―Such ties,‖ writes Frank Costigliola, ―would demonstrate
France‘s worldwide interests and sympathy for former colonial peoples.‖ 56 The resulting
paradox left EEC members hailing the emergence of independent states in Asia and
Africa while simultaneously marginalizing their significance by creating a new and
exclusive supranationalist framework. U.S. policy-makers followed suit by creating
institutions designed to advance the country‘s ideological, cultural, and commercial
interests. In doing so, senior government officials persisted in creating outlets where
self-interest could be disguised in broader, universal terms.
Specialized institutions such as OPEC, the EEC, and others challenged more
inclusive organization such as the United Nations in pursuing a multilateral agenda.
These new international structures represented a narrow set of interests that world leaders
favored over broader consensus located within the UN General Assembly. As a result,
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decision-making within these exclusive circles replaced genuine debate within more
multilateral forums. Thus, the single most important lesson emanating from the Suez
crisis—the importance of open exchanges of diplomacy in crisis management—was lost.

VII

Several notable historians and other scholars of the Suez crisis have over looked
this aspect. Historians such as Peter Hahn, Cole Kingseed, Salim Yaqub, Amos Yoder,
and others give varying degrees of credit to President Eisenhower and his administration
for taking matters to the United Nations.57 Typically, the United States is cast as playing
a leading role thwarting British, French, and Israeli belligerence. 58 Matthew Holland
argues that direct, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States ―could
have prevented the British and French invasion and made America an Arab hero.‖ Only
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President Eisenhower‘s campaign for re-election and Secretary of State Dulles‘s severe
health problems let this opportunity slip. 59 The historical record, however, proves that
these conclusions may be oversimplified. The administration‘s initial inclination was to
handle the matter through the London Conferences, which as mentioned earlier, placed
preconditions on negotiations. Once the crisis turned to conflict, the U.S. delegation to
the United Nations disagreed with the General Assembly‘s mandated deployment of an
impartial peacekeeping force. Instead, America‘s UN ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr. called for returning the Middle East to the status quo ante bellum. Yet, the
deployment of the UNEF marked a significant shift in the status quo. Additionally, of all
the calls for a cease-fire, including one by U.S. officials, the UN‘s appeal was the only
one all parties observed. Under these circumstances, the Eisenhower administration
played a minor role in rallying the General Assembly and maximizing its influence.
Other historians use different means to reach similar conclusions. In his chapter
titled ―The United Nations Fails,‖ Herman Finer accuses Dulles of ―‗stringing along‘‖
Britain and France to mask his own cowardice in the face of ―Russian power.‖ Contrary
to more contemporary assessments, Finer implies that UN ineffectiveness in averting war
resulted from decisions made by U.S. cabinet officials. By attributing UN success to
U.S. actions, Finer disregards the General Assembly‘s role as well as that of
Hammarskjöld, Pearson, and Lall. 60 Frederick Marks pays generous credit to
Hammarskjöld‘s abilities during the crisis but maintains that the United Nations remained
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ineffective because national interests remained dominant.61 While accurate in assessing
the aftermath of the Suez crisis, Marks‘s analysis deprives the United Nations of due
credit during the crisis itself. The multilateral diplomacy practiced in the early weeks of
November 1956 superseded the interests of any one nation, however brief it may have
been.
Non-Western historiography accentuates many of the same attitudes as Western
historians. Similar to American scholars, Mohamed Heikal, one of Nasser‘s most trusted
advisors, agrees that the U.S. was largely responsible for organizing world pressure to
force the removal of Israeli troops from Sinai. In another instance, Heikal describes a
scene where Nasser implied that Hammarskjöld was little more than an unwitting puppet
of American and Israeli interests.62 As a Senior Fellow at the Shalem Center in
Jerusalem, Michael Oren describes a similar situation from the Israeli perspective.
Defining the relationship between Israeli Prime Minister David-Ben Gurion and
Hammarskjöld as ―ambivalent adversaries,‖ Oren points out how Israel ―harbored great
resentment toward the UN.‖63 According to historian Mark Kramer, the Soviets
interpreted UN actions in Suez as a sign to accelerate unilateralist policies in Hungary. 64
Clearly, numerous historians of the Suez crisis say little that is positive regarding United
Nations involvement and relegate the world body to a dependent and often ridiculed role.
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VIII

Comprehending the crisis from a multilateral perspective requires an overview of
events relating to the Suez Canal and the UN‘s involvement in the Suez crisis. Chapter
One of my paper provides an overview of the relationship between national interests and
multilateral dialog from mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. Particular
attention addresses Ferdinand de Lesseps‘s undaunted negotiations in promoting the Suez
Canal project, its effects on British policy-making as well as an impressionable Zionist
movement, and the various initiatives that contested this prevailing mindset as a more
genuine multilateral perspective emerged in the postwar, post-colonial world. At a time
when adversarial world powers huddled in their respective spheres of influence, new rival
powers such as India and China initiated a dialog at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference
(ARC). The ARC‘s constructive meetings conveyed a willingness to negotiate openly,
which slowly grew in popularity.
Chapter Two examines the continued growth of these popular trends and the
concurrent pursuit of enforcing a stricter sense of world order by the leading world
powers. During the Eisenhower administration, America‘s Cold War security interests to
preserve the status quo clashed with British and French imperial interests as well as Arab
nationalist fervor and Israeli security concerns. These attitudes dictated policy formation
and responses among the Western powers that escalated the likelihood of conflict. Rather
than accommodate nationalist movements in Iran and Egypt and the diplomatic latitude
that they required, leaders of Western governments interpreted these events by using their
own nationally-interested criteria. Nasser‘s adoption of identical standards in the case of
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the Algerian War, the Czechoslovakian arms deal, the proposed Aswan Dam deal, and
antagonizing border raids between Egypt and Israel made regional security nearly
impossible. The irony involved in the headlong pursuit of security interests leading to
greater insecurity left few alternatives for the genuine reconciliation of differences.
Fortunately, efforts to implement these rigid agendas coincided with the United
Nations‘ shift toward engaging in more multilateral diplomacy. When Dag
Hammarskjöld was elected to the post of Secretary General, the organization succeeded
in diffusing crises that individual nations had promulgated. One such example concerned
American pilots held as prisoners in Communist China ever since the Korean War.
Acting on behalf of international opinion and in the interest of good faith, Hammarskjöld
negotiated the pilots‘ release. Quick to transform their compliance into their own public
relations victory, however, Chinese officials touted their benevolent goodwill at the
Bandung Conference.
Named for the Indonesian city where the conference convened, the Bandung
conference of 1955 became a forum where independent acclaim and interdependent
cooperation co-existed. On the one hand, several prominent world leaders from the
African-Asian bloc, including Nasser and Communist China‘s Premier Zhou Enlai,
manipulated the event to further their own goals. On the other hand, the meeting
symbolized the emergence of the non-aligned nations‘ intent on achieving socioeconomic independence and exerting influence through international institutions such as
the United Nations. Both the UN‘s actions under Hammarskjöld and the Bandung
Conference of 1955 demonstrated the complex divide between national interest and
multilateralism around which the Suez crisis revolved.
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The next three chapters address the Suez crisis and the concurrent Hungarian
crisis. A meticulous investigation of the diplomatic deadlock encountered between
Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 and the eruption of hostilities
three months later reveals that static and erroneous perceptions only heightened tensions.
Analysis of the London Conferences and the diplomatic maneuvering both outside and
inside these meetings demonstrates how no national leader approached the problem with
an adequate sense of objectivity. America‘s preoccupation with re-establishing an
antiquated status quo was mired in futility. British and French imperial interests secretly
supported Israel‘s quest for territorial security. Meanwhile, the Arab community in the
Middle East consolidated themselves under Nasser‘s pan-Arab banner. So self-consumed
were these various interests that the UN played no role in the Suez crisis until October
1956. Once recruited to handle the crisis, UN officials focused on the alarming
disintegration of border security between Israel and its neighbors rather than wade
through the exhaustive ideologically-charged arguments.
Similar circumstances existed behind the Iron Curtain. Contrary to his spring
1956 speech in which he championed the concept of pluralist consensus, Nikita
Khrushchev faced his own crisis when Poles and Hungarians began plotting a more
independent course. Like Western leaders, Khrushchev stoked the fires of crisis by
masking his desire for order beneath an illusive veneer of multilateral legitimacy. The
resulting confusion dispirited Communist party subordinates who initially withdrew
Soviet troops from Hungary only to return days later as the Suez crisis turned violent.
The key difference between the Hungarian crisis and the Suez crisis was the UN‘s
temporary ascendance to power in Middle East matters.

33
Chapter Four focuses on the General Assembly‘s discussion of the Suez crisis in
late October and early November. The extensive emergency sessions leading to
compromise and the creation of the first peacekeeping force demonstrate that agreement
was not based on the assumptions of a select few, but rather reflected a broader
consensus. As architect of the UNEF, Canada‘s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson built a
wide base of support prior to announcing his proposal. In conjunction with Pearson‘s
plan, India‘s UN representative, Arthur Lall, and delegates from eighteen other nations
introduced their own draft resolution charging Hammarskjöld with the task of overseeing
the cease-fire process. As a result, re-establishing stability through more inclusive means
promoted the likelihood of establishing a more resilient resolution.
Yet, as examined in Chapter Five, the triumph of multilateral diplomacy receded
as national leaders manipulated the UN‘s diplomatic success to benefit national interests.
Short- and long-term consequences of the Suez crisis shared in marginalizing the UN‘s
role as a more dynamic, independent institution. The Eisenhower Doctrine and Treaty of
Rome set the course for U.S. and European policy priorities. French reconciliation with
Germany aimed to establish an economic order independent of American infringement. 65
With British backing, America‘s policy in the Middle East pursued well-established Cold
War objectives hoping to contain communism via proxy allies. The Lebanese crisis of
1958 serves as an excellent example of how these Cold War concerns deprived
Lebanon‘s political leaders of alternatives that could be tailored to address their concerns.
The Soviets followed much the same course as the Americans for the remainder of the
Cold War. Pan-Arab nationalism quickly lost focus, consumed by more immediate local
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concerns: petroleum, the plight of the Palestinians, and the growing appeal of Islamic
fundamentalism.
The growth of non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations proved
especially pivotal in advancing national interests. As a result of these efforts, the
international harmony generated by the UN‘s initiatives yielded to new, rival
organizations. Appointed by the leadership of participating countries, executives within
organizations such as OPEC and the EEC promoted uniformity of interests while
ignoring serious ruptures within and between communities. OPEC paid little attention to
matters outside the petroleum trade, leaving a seriously divided Arab society to cope with
the new commercial classification between oil-producing and non-oil-producing states.66
In addition to commercial concerns, states began consolidating cultural authority. Where
Europe‘s Treaty of Rome supported economic development in places such as Africa on
the one hand, the treaty promoted European supranational solidarity by coordinating
social and cultural programs among its members to distinguish itself more clearly from
the international community. Nasser employed similar tactics when implementing
strategies to guarantee popular compliance with his political agenda. To thwart domestic
infiltrations by political rivals such as the Society of Muslim Brothers, Nasser created a
network of government-sponsored professional associations. By 1965, members of the
United States Congress proposed federal funding for private organizations to extend
cultural and economic goodwill around the globe.
Not surprisingly, some scholars warned of the consequences that disguising
government policies as private initiatives might have on society and self-identity.
Assessing Hannah Arendt‘s 1958 book, The Human Condition, scholar and author Peter
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Watson believes that Arendt identifies ―the essential difficulty with modern society:‖
people were becoming increasingly disconnected with politics and frustrated with the
idea that an individual could not affect change in an increasingly interconnected world.67
In other words, the masses turned their backs on the promise of independent
internationalism and reverted to finding sanctuary in the advancement of national
interests. Astute intellectuals understood the dire consequences of such sentiments.
Writing in 1961, Daniel Boorstin warned that the United States suffered most from its
―illusions‖ and urged his countrymen not to ―make the world in our image.‖ 68 Others,
including Neil Postman, reiterated these concerns in the 1980s. 69

IX

The warnings of past decades appear to be coming to fruition.

Numerous

scholars note the ―intrinsic‖ role private organizations play in government policy
making.70 While some organizations have aided in hard fought struggles for freedom and
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equality and thereby enhanced ―civil society,‖ these institutions have done so by creating
an international relations environment emblematic of the governments sponsoring their
activities. Instead of one, primary institution, such as the United Nations, where differing
interests converge and negotiate, an abundance of institutions advance the principles of a
particular set of interests. Where some historians herald the arrival of these NGOs as
evidence of a burgeoning ―global consciousness,‖ others describe how they can
undermine moderate governments.71 Contrary to the UN‘s role during the Suez crisis,
private associations act as the most popular instrument for states to antagonize other
states rather than promote compromise. By 1998, government funding accounted for
roughly 40 percent of NGO budgets.72 Equally disturbing is the paradoxical nature of
having a multitude of private groups encouraging economic and ideological uniformity
while an institution such as the United Nations negotiates less successfully betweens
disparate groups.73 Eager to remain relevant, the UN works closely with private
organizations at the expense of its own influence. As a result, interdependency among
differing points of view becomes a lost art.
Comprehensive investigation of the Suez crisis from this perspective requires the
use of several archival resources. Transcripts of UN Security Council and General
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Assembly meetings including analysis of emergency sessions pertaining to the Suez and
Hungarian crises are extremely valuable. These records are available electronically at
various regional repositories including the New York Public Library and the Library of
Congress. UN Annual Reports also offer additional insight into Hammarskjöld‘s sense of
institutional mission. Records within the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
provide a thorough understanding of the attitudes taken by senior executive branch
officials as well as cabinet and national security staff. Materials located at the National
Archives in College Park, Maryland record the views and perspectives of U.S. embassy
staff and provide first-hand reactions to international developments. Combined with the
wealth of narratives, biographies, and collected primary documents regarding the Suez
crisis and its aftermath, the lost art of interdependent diplomacy becomes a matter
deserving greater attention as the effects of international affairs grow more immediate.
Viewed from this perspective, a new understanding emerges from the UN‘s
involvement in the Suez Crisis of 1956. More than any other example, the organization‘s
participation in resolving the crisis demonstrated its ability to act independently of any
one set of interests—particularly the interests of the five permanent members of the
Security Council. With this in mind, world order is a concept that is better achieved
through multilateral diplomacy rather than through the nationally-interested concerns of a
particular nation. More inclusive approaches, involving the UN‘s perceptive leadership
and the exchange of international opinions within the UN General Assembly, create a
more robust sense of international commitment. This multilateral approach not only
facilitated circumstances necessary for resolving the Suez crisis, but also provided a
successful course of action for the enforcement of peace. While world leaders agreed to
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the UN‘s conditions for peace, they rejected the means by which it was achieved. Since
1956, world leaders redoubled their efforts to redefine multilateral discourse by
monopolizing circumstances surrounding diplomatic negotiation. Much like trends
emerging from the late nineteenth century, perceptions of multilateralism remain
beholden to public and private interests within nations rather than the interactions
between nations. In many cases, the new definition cultivates crisis by ostracizing
alternative perspectives and undermining the efforts of creating a vibrant international
system. Over half a century later, the Suez crisis demonstrates the need for national
leaders to respect multilateral diplomacy rather than re-create it in their own selfinterested image.

39

Chapter I

Disingenuous Consensus: the Subjugation of Multilateral
Diplomacy from the 1850s to the 1950s and Its Impact on the Suez
Crisis of 1956

In many respects, the diplomatic maneuvering that led to the Suez Canal‘s
construction in 1869 factored into the positions of national leaders taken during the Suez
Crisis of 1956. As the canal‘s chief lobbyist and architect, Ferdinand de Lesseps
appealed to a host of conflicting national interests to gain support for the canal, which
was to serve as an example of internationalist harmony. Ignoring the irony, de Lesseps
forged ahead with creating the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal.
Originally conceived as a multi-national conglomerate, the company enjoyed little
official support from European powers, including Great Britain. Stubborn political
opposition in London waned over the course of the next decade as Britons reconsidered
the canal‘s economic and strategic benefits.
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As sentiments changed, British politicians and policy-makers began mimicking de
Lesseps‘s campaigning technique. Witnessing de Lesseps‘s ability to influence
governing officials by catering to their national interests, observers realized that the
Frenchman had also fused these independent interests together to convey a sense of
multilateral destiny that the canal would generate, thus fulfilling his own entrepreneurial
interests. Nineteenth century British policy-makers employed similar measures to extend
their own unilateral economic, strategic, and colonial interests over the canal. British
policy remained largely unchanged during the events comprising the Suez Crisis of 1956.
To those officials who inherited this mindset, the Suez crisis loomed as an incident
without end, mainly because the more inclusive and, therefore, authentic multilateral tack
required for successful conflict resolution was antithetical to British interests.
Meanwhile, early Arab and Jewish nationalists followed de Lesseps‘s strategy in
marshaling heterogeneous sentiments to suit their own hegemonic purposes.
Unfortunately, for Egyptian nationalists such as Ahmed Urabi, efforts to thwart British
and French incursion in the 1880s failed. Zionists, on the other hand, enjoyed greater
success. De Lesseps‘s organizational and diplomatic skills inspired those such as
Theodore Herzl, who were eager to establish their own non-governmental interest groups.
Herzl used de Lesseps‘s Suez Canal Company as a model for his own Zionist ambitions.
The combination of national and ethnic interests directly affected the animosities
fermenting in the long ascent to the Suez crisis. The progression of these events and the
characteristics shared among them demonstrate how the Suez Crisis of 1956 served as the
culmination of a series of crises where key leaders disguised their particular sense of
world order beneath a more palpable, multilateral perspective.
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I

Over the course of its lifetime, the Suez Canal has helped redefine the relationship
between governmental and non-governmental interests. The growth of entrepreneurial
influence encroached rapidly upon matters once relegated to traditional diplomacy. This
new development benefited de Lesseps greatly. Once in the service of France‘s elite
diplomatic corps, Ferdinand de Lesseps left public service to become the self-proclaimed
ambassador of the Suez Canal project by the 1850s. Favorable personal relations with
the French imperial family and the head of the Egyptian government provided de Lesseps
with an advantage in carrying out his colossal business proposition.
Like any good businessman, de Lesseps used any means of nationally-interested
flattery to convince his audience of the importance of his engineering marvel, the Suez
Canal. When addressing his cousin Eugenie de Montijo, wife of the French Emperor
Louis-Napoleon, de Lesseps described the proposed canal as a monument to French
imperial industrialization. To woo the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Pasha al-Said,
whom de Lesseps had known since childhood, the Frenchmen thought that the canal
would serve as ―a glorious record for [Mohammad Said‘s] reign‖ and ―an inexhaustible
source of wealth for Egypt.‖ Continuing on in somewhat of a non-sequitur, de Lesseps
described how the canal would also revitalize the Ottoman Empire, thus demonstrating
that its better days lay ahead.74
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The common theme running throughout these presentations illustrates the
mutually exclusive means de Lesseps used to garner support from the various parties.
While these tactics were neither original nor surprising, de Lesseps‘s methods generated
a false sense of consensus from contradictory interests. Instead of working to bridge gaps
among competing national interests, de Lesseps tailored his ambitions and diplomatic
strategy to serve these competing interests. As a result, de Lesseps‘s approach helped
fuel later confrontations by misrepresenting consensus. By 1956, American and Soviet
cold war security, British and French imperialism, as well as Egyptian and Israeli
nationalism collided in their presentation of self-interest as selfless interest.
In addition to forming the basis of de Lesseps‘s sales pitch, delusion also
pervaded his business model. Nearly four years after acquiring the rights and titles to
build the canal and collect canal tolls over the course of a ninety-nine year lease, de
Lesseps set about creating the Suez Canal Company responsible for completing
construction. Ideally, de Lesseps hoped to have ―all Western Powers‖ participating as
major shareholders of his company‘s stock. All of the 400,000 shares would be divided
between eight countries. Minor shareholders such as the United States and Portugal had
access to 20,000 shares a piece. France and Britain each had 80,000 shares set aside.
When the stocks were made available in November 1858 at a sum of 500 francs per
share, however, de Lesseps‘s scenario disintegrated. According to historian Hugh
Schonfield, ―the issue [of stock] would have failed completely had it not been for the fine
response of France and Egypt.‖ Although disseminated more broadly across nineteen
countries, France and Egypt controlled over ninety-six percent of all the company‘s
shares. Of the nineteen countries that bought initial stock in the Suez Company, only six
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held 1,000 shares or more.75 Yet, despite high concentrations of company securities, de
Lesseps insisted that the canal would benefit international commerce and
communication.76 When combined with de Lesseps‘s penchant for presenting plans to fit
his audiences‘ ambitions, the incompatibility between a national interest-oriented sense
of world order and a more multilateral dialogue becomes clear. Support for the canal
operated from interests that not only competed with one another, but also contested any
sense of multilateral harmony. Rather than comprehend these divergent complexities, de
Lesseps believed that they were interconnected. He manipulated both for his own
purposes, but the very nature of his approach was, at best, disingenuous toward
constructing a more genuine consensus. For de Lesseps, the citizens of nineteen different
countries wanting a preverbal ―piece of the action‖ represented an international mandate.
He remained less concerned about where the bulk of shares resided or what impact that
could have in international affairs.
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II

Apathy within the British government turned to alarm once it learned that almost
all of the profits from canal traffic would be consolidated in French and Egyptian
treasuries. England‘s Prime Minister, Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston, remained the
project‘s chief opponent. As a nineteenth century liberal, Palmerston thought that
economics, not politics, should determine the issue. As Palmerston‘s biographer, Herbert
Bell, points out, the prime minister opposed not so much the canal, but the conditions
under which it was conceived and the ramifications it would have on Europe‘s balance of
power. Palmerston argued that France had pursued the canal project ―in hostility to the
interests and policy of England.‖ He feared that the canal would transform the
Mediterranean Sea ―into a French lake‖ threatening British imperial security and access
to India. Lastly, Palmerston fretted over implications the canal held for the Ottoman
Empire. Britain supported the Turks as a bulwark against Russian ambitions in eastern
and central Asia. Completion of the Suez Canal would make Egypt more independent
from Turkish control, thus weakening Britain‘s regional ally, while simultaneously
bringing Egypt under French influence and providing Russia with an additional target
should it wish to invade the Middle East.77 Palmerston might have succeeded in
thwarting de Lesseps‘s plans had it not been for a divided British public. For a time,
Parliament and the British people agreed, but small cracks in the public support became
large fissures by 1858 and 1859.
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Advocates for the Suez Canal included Palmerston‘s political opposition and the
public‘s perception of British world dominance once cultivated, ironically enough, by
Palmerston himself. One of Palmerston‘s critics was William Gladstone who objected to
the prime minister‘s Anglo-centric outlook.78 Another parliamentarian, sensing political
opportunity, took more extraordinary measures to not only criticize government policy,
but also facilitate its collapse. On a visit to Paris in December 1856, the aging Member
of Parliament Benjamin Disraeli became friends with Ralph Earle, a young British
attaché at the Paris embassy. As biographer Sarah Bradford puts it, both men were
highly critical of Palmerston‘s government and shared a ―passion for secrecy and
intrigue.‖79 From 1857 through 1858, Earle supplied Disraeli with ―secret information‖
for use as political ammunition against Palmerston. Political intrigue became diplomatic
intrigue when Earle began passing information on to French officials and reporting his
encounters to Disraeli. According to Robert Blake:
[Earle] gave [Napoleon III] a summary of the case which might be
published by the French Government against Palmerston, and advised the
[French] Emperor to revive the Suez Canal scheme . . . in order to
emphasize British dependence on French goodwill in the East. In effect,
[Earle] was inciting Napoleon to pursue an anti-British policy in the hope
that the resulting fracas would bring down Palmerston . . . . The absence of
clear evidence about Disraeli‘s attitude cannot absolve him from
complicity. It is very unlikely that Earle would have written as he did
unless he had good reason to expect a favorable reception. 80
By December 1859, such intrigue had not removed the prime minister from office, but it
had fractured the nation‘s public opinion. The Times favored construction of the canal as
long as it was ―essentially British.‖ 81 Days later, Palmerston wrote J.T. Delane, the
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newspaper‘s editor, to repeat his objections. 82 Nearly eight months after construction on
the canal began Palmerston‘s arguments against political involvement in the project were
disintegrating.
To some extent, Palmerston was responsible for his political predicament.
According to another of his biographers, the prime minister became a victim of his own
popular success. To buoy his mass approval prior to 1859, Palmerston acquiesced to
popular perceptions ―of Britain‘s giving the law to the world,‖ but this mentality did not
dictate Palmerston‘s meticulously crafted and pragmatic foreign policy. 83 In many
respects, Palmerston maintained the diplomatic practices established during the Congress
of Vienna. After 1815, harmony among Europe‘s leading states required a measure of
latitude between honoring an international ―pact of restraint‖ while preserving a nation‘s
freedom of self-interested ―mobility.‖84 Keeping within these perimeters helped maintain
peace—not by imposing order—but by appealing to the competing interests of order. By
the 1860s, these two diverging approaches, national interests versus multilateral
diplomacy, created political friction for Palmerston. 85 Almost a century later, a similar
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quandary applied to the Suez Crisis of 1956 as the international community, represented
by the United Nations, came to terms with its constituent members without sacrificing its
objectivity as an internationalist arbiter.
During the 1860s, both Palmerston and Gladstone labored to improve Britain‘s
relations with Egypt once canal construction began. Not until Benjamin Disraeli became
Prime Minister in 1874, however, did the British government chart a more unilateral
course in policy-making. International affairs of the early 1870s exhibited swift,
converging economic currents that played to Disraeli‘s political strengths. For much of
the nineteenth century, Egypt had prospered in the cotton-growing industry. During the
American Civil War, the northern embargo of southern cotton exports increased Egypt‘s
annual export profits from one million pounds sterling in 1860 to nearly eleven million
pounds sterling by 1865. Careless monetary policies and expensive modernization
efforts, however, left Egypt financially over-extended and suffering from inflation. With
the resumption of America‘s cotton trade by 1866, prices plummeted leaving the viceroy
and his successor, Ismail Pasha, few resources for paying the nation‘s suffocating debt.
By the mid-1870s, Egyptian debt approached 100 million pounds with millions more
being added for overdue interest payments. Among its few worthwhile assets were the
nearly 177,000 shares of Suez stock the Egyptian government purchased to help fund the
canal‘s construction.
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III

Opened on the eve of the new decade, the canal quickly became an investor‘s
nightmare. Shares lost over half their value by 1871. The shares rebounded by 1875, but
Ismail needed cash desperately to avoid defaulting on immense loan interest payments.
Having already mortgaged his shares to raise cash, Ismail had no choice but to announce
the sale of these securities which would yield no dividends and possess no voting rights
on the company‘s board until 1895. In the summer of 1875, he set his price at four
million pounds.
As England‘s newly elected prime minister, Disraeli jumped at the opportunity to
fulfill his imperial ambitions and acquire almost half of the canal‘s shares in a single
stroke. Disraeli pounced for several reasons. First, eighty percent of the canal‘s traffic
flew the Union Jack. While still only accounting for about ten percent of England‘s
world trade total, the waterway‘s economic value benefited Britain‘s interests undeniably.
Second, by 1873, British creditors controlled more than half of the debts extended to prop
up Egypt‘s economy. 86 Defaulting on these debts threatened England‘s creditors as much
as Egypt‘s debtors. Third, a recent mutiny in India and Russia‘s continued interest in the
Middle East and Central Asia made the canal more valuable as a strategic asset for
British policy-makers. Lastly, as Robert Blake mentions, ―it seemed all too likely that if
[Egypt‘s] Khedive, whose financial profligacy was only surpassed by that of his nominal
suzerain, the Sultan, finally went bankrupt, the French Government would seize the

86

A.G. Hopkins, ―The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882,‖ The
Journal of African History, Vol. 27, No. 2, (1986), p. 379.

49
chance [to intervene].‖87 The possibility of French unilateral action was an event
Britain‘s Conservatives and Liberals hoped to avoid.
To meet Ismail‘s asking price, Disraeli operated outside official government
circles. By-passing his Chancellor of the Exchequer, the prime minister established a line
of credit with Baron Lionel de Rothschild, one of the wealthiest bankers in Europe.
Using the British government as collateral, Disraeli received four million pounds at five
percent interest with an additional two-and-a-half percent commission to compensate
Rothschild personally. On 26 November 1875, the British government transferred funds
via Rothschild‘s bank—an astounding three days after Ismail agreed to Britain‘s offer.
The hasty and clandestine nature of this transaction polarized British public
opinion. For the most part, the masses cheered Disraeli‘s actions. ―Suez captured the
public imagination,‖ says Disraeli biographer Stanley Weintraub, ―and helped move the
Palmerstonian Daily Telegraph, which had supported Gladstone, over to Disraeli.‖ 88 The
Queen also expressed her approval.89 Support came from the Jewish community too. A
spring 1876 article in the Jewish Chronicle hailed Disraeli‘s move as proof of Britain‘s
interest in bringing Palestine under British control. 90 Pronouncements such as these,
however, left some questioning the prime minister‘s motives.
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Critics attacked nearly every aspect of Disraeli‘s dealings. Anti-Semites spread
fears of a Jewish conspiracy. Himself of Jewish decent, Disraeli was shunned as a
―Shylock‖ obsessed with ―personal gain at the expense of the national interest.‖91
Rothschild‘s Jewish heritage only fueled these conspiracy theories. In the more reasoned
realm of politics, William Gladstone and others took the opportunity to critique their
adversary‘s policies. During a 21 February 1876 debate in the House of Commons,
opponents questioned the wisdom of purchasing shares that would be financially
impotent until near the end of the century. In response, Disraeli argued that by simply
owning such a large portion of a company, it was impossible not to wield some degree of
influence regardless of the stocks‘ condition. 92 Gladstone worried that England was
committing itself beyond its capabilities. 93 Regarding the Rothschild loan, Gladstone and
others took umbrage at the two-and-a-half percent commission because it made it seem
―as if [the Rothschilds] were a nonprofit concern and Britain a charity case.‖ 94 In many
respects, these developments shared similar characteristics with de Lesseps‘s strategy.
Both men blended public and private interests to achieve their respective
objectives. De Lesseps enlisted the help of government leaders to provide moral and
financial support for his proposal. Disraeli reversed the relationship, using Rothschild‘s
bank to provide the capital for purchasing Egypt‘s shares and aid in securing British
national interests. In doing so, both men consolidated control over the canal. De Lesseps
expressed an initial interest in limiting the disbursement of Suez Company stock to fewer
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than ten countries. After the initial public offering, de Lesseps‘s wish appeared to be
granted when only two countries held an overwhelming majority of the securities. In
1875, the British government perpetuated the trend by replacing Egypt as the largest
single shareholder.
Another characteristic de Lesseps and Disraeli shared was the ability to project
their respective perceptions of reality as innate fact. During de Lesseps‘s induction into
the French Academy on 23 April 1885, the institution‘s director Ernest Renan hailed de
Lesseps‘s qualifications. ―No one, assuredly, in our age,‖ Renan proclaimed, ―has been
more persuasive than [de Lesseps], and in consequence no one has been more
eloquent.‖95 Disraeli‘s brilliant maneuvering in 1875 rivaled that of the French
entrepreneur, de Lesseps. Yet, like many of his fellow citizens, Disraeli misunderstood
the division between public investment and physical ownership. 96 Contrary to Britain‘s
popular perception, the Suez Company did not own the canal, only the rights to fees
collected from it.97 In addition to mimicking de Lesseps‘s techniques, Disraeli‘s
approach also reflected some trends practiced by his own political rivals. Similar to
Palmerston, Disraeli projected Britain‘s hegemony. Like Palmerston, Disraeli allowed
the British people to believe in this identity without correcting or restraining it. Unlike
Palmerston, however, Disraeli believed his own illusions. The symbiotic relationship
between Disraeli‘s policies and public fervor became intoxicating. 98 This errant
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mentality persisted for the next eighty years, directly contributing to the Suez Crisis of
1956.
Meanwhile, the British government‘s monopolization of commercial and strategic
influence proved detrimental to cultivating a broader sense of international harmony.
Although these methods established a greater sense of unity among state and non-state
interests, they undermined connections between individual states and the rest of the
international community. Agreements continued to be drafted and implemented, but the
basis on which these understandings rested was increasingly unstable. In essence, greater
compatibility between governments and private organizations helped contribute to
international tension and crisis diplomacy. Neither de Lesseps nor Disraeli heeded these
concerns as they worked to insulate their respective interests from international
interference. Indeed, their perspective reflected the prevailing sentiments of the era.

IV

From this period on, England and much of the world applied and reacted to
increasingly jingoist ideology expressed first and foremost in various competing foreign
policies. Gertrude Himmelfarb‘s analysis of Victorian social history establishes,
implicitly, how the English transformed national values into universal ones. In her book
The De-moralization of Society, she contends that integrating imperialist national
interests with international common interests emerged as the standard in British policymaking. Although Himmelfarb remains suspicious of interpreting the application of
values as virtuous behavior, she concludes that ―it was no small feat for England, in a
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period of massive social and economic changes, to attain a degree of civility and
humaneness that was the envy of the rest of the world.‖99 In other words, Himmelfarb
pardons the imposition of British values on others because of their enlightening effects on
other societies. 100 The period following England‘s acquisition of canal stock reveals a
more complex relationship.
By 1876, European colonial appetites gorged on further Egyptian misfortune.
Within a year of selling its interests in the Suez Canal Company, the Egyptian
government returned to the brink of defaulting on its crippling debt. French and English
financiers intervened on a massive scale. Known as ―Dual Control,‖ European
bureaucrats began crafting Egyptian fiscal policy. Under this policy, Egyptian viceroys
lost political credibility. 101 As public services in Egypt either declined or were usurped
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by British officials, some Egyptians clamored for reform. Ahmed Urabi, a colonel in the
Egyptian army, began fighting for prompt payment of money owed to soldiers. By 1881,
Urabi criticized the Egyptian government and the amount of foreign influence throughout
the bureaucracy. He wished to implement a nationalist agenda. 102 In September, he and
his allies brought down the government and created a new one in December. While
emphasizing Egyptian sovereignty, Urabi maintained loyalty to the Khedive, the Sultan,
and the paying of Egypt‘s debts.
For the British government, Egyptian sovereignty threatened British colonial
interests. On 8 January 1882, British and French officials issued a Joint Note threatening
direct intervention. Urabi‘s defeat at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir on 13 September 1883
left British officials in complete control. Disbanding of the Egyptian army meant that
British military personnel assumed responsibility for Egypt‘s protection. As one
historian put it, ―Britain had put a lid on Egyptian Nationalism, which was to be kept
down for more or less seventy years, . . . and assumed responsibility for the most
populous and sophisticated country in Africa.‖ Additionally, the British government had
also muzzled domestic opposition to its imperialist policies. 103 By the time this latest
crisis ended in 1883, Gladstone‘s ruling Liberal Party had endorsed the imperialist
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ideology that Disraeli‘s Conservatives had long championed. 104 The narrow spectrum of
Britain‘s ideological debate was set.
Indirectly, these circumstances also influenced the scope of ideological debate
within Egypt. Empathy for Egyptian nationalism had not been extinguished, but the
lessons of these late-nineteenth century experiences altered the relationship between
Egyptians and their nationalist aspirations. Numerous issues, including the canal,
sparked repeated protests during the first half of the twentieth century. 105 Rather than
challenge the British government‘s usurpation of multilateral principles to fulfill Britain‘s
national interests, Egypt‘s iconic nationalist leader of the 1950s, Gamal Abdel Nasser,
adopted these tactics to advance his own pan-Arab vision. The precedent set was to make
a particular cause appear more inclusive than any other cause and to exploit divisions
within rival perspectives. Instead, these Machievellian machinations undermined the
fundamental characteristics of multilateral diplomacy.
With much of British society firmly believing in the benevolent principles of
universal liberal doctrine, the country‘s diplomats set about reconciling England‘s North
African gains with the rest of Europe. While not the first conference assembled to
discuss Suez Canal matters, the Constantinople Convention of 1888 was perhaps the most
important. Unlike the Conference of 1873, which standardized the canal‘s fees and the
measurement of tonnage, the 1888 convention addressed the issue of security.
Immediately after ousting Urabi, British officials wanted a multilateral agreement ―to
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preserve the freedom of the canal for the passage of all ships in any circumstances‖ while
reserving ―the right to defend the canal from an act of aggression against Egypt so long as
[Britain‘s] occupation . . . continued.‖106 Negotiations teetered for the next six years
culminating in the 1888 meeting. Attendees included British, French, Russian, Spanish,
Italian, Dutch, Austrian, German, and Ottoman officials.
Signatories of the Constantinople Treaty represented a broader collection of
interests and opinions than the French and British rivalries decades earlier, but certain
conditions provided ample opportunities for unilateral activity. Throughout his quest to
build the canal, de Lesseps believed that the great powers should maintain the waterway
as a neutral site benefiting world trade.107 Unfortunately, the politics of Europe‘s balance
of power were not so idealistic. France and Russia wanted Britain out of Egypt as soon
as possible. 108 The 1888 agreement not only failed to do so, it also did little to clarify
transit rights and canal control. In the words of historian Hugh Schonfield, ―the Canal
was not to be neutralized but rather extraterritorialized while remaining part of Egypt.‖109
The canal may have remained a part of Egypt, but matters concerning its operation
belonged to the Commission of Consular Agents, comprised of the states attending the
1888 convention. Article 12 guaranteed international safeguards by proclaiming ―that
none of [the participants] shall endeavor to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or
commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be
concluded.‖110 Yet, under Articles 8 and 9, all participants oversaw proper enforcement
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of the treaty, but Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were responsible for resolving canalrelated disputes.111 The combination of these stipulations robbed the Constantinople
Treaty of any multilateral value. Interested parties were left to police themselves and
settlement of any infractions rested in the hands of the two governments least able to
impose authority on others. Egypt‘s de facto status as a protectorate of the British
Empire meant that the British government sacrificed very little when it agreed to these
conditions. With Egypt and the canal under British control, attention shifted to securing
British interests in Palestine. ―The urge,‖ historian Isaiah Friedman writes, ―to widen the
cordon sanitaire off the Suez Canal zone became almost irresistible‖ and led the British
government to dominate much of the Middle East.112 The mirage of a multilateral
framework not only disguised the aims of unilateral control, but also, in Britain‘s case,
demonstrated a perpetual desire for expansive influence.

V

Special interest groups, such as the burgeoning Zionist movement of the late
nineteenth century, adopted similar political tactics. Zionist ambitions of creating a
Jewish homeland reflected trends tracing back to the early 1800s. Roughly a decade after
Napoleon‘s invasion of Egypt, Jews began returning to the Negev region in ―large,
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organized parties.‖ Turkish and Egyptian rulers respected Jews, providing them with
legal rights and representation in local government. As the century progressed, orthodox
Jews saw Erez-Israel as a pristine, uncorrupted land far removed from the modern
European culture that eroded the foundations of Judaism by satisfying immediate
gratification with ―material needs.‖ Over time, Europe‘s Jewish community split
between those espousing separation from and those favoring assimilation with
mainstream European society. 113 As the century drew to a close, Zionist leadership
established an illusion of unity to mask stark divisions within the Jewish community and
all across Europe regarding the formation of a Jewish state.
As a young journalist in Vienna, Theodor Herzl became an ardent Zionist. Just as
de Lesseps had done nearly forty years earlier, Herzl moved almost constantly across
Europe to spread his ideas and rally support. From 1890 to 1895, the journalist organized
Jewish nationalist sentiment to combat what he considered to be a rising tide of antiSemitism. He corresponded with religious figures, fellow journalists, authors, and both
active and retired politicians.114 During these years, Herzl remained adamant in his
perspective. After submitting his ideas to the Rothschild Family Council, the young
journalist recorded in his dairy: ―I [Herzl] bring to the Rothschilds and the big Jews their
historical mission. I shall welcome all men of goodwill—we must be united—and crush
all those of bad.‖115
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Herzl realized that he faced stubborn opposition. In Paris, Baron Maurice von
Hirsch described Herzl‘s views as ―fantastic‖ and utterly unattainable without help from
wealthy Jews who opposed the Zionist movement.116 Where Herzl wished to transplant
Jewish culture, Hirsch sought its complete reconstruction from an urban, professional
culture to a rural, agrarian one. Herzl wanted to accentuate Jewish innovation and
ambition. Hirsch wanted a more humble approach to Zionism. By 1896, many Jews,
including formal publications such as The Jewish Chronicle, preferred Hirsch‘s
arguments over Herzl‘s. 117 Other Europeans such as the wealthy Jewish banking family
of the Rothschilds as well as former German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck also deemed
Herzl‘s proposals to be somewhat radical and dangerous.118 After these early negative
critiques, Herzl traveled to England and found a more favorable audience.
English support for a Jewish homeland in the Middle East was well-established by
the time Herzl visited London and Wales. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Lord
Palmerston advocated Jewish emigration to Palestine, in effect, reinforcing Britain‘s
consolidation of power in the region. To demonstrate the level of commitment to the
region, the British government pursued, not only formal diplomatic ties with Ottoman
officials, but also cultivated informal relations with a private, ethnic community within
the Ottoman‘s domain. Disraeli‘s handling of Suez Canal securities and the outright
seizing of control in Egypt in 1882 only intensified England‘s interests in the Negev
region. Jewish settlement of the area would secure the only viable route through which
England‘s chief rival, Russia, could threaten the Suez Canal. In November 1895, Herzl
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toured England spreading his Zionist message. England‘s Zionist allies, including Israel
Zangwill, helped Herzl refine his nationalist aspirations. 119 Inspired, Herzl returned to
Vienna in 1896 to record his thoughts in what has become a centerpiece in Zionist
literature.
Similar to de Lesseps‘s approach to constructing the Suez Canal, Herzl applied
business-oriented means to fulfill romantic Zionist ends in his 1896 landmark book, Der
Judenstaadt.120 Like the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal, Herzl called
for creating a ―Jewish Company‖ to act as ―a joint-stock company‖ to assist in the
emigration of Jews interested in establishing a Jewish homeland. Understanding the need
for popular consensus within the Jewish community, Herzl organized ―the Society of
Jews‖ to ensure, as Herzl put it, ―that the enterprise becomes a Suez rather than a
Panama.‖121 As two de Lesseps-inspired projects, the Suez and Panama Canal ventures
became the measure for the Jewish Company‘s success and failure. Herzl could not have
been any clearer in how influential the Suez Canal Company, and de Lesseps himself,

119

Desmond Stewart, Theodor Herzl (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 209-210.
According to Zionist scholars, Benny Morris and David Vital, Herzl ―invented Zionism as a true political
movement and as an international force.‖ See Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the ZionistArab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 20; and Vital, The Origins of Zionism, p.
17. Isaiah Friedman challenges this perspective somewhat by arguing that Zionism gained its full-throated
expression with the advent of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Friedman, The Palestine Question, p. 282.
120
Der Judenstaadt translates as The Jewish State.
121
World Zionist Organization, Hagshama Department, The Jewish State-III. The Jewish Company,
[updated unknown; cited 20 September 2007], Available from
http://www.hagshama.org.il/en/resources/view.asp?id=285. Working with the Society, the Jewish
Company would be responsible for managing and selling European properties and purchasing properties in
Palestine. By the early twentieth century, the Jewish Colonial Association (JCA), the Jewish National
Fund (JNF), and the Palestine Land Development Company encouraged Jewish settlement of Palestine by
purchasing land and teaching Jewish immigrants how to acclimate themselves and thrive in their new, arid
surroundings. See Best, et. al., International History of the Twentieth Century, p. 120. Speaking in broader
generalities, the Israeli historian, Avi Shlaim describes ―modern Zionism‖ as ―a secular movement with a
political orientation toward Palestine.‖ According to Shlaim, Herzl thought of Jew s not only in terms of a
religious community, but also as members of a national heritage. See Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 2-3.

61
was to his envisioning the Jewish settlement of Palestine.122 However, one of the earliest
challenges facing Herzl‘s scheme was the faulty presupposition upon which his ―Society
of Jews‖ rested.
As Herzl ascended to the forefront of the late nineteenth century Zionist
movement, he underestimated the persistent divisions within the Jewish community and
opposition he had experienced in sharing his views. Just as European heads-of-state and
British public opinion had splintered during the Suez Canal‘s construction, Jewish
opinions regarding Zionism were by no means unified. Hirsch remained committed to
his agrarian experiment in Argentina.123 In another instance, Jewish publishers refused to
print Herzl‘s book. One such publisher believed that the Jews‘ conditions were
improving socially and politically and that European anti-Semitism was receding. 124
Others, including the wealthy banker Lord Nathaniel Rothschild, 125 tended to agree.
Herzl recorded in his diary that ―[Nathaniel Rothschild] did not believe in Zionism. . . .
[Rothschild] was an Englishman and wanted to remain one.‖126 As the wealthy European
family who had helped England secure commercial rights to the Suez Canal, the
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Rothschilds did not want Herzl to spread news of the hardships experienced by Eastern
European Jews.
Russian and Eastern European Jews became political and social scapegoats for
rising nationalist and anti-Semitic feelings. Legal discrimination stripped Jews of voting
and property rights as well as equal education opportunities. Pogroms targeting Jewish
communities and businesses led to mobs looting, publicly beating, and murdering Jews.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed over two million Jews fleeing
from the East to Western Europe and to the United States. A few Eastern European Jews
made their way to Palestine and wished to continue doing so without attracting the
international attention that Herzl was fomenting. Critics of Herzl‘s methods, including
the Rothschilds, believed that agitation would result in restrictive immigration policies
preventing Jews from relocating in the West.127 The Dreyfus Affair of 1894-1895
amplified these fears as anti-Semitic activities increased in Western Europe after Alfred
Dreyfus was wrongfully found guilty of treason. Dreyfus was a French military officer
who was also Jewish. Herzl argued that such abuses made a Jewish homeland an
indispensable necessity. 128
Outside the Jewish community Herzl encountered mixed reactions to his proposal.
In some cases, he found tacit support but always in an unofficial capacity. The Grand
Duke Friedrich I of Baden worried that by supporting Zionism, ―people would
misinterpret this as anti-Semitism on his part.‖ When pressed to allow his views to be
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shared with ―a few trustworthy men in England,‖ however, the Duke agreed.129 In other
cases, Herzl ran into stubborn resistance. Ottoman obstruction to relinquishing control of
any part of Palestine thwarted any immediate plans for a Jewish state. Despite this
setback, Herzl wove together a network to move his ideas forward, much the same way
as de Lesseps had done.
As Europe‘s leading figures in the Jewish community convened the First Zionist
Congress in August of 1897, Herzl and others realized that dissension could prove fatal to
the movement‘s agenda. As the World Zionist Organization proclaims on its web-site,
―the Congress was created to organize all the Zionist ideologies under one movement, a
political movement.‖130 To his credit, Herzl handled the proceedings with the utmost
diplomacy. He eased tensions, allowed delegates to speak their mind, and yielded to the
assembly‘s decisions regarding the Zionist platform‘s content. Yet, his frustrations
seethed beneath this placid veneer. Confiding in his diary, Herzl referred to some
attendees as ―‗enemies‘‖ and even went so far as to describe one adversary as ―a real
Judas.‖131 The Jewish physician and literary icon, Max Nordau, voiced an equal degree
of vehemence when he took the podium at the Zionist Congress. After describing the
tormented existence of Western European Jews and the resiliency of the Jewish
community, Nordau concluded, ―The opinion of the outside world had no influence,
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because it was the opinion of ignorant enemies.‖ 132 What is supremely ironic about the
approach Herzl and Nordau took is that they sought to add their voices to the world
community by creating a new Jewish state—but they did so by shunning much of the
very community they wished to join.
In some respects, interesting comparisons exist between the Zionist strategy and
those strategies used by de Lesseps and Britain‘s political leadership. While not as
concerned with camouflaging nationalist ambitions beneath multilateral rhetoric, Zionist
leaders continued recognizing the importance of projecting uniform solidarity as a
prerequisite for influencing the international community. By 1907, members attending
the Eighth Zionist Congress called for pressing ahead with establishing Jewish colonies
in Palestine. ―After that,‖ writes one scholar, ―the necessary international guarantees to
protect Zionist colonization could be obtained.‖133 Projecting a presence of broader,
universal support remained in the service of fulfilling self-interested ends just as it had
been by Europe‘s entrepreneurs and politicians. Yet, some Zionists took the
extraordinary measure of denouncing the international community and its insensitivity to
Jewish concerns. During and after the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion‘s foreign policy operated from the same uniquely hypocritical set of
assumptions. In addition to escalating the likelihood of crisis between states, this
perspective dictated the agenda of transnational groups such as the Jews dating back to its
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earliest foundations. The use of ―a variety of myths,‖ as historian Michael Berkowitz put
it, allowed ―[succeeding Zionist Congresses to act as] the single most powerful force in
transmitting Zionist goals and ideals to the party faithful and the broader Jewish
audience.‖134 The manipulation of an internationalist perspective reigned uncontested.

VI

French and British Middle East policies enacted during the First World War only
reinforced the status quo. Beginning in November 1916, Britain‘s Sir Mark Sykes and
France‘s Francois Georges Picot discussed postwar plans for the region. According to
historian David Fromkin, despite the treaty‘s division of regional influence between
Britain and France, British officials portrayed French rule as ―annexation‖ of Arab land
while depicting British authority as synonymous with Arab ―independence.‖ 135 The
desire to secure their own interests in the Middle East jeopardized the multilateral niche
British diplomats had attempted to create for themselves. Practicing these types of
mutually exclusive tactics did little to achieve the objective of negotiating a postwar
peace agreement.
British officials adopted an almost identical approach when addressing Zionist
concerns. Mindful of their interests in the region, British officials respected the
―international problem‖ that Palestine and the Jewish Question posed. Failure to
recognize Jewish claims might have made the Jewish community allies of the German
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Empire. 136

In addition to depriving Germany of Jewish support in the Great War, the

British government sought to preserve Britain‘s wartime gains in the Levant. Britain‘s
outright ―military conquest‖ of Palestine ―would have violated the principle of nonacquisition of territories by war enunciated by President Wilson and the Provisional
Russian government, and alienated world opinion.‖ Left with no other viable option,
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George authorized the Balfour Declaration,
recognizing Zionist claims in Palestine. 137 Once again, unilateral objectives sought
fulfillment through multilateral means. By proclaiming Britain‘s endearing ties to Arab
and Jewish populations as stipulated by British interpretation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty
and the Balfour Declaration, Lloyd George hoped to safe-guard his country‘s interests in
the region.
Fortunately for the British government, much of the rest of Europe as well as the
United States was receptive to Zionist ambitions. Like Great Britain, however, the basis
for this support remained beholden to the respective countries‘ national interests. The
French Foreign Ministry‘s support for Zionist goals remained based on the condition of
Allied success in the Great War.138 In historian Alan Sharp‘s estimation, French Prime
Minister Georges Clemenceau traded greater British control in Palestine and the Middle
East for Britain‘s future support of French interests in the Rhineland and other
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Eurocentric issues. Lloyd George‘s part in fulfilling this quid pro quo was not
forthcoming, however. Sharp attributes the reversal to changes in British and Russian
fortunes of war. British conquests in the Middle East late in the war bolstered British
confidence. Meanwhile, the collapse of Tzarist Russia in 1917 removed the threat of
Russian expansion into the region. Where French occupation of Lebanon and Syria once
served as a buffer, protecting British spheres of influence from a possible Russian
incursion, French possessions now rivaled British interests in the Middle East. 139 ―The
bitterness resulting from this Anglo-French misunderstanding [regarding the quid pro
quo],‖ Sharp continues, ―was unfortunate and persistent.‖140
Indeed, the British government‘s effort to incorporate as many allies as possible
without sacrificing any of their national interests seems naïve. Like a diplomatic game of
musical chairs, once the music stopped, parties would participate in a free-for-all. This
analogy representing the pursuit of self-interest is neither surprising nor unique. What is
particularly disturbing, however, was the way in which British officials continued
misrepresenting notions of multilateral diplomacy. The implication that everyone‘s
interests could be met rested on policies that contradicted one another. After the chorus
of the Great War ended in November 1918, Jews and Arabs occupied the same seat.
At the Paris Peace Conference, Jews and Arabs stated their case for selfdetermination before the conference‘s Council of Ten in February and early March 1919.
Jewish leaders agreed to British trusteeship provided that Britain encourage local self-
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government, respect Jewish religious traditions, enforce equal rights, and allow those in
Palestine to freely choose to become Palestinian citizens if they so desired. Prince Feisal
spoke on behalf of Arab interests. Recounting the Arabs‘ loyal service to the Allies in
defeating the Ottoman Turks, Feisal requested fulfillment of promises made regarding
Arab independence, contrary to the settlement reached in the secret Sykes-Picot
proceedings. During one exchange at the Council of Ten meeting, American President
Woodrow Wilson asked for Feisal‘s ―personal opinion‖ if the Middle East were to be
mandated to one of the Great Powers. Would he [Feisal] prefer one mandatory or
several? Initially, the Prince deferred to wishes of Arab public opinion. When pressed
for his own views though, Feisal opposed ―partition.‖ As he put it, ―Arab unity‖ was his
primary concern. ―The Arabs,‖ he said, ―asked for freedom only and would take nothing
less.‖141 The council largely ignored Feisal‘s opinions. 142 Britain and France partitioned
the Middle East and governed the territories they controlled.
Britain‘s obsession with preserving order during the interwar period disregarded
the need for establishing an internationalist network to bridge the influx of ethnic and
cultural diversity. As early as 1921—even prior to the League of Nations officially
recognizing the Sykes-Picot Agreement—tensions boiled over during the Nebi Musa
riots, in Palestine. In an effort to impose order, British officials investigated the causes
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for the riots and limited Jewish immigration to Palestine. Historian Anthony Best and
others agree that ―the unrest, as well as the British response laid down the pattern for the
rest of the mandatory period.‖143 Throughout the remainder of the 1920s, relations
between British authorities, Jews, and Arabs were particularly opportunistic. The Arab
majority, represented by the Husseini faction, were highly critical of British policies, yet
received ample funds from British sources. The minority Nashashibis faction, espousing
reconciliation with the Jews, won Jewish financial support. During the Wailing Wall
riots of 1929 where Arabs and Jews clashed over rights to religious prayer in Jerusalem,
Arab protesters also ―accused the Jews of . . . coveting all the Arab lands lying between
the Nile and Euphrates [Rivers].‖ 144
Caught in a deteriorating situation, where instability in Palestine was the norm,
British policies began to break down as a result of internal discontent as well as external
disillusionment. The British government sought to salvage reconciliation by redefining
its explicit support for Jewish autonomy in Palestine. In the wake of the Wailing Wall
Riots, the 1930 Passfield White Paper called for Zionist concessions regarding the
establishment of a national home. Historian Peggy Mann contends that one reason for
British reservations was due to the growing importance Arab oil played in determining
Britain‘s economic and national security policies. The Suez Canal‘s role as a conduit
through which vital supplies of oil moved also impacted British policies in the region.
This imperial asset could have become the target of Arab reprisals if British officials
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persisted with supporting Zionist claims. 145 Agreement on these findings, however, was
by no means unanimous. By 1931, Zionist supporters in Britain had mobilized public
opinion enough for British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald to voice his opposition to
the Passfield report and its call for restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine. 146
This bout of policy whiplash left many Arabs questioning Britain‘s status as an honest
broker in the Middle East.
The Arab Revolt, lasting from 1936 to 1939, testified to Arab frustrations.
General strikes and acts of civil disobedience turned to outright violence by 1937.
During that year, British advisers, convening the Peel Commission, recommended
partition of Jews and Arabs. The British government shied away from this drastic
proposal and reverted to its policy of abandoning the creation of a Jewish state. Jewish
immigration was curtailed again and support shifted to ―guaranteeing the achievement of
an Arab Palestinian state within ten years.‖ 147 These experiences during the interwar
years demonstrate the debilitating effects British interests had in the Eastern
Mediterranean. In addition to failing to address the concerns of the two most contentious
ethnic communities in Palestine, erratic British policies also sabotaged British efforts to
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stabilize the region. The Suez Crisis of 1956 arose and intensified as a result of similar
circumstances.

VII

After the Second World War, prospects for an enlightened era of multilateral
diplomacy seemed possible. The Iranian crisis of 1946 provided the newly formed
United Nations with an opportunity to capitalize from this popular attitude. Several
weeks after the formal surrender of the Axis Powers, Soviet forces lingered in the
northern provinces of Iran. When rebellion erupted in these provinces, the Soviets denied
access to Iranian troops deployed to quell the revolt. On 19 January 1946, the matter was
referred to the United Nations Security Council. While American officials did expend a
significant amount of diplomatic pressure through the UN, they respected the
organization‘s jurisdiction. The United States government favored immediate UN action
to convey a sense of strength and authority to the international community. When
Soviets and Iranians presented their own individual proposals to end the crisis, some
American advisors opted for broader debate. ―An agreement involving withdrawal of the
Soviet and Ukrainian notes following withdrawal of the Iranian note, without full
discussion in the Security council,‖ one undated draft telegram stressed, ―would indicate
that the Security Council was an arena for unabashed political bargaining instead of a
forum for free international discussion.‖ 148 As the Cold War consumed the attention of
policy-makers in Washington over the course of next decade, calls for open debate
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remained constant but the basis for such debate changed from preserving the viability of
the United Nations to protecting America‘s global security interests.
Other initiatives to facilitate multilateral debate after the Second World War were
better at remaining beholden to their original sense of purpose. The re-aligning of
economic and political power after 1945 allowed colonized populations to demand and
act on behalf of their independence, which helped encourage collective discourse. As
early as the spring of 1947, organizational efforts began with the Asian Relations
Conference (ARC).149 Over 200 delegates and observers represented thirty-one countries
ranging from Egypt to Australia and beyond. 150 Defined as a ―cultural‖ conference, the
ARC ―decided on as inclusive a list of invitees as possible‖ to counter ingrained trends of
conferring within exclusive groups so as to present a unified front and thus diminish
differences.

Diverse and openly opposed groups such as the Jews and Arabs as well as

the Nationalist and Communist Chinese factions were invited to contribute to the ―growth
in understanding‖ and ―maturity‖ necessary for postwar problem-solving. Attendees
included specialists ―from cultural organizations . . . [as well as] individual scholars.‖ 151
Many conflicting assessments obscure the conference‘s significance. In a general
sense, the meeting met expectations, but some critics felt more could have been achieved.
Historian A.W. Stargardt makes two key observations that accentuate success. First,
―many individual delegates tended to voice their own views, rather than repeat a ‗line‘
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and, at times, the discussions were enhanced by the diversity of views expressed by
members of the same delegation. For the most part, delegates agreed upon raising
standards of living via planned economies that were ―free . . . from the influence of
foreign capital.‖ According to analysts at the American Institute of Pacific Relations
present during the conference, Jewish representatives, comprising the entire Palestinian
delegation, dissented, advocating instead, ―heavily capitalized‖ partnerships with
industrialized nations. 152 Yet, when some delegates proposed a continental trading bloc,
others feared the threat of Indian and Chinese dominance. 153 Second, Stargardt noticed
that ―looking beyond the detail, this conference was seen as a great demonstration for the
freedom and independence of the countries of Asia which some were in the process of
achieving and which could not long be denied to others.‖ 154 General consensus declared
that imperial elements should be removed and that countries reserved the right to set ―its
own immigration policy.‖ However, opinions splintered over the amount of support
powerful Asian states should commit to weaker neighbors in their struggle for
independence. Those in favor of more ―active assistance‖ were off-set by those
attempting isolate, not expand, pockets of conflict. 155 More than anything else, the ARC
served as a forum of opinion that became more institutionalized—but rather than promote
uniformity, it accepted and reflected diversity as an alternative to rigid perceptions of
order.
After World War II, the world‘s political environment was such that individuals
and newly independent countries such as India sought to embrace this diversity and
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include those that European imperialists ostracized. This idea grew in popularity up
through the 1950s and had a definitive effect on multilateralsim within the United
Nations. Historian Akira Iriye would label ARC objectives as ―globalization‖ and
―multiculturalism‖ that ―was . . . giving rise to [an] awareness of diversity.‖ 156 Extending
beyond awareness, however, the ARC, and the numerous examples succeeding it, helped
propel diversity into a broader sense of internationalist purpose. As Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru, the ARC‘s chairperson, stated at the opening session:
We seek no narrow nationalism. Nationalism has a place in each country
and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become aggressive
and come in the way of international development. . . . The freedom we
envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular
people, but must be spread out over the while world.157
Rather than interpret multilateralism as an extension of national interests, Nehru and
indeed much of the developing world separated the two spheres. By 1947, Nehru and
others wanted their new nationalist regimes to affect international debate and did so by
accentuating diversity rather than suppressing it. Nehru‘s approach formed the basis of
his evolving non-aligned philosophy. This idea of improving the socio-economic
standing for a majority of the world‘s population took off during the 1950s and became
the basis for the Non-Aligned Movement.
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VIII

Although the impact of the ARC‘s independent internationalist outlook affected
some participants profoundly, others saw no place for such a perspective to their own
autonomous pursuits. For example, the curtailing of nationalist sentiments in favor of
multilateral diversity failed to influence matters regarding the increasingly volatile
Jewish-Arab dispute in Palestine. As Britain‘s imperial domain crumbled rapidly after
World War II, both Arabs and Jews perpetrated terrorist attacks. Generally speaking,
Arabs targeted Jews; Jews targeted British authorities. 158 Jewish militants obliterated
British military headquarters at the King David Hotel on 22 July 1946. On 14 February
1947, London officials announced their intent to return Palestine to the League of Nations
successor, the United Nations. Meeting in its first emergency session in May 1947, the
UN General Assembly agreed to form a special committee to investigate. Like the
countless commissions preceding it, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP) gathered information and testimony to decide on a course of action.
The Special Committee faced truly daunting challenges as it inherited the
problems pervading the fate of Palestine. One of the most crippling issues was the
questionable quality of the committee delegates. Ralph Bunche, representing the UN
secretariat office during the UNSCOP mission, provided less-than flattering assessments
of his colleagues. In his opinion, of all the delegates from Australia, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Holland, Iran, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and
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Yugoslavia, no one possessed the necessary appreciation of the situation, nor the
objectivity required for constructive leadership. 159 None of the committee members,
including Bunche, were specialists in Middle Eastern affairs. What Bunche possessed
that the others lacked was an ability to balance sensitivity to the intricacies of the
situation with the resolve necessary for maintaining perspective. 160 The committee
members‘ lack of this critical equilibrium was not the only challenge that confronted
them in Palestine.
External efforts to influence UNSCOP added to the complexities facing the UN
delegation and its mission. Raids, arrests, and killings continued in spite of the
committee‘s presence in Palestine. These activities distracted the delegates as they
questioned whether the committee, as a whole, should comment publicly on these matters
or keep their attention focused on the task at hand. Debate within UNSCOP devolved
into futile pro-Zionist, pro-Arab arguments regarding the volatile course of events
involving British authorities, Jews, and Arabs. In some instances, Jews and British
authorities used ―spies and bugging devises‖ to monitor UNSCOP members. 161 As the
UN group set their itinerary for conducting interviews of various factions within each of
the interested parties, British officials declared that UNSCOP would have to provide a list
of the prospective interviewees, some of which included people wanted by the British
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authorities. 162 British attempts to manipulate UNSCOP to serve their own purposes
threatened to derail the UN‘s efforts to engage in pluralistic diplomacy.
Arabs and Jews devised their own strategies when interacting with the UN
delegation. Protesting UNSCOP‘s simple notion of acknowledging and negotiating with
Zionist interests, Arab officials boycotted the delegation‘s fact-finding mission. The
Jewish population, on the other hand, carried out a well-scripted drama. Moderate and
hard-line Zionists, such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, often employed
―good cop, bad cop‖ tactics to make Weizmann‘s appeals appear more amiable and
persuasive to committee delegates.163 Seeing Ralph Bunche as the most capable member
of the delegation, Zionists from the Jewish Agency wanted private access to him in order
to make their case. 164
The attempts to influence and interfere with the UN delegation combined with the
rigors of their travels and security burdened the committee members. Like all mediators
in the Arab-Jewish dispute, Bunche and other members of UNSCOP grew frustrated and
became mired in confusion and pessimism. 165 One of the main frustrations was the fact
that, as Bunche put it, ―there was a vacuum in [Palestine] so far as authority was
concerned, and this was particularly true with regard to the Arabs.‖ Where Jews were
allowed to construct a ―semi-governmental apparatus‖ consisting of hospitals, schools,
and ―local authorities,‖ Arabs remained dependent on British authorities and were thus
poorly prepared for the termination of Britain‘s mandate in Palestine. 166 Given these
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circumstances, the UN officials moved towards making their final recommendations.
UNSCOP agreed upon some form of territorial partition between Jews and Arabs but
differed as to its degree. Bunche drafted both the majority and minority reports that
would eventually frame the scope of debate in the UN General Assembly.
The Indian, Iranian, and Yugoslavian delegates represented the minority
viewpoint which supported the idea of a federal, bi-national state. Instead of two separate
entities, land would be divided into Arab and Jewish sectors, but political power would
rest in a unified central government representing the interests of both parties. Defense,
foreign policy, finance, and immigration would be the responsibility of the federal
government, while the two ―states‖ comprising it would dictate education, housing,
public health, and taxation policies. 167 The pluralist aspects of this proposal seem clear.
Arabs and Jews would be able to enjoy nominal self-determination of primarily domestic
concerns while federal control set the international agenda.
In a lengthy explanation of his opposition to the majority, Abdur Rahman, India‘s
UNSCOP representative, noted that support for a federated state was considerable.
Rahman expressed how the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, assessing the plight
post-World War II Palestine, had rejected complete partition because of fears that it
―would result in civil strife which might threaten the peace of the world.‖ Rahman and
Vladimir Simic, Yugoslavia‘s delegate, acknowledged that Britain‘s maintenance of the
status-quo led to deficiencies in education, public health, law, land reform, and taxation
policy which resulted in a weak political infrastructure. In spite of these shortcomings,
Rahman argued that self-determination was indivisible and therefore must be granted to
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the people of Palestine as a whole. 168 UNSCOP‘s majority, however, adopted a more
literal interpretation of the term ―self-determination.‖
Minus the three delegates favoring federalism and Australia‘s abstention, the
remaining committee members called for two separate states. Like a Salvador Daliinspired checkerboard, the boundaries of these two states paradoxically integrated the two
communities together while simultaneously alternating patches of territory between
Jewish and Arab rule. Jerusalem and lands immediately surrounding it became an
international enclave. In an effort to emphasize greater cooperation, and perhaps appeal
to the advocates favoring federation, UNSCOP would authorize official recognition of
either state‘s independence after the signing of a treaty creating ―a formal economic
union.‖169 Nearly six months after Nehru‘s proclamations at the ARC, where he
espoused nationalist sentiments that respected the international community and its efforts
to guarantee universal freedoms, UNSCOP delivered its findings to the United Nations
General Assembly. By October 1947, the Assembly deliberated both proposals.
Support for United Nations Resolution 181, endorsing partition, was at best
reluctant. In the United States, President Harry S. Truman agonized over the ArabJewish predicament. As early as 1946, the president supported partition plans. 170 Yet,
according to historian Michael Cohen, ―Truman still clung to the plan for a unitary
Palestine as advocated first by the Anglo-American Committee‖—the same committee
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Rahman praised in his opposition of UNSCOP‘s majority ruling. Lobbyists for Zionism
and political reverses during America‘s 1946 mid-term elections helped Truman change
his mind. The Chairman of the Democratic National Committee told Truman that even
toning down previous pro-Zionist statements could cost the president re-election in 1948.
Likewise, high-ranking bureaucrats opposed to partition came to understand the political
interests at work. As the UNSCOP plan made its way before the UN General Assembly,
Loy Henderson, a State Department official and member of the U.S. delegation to the UN
―realized [years later] that Congress, the press, the Democratic party, and aroused public
opinion would all turn against [Truman] should he withdraw his support for the
Zionists.‖171 According to historian Peter Hahn‘s investigation of the close relations
between Zionist organizations and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Truman
heard from yet another bloc of his constituency that was in favor of creating an
independent Jewish state.172 Truman, himself, recalled years later, ―I do not think I ever
had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this
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instance.‖173 Much like the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, U.S. officials operated from a
position of national self-interest that infringed upon multilateral approaches to arbitration.
From roughly this point forward, the United States began a slow process of
replacing Britain as the power responsible for constructing consensus in the Middle East.
Historian Melani McAlister notes that, in spite of domestic political opposition, the threat
of continued Soviet expansion accentuated ―the necessity not only for U.S. leadership but
also for U.S. supremacy.‖ 174 One key focus for such ―supremacy‖ applied directly to the
Arab-Jewish dispute. Using the United Nations as a basis for consensus, American
officials applied their own ―special pressure‖ on Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines,
Nationalist China, Ethiopia, and Greece to get UNSCOP‘s partition plan through the
General Assembly. 175 Economic and military aid as well as collective security
agreements, such as the Rio Treaty of 1947, helped ensure all but Greece‘s compliance.
Without this effort, the two-vote cushion by which UN Resolution 181 passed the
General Assembly would not have been achieved in all likelihood.
In many respects, these events emulate the course taken by British officials with
regard to the Suez Canal. Two examples, the complete reversal of British and American
policy regarding the Zionist agenda and the fulfilling of national interests through the
manipulation of multilateral consensus, stand out as the most significant parallels. 176
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Truman as well as much of the American public understood the Arab-Jewish dispute
mainly from the viewpoint of domestic national politics rather than Middle Eastern
stability. As a result, the motivation for passage of UN Resolution 181 conflicted with
efforts to establish a greater degree of interdependency between Arabs and Jews that a
federated state may have cultivated. National self-interest remained the dominant motive
not only for the United States, but also for the several states that were corralled into
voting for partition.
While national interests are rightfully considered to be a fundamental aspect of
international affairs, it seems equally justifiable to conclude that obsessive attention paid
to national interests creates new and increasingly volatile problems that unfettered
multilateral diplomacy may be better able to resolve. Throughout the history of the of the
Suez Canal and the myriad interests it stimulated, one subtle irony that contributed
substantially to international crisis was the inability of interested parties to identify and
allow for multilateral diplomacy in matters where national interests conflicted. Officials,
such Ralph Bunche and others, who comprehended the perilous diplomatic trends being
established, formed a nascent minority. As a result of the prevailing insensitivity to
using multilateral means to achieve unilateral ends, the actions taken during 1947-1948
and the subsequent decade contributed directly to the intensity of the Suez Crisis of 1956.
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IX

The escalation of regional tensions that factored directly into the Suez crisis began
with abandoning the procedures established in UN Resolution 181. According to the
resolution, two criteria were to be met prior to official recognition of partition. First, a
two-month grace period between Britain‘s evacuation and Palestinian and Jewish
independence was to be observed. Second, recognition of independence rested on the
economic treaty both Jews and Arabs were to ratify. If the treaty failed to take effect
before 1 April 1948, the UN commission was authorized to implement it. Only after the
partitioned states achieved independence under these conditions would either state be
eligible for membership to the United Nations. 177 Rather than instill a sense of orderly
transition across Palestine, however, the UN resolution‘s promise of recognition moved
Jews and Arabs to intensify their efforts to attain independence.
For British authorities eager to leave Palestine, these sentiments uncorked a new
conundrum. On the one hand, the British were relieved of their responsibilities in the
Levant. On the other hand, those officials among the last to leave feared that the
introduction of UN Palestine Commission officials would precipitate unrest and the
targeting of British authorities. As a result, the British kept the UN commission out of
Palestine ―until just [before] the British were terminating the mandate.‖ UN officials
were unable to build meaningful relationships, necessary for implementing Resolution
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181, and therefore act as an effective intermediary between Jews and Arabs. 178 British
forces scheduled to leave no later than August 1948 relinquished control three months
earlier. The day after Britain announced the end of its mandate, Israel declared its
independence on 15 May. The same day, Israel‘s Arab neighbors declared war on the
new Jewish state.
The war continued for much of the remainder of 1948. As the United Nations‘
chief negotiator, Count Folke Bernadotte secured a temporary cease-fire, during which
time Arabs and Israelis reinforced their positions. While it is worth noting that the
Truman administration remained committed to supporting the UN mediation between
Arabs and Jews, it is equally important to understand the context and limits of that
support. Historian Melvyn Leffler points out that Truman and his subordinates embraced
the spirit of the negotiations conducted by Bernadotte, but American participation in
enforcing a UN cease-fire remained out of the question. Yet, when American and British
officials did discuss the possibility of restoring order, the strategies proposed remained
independent of the UN‘s jurisdiction. 179 Without adequate enforcement, the UNsponsored arms embargo was violated repeatedly. In one particularly ironical case,
Czechoslovakia delivered four Nazi-built Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter aircraft to Israel
to aid in their war for independence. 180 The combatants rejected a 15 July United Nations
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Security Council order to ―desist from further military action.‖ 181 Towards the end of
1948, the fortunes of war turned in Israel‘s favor. In addition to holding their ground,
Israelis conquered another twenty-one percent of territory formerly known as
Palestine. 182
Typical of twentieth century warfare, non-combatants bore the brunt of the war.
And just as typical, both sides set about defining the context of the ensuing debate. Fear
of reprisals and outright evictions of Arab ethnicities drove Palestinians from their
homes. According to Arab-Israeli dispute specialist, Benny Morris, departure of
Palestinian civic leaders, intellectuals, and business-owners contributed to the mass flight
of the poor.183 Reports of Israelis carrying out massacres and looting cars, homes,
businesses, and warehouses as well as destroying property added to exodus.184 As early
as 1 August, Bernadotte reported the ―acute‖ degree ―of human suffering;‖ refugee
estimates reached 550,000. Bernadotte wanted to allow Palestinian refugees to return
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home for those wishing to do so once peace was re-established.185 The Foreign Minister
of Israel‘s provisional government, Moshe Shertok, reckoned that neighboring nations
who had invaded Israel were responsible for mass dislocation; therefore Israel felt no
responsibility for accommodating the refugees‘ return. Israel remained willing to
negotiate terms of return as a part of a peace settlement acknowledging Israel‘s right to
exist.186
Israeli leadership also stirred debate by equating the plight of Palestinians to those
of Jews stuck in Europe‘s post-World War II relocation camps. An estimated 250,000
Jews resided in camps across Europe in 1948. In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary
General Trygve Lie, Shertok described the ―demoralizing life of camp inmates‖ despite
the approximately two million U.S. dollars per month the Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee spent to maintain the camps and their occupants.187 Jamal Husseini, President
of the Palestine Arab Delegation to the United Nations, took issue with Shertok‘s
assessment.
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Where Israel made broad generalizations, Arabs, such as Husseini, considered the
plight of the two groups as utterly incomparable. Jewish refugees in Cyprus, Husseini
said, were not so much refugees as illegal aliens who had violated British immigration
law. Additionally, Arab refugees numbered nearly twice as many as Jewish refugees in
Europe; therefore stressing the limited resources available to them. 188 Since 1945,
Husseini contended, Jewish organizations caring for Holocaust survivors, along with
American funds, and the UN‘s own International Refugee Organization had provided
hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in relief making Jewish refugees recipients of ―more
attention and contributions then any other refugees in Europe.‖189 Arab authorities were
not as well prepared to deal with the rush of humanity that swamped the region which
worsened the prospects for peaceful co-existence.
188
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Those individuals who persevered with fashioning peace agreements that
jeopardized the unilateralist wartime actions, perpetrated by both sides, became targets of
violence. The most infamous of examples occurred when the UN‘s chief negotiator in
the region, Count Bernadotte, called for a new partition plan requiring Jews to yield land
won during the war to Arabs. 190 Bernadotte‘s amendments proposed transferring the
Negev and West Bank jurisdictions to Transjordan authorities. The Jews were
compensated for these losses by gaining control over the ―western Galilee‖ region.191
Neither Jews nor Arabs endorsed Bernadotte‘s plan. The Negev region was
essential to Jewish plans for future population growth. Arabs were suspicious of
Transjordan‘s consolidation of territory and its impact on the regional balance of
power.192 When Ralph Bunche was chosen to deliver Bernadotte‘s report to the General
Assembly, both Israelis and Arabs favored postponement. According to Bunche, Arab
delegates wanted to await the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States.
The Republican nominee, Thomas Dewey, was believed to harbor pro-Arab sentiments
stemming from his close ties to Wall Street investors concerned with protecting their oil
interests in the Middle East. As Election Day approached, however, Arabs were crestfallen at the news of Dewey‘s pro-Israel declaration.193
With the status quo unlikely to change, belligerent interests in the Levant took
matters into their own hands. At 2:05 p.m. GMT on the Friday afternoon of 17
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September 1948, Count Bernadotte was assassinated by Israeli terrorists. En route to a
local YMCA, the UN convoy carrying Bernadotte stopped at an Israeli army roadblock.
Two men wearing Jewish army uniforms approached Bernadotte‘s vehicle ―and fired at
point blank range.‖194 During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Bernadotte had negotiated
cease-fires in an effort to initiate a more stable peace, had proposed reversing the ethniccleansing that had taken place, and had supported territorial concessions that might have
provided a greater sense of security. 195 These efforts interfered with the installation of
unilateral order from which the Arab-Jewish War of 1948 emerged.
What was particularly disturbing about the impact Bernadotte‘s assassination had
on collective diplomacy was the general apathy that the international community
exhibited thereafter. Bernadotte and the United States government pushed Israelis for
―substantial repatriation as part of a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem and
the conflict.‖ Yet, American pressure lacked the ―conviction‖ necessary to impel the
Provisional Government of Israel (PGI) to yield. 196 Speaking before an audience at the
National Defense University in the early 1950s, Ralph Bunche made a similar
observation and concluded that ―if the [British, French, and American] governments take
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an apathetic position, if they are diffident or indifferent, if they are content with drift,
then dangerous situations [may] well develop simply by default.‖ 197 Bunche‘s somber
prognostication proved highly accurate as multilateral diplomacy became the indentured
servant of competing national security interests. Over the course of the decade following
the Second World War, the dominant mentality governing international relations was one
where dialogue and interaction between various interests threatened the application of
national security prerogatives.

X

While radical factions within countries, such as the one responsible for
Bernadotte‘s death, took the most extreme of measures to repudiate multilateral
diplomacy, governments took a more subtle approach to turn this diplomatic liability into
an asset of national interests. For American officials, the intensification of the Cold War
justified this principle which determined the operational parameters for virtually all of the
county‘s international relations. As authors of the provocative NSC-68 report put it, ―In a
shrinking world, . . . it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin
design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable.‖ 198 In
addition to implying that a hegemonic sense of uniform order was desirable when faced
with the alternative of Soviet domination, policy doctrines such as NSC-68 also assumed
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that any debating of alternatives was detrimental to America‘s national security. The
―absence of order‖ was the peril over which American interests obsessed.
The aim of imposing American notions of order in contested areas of the world
had two unintended consequences that contributed to fundamental issues surrounding the
Suez crisis. First, the implementation of American security interests alienated nationalist
sentiments of self-determination popular after the Second World War. 199 More than
simply combating breakdowns in international order, officials in Washington associated
any independent ideology or deviation from American expectations as a threat to
American interests. When the rising tide of nationalism in Egypt and much of the rest of
the Arab world coalesced in the 1950s and challenged American efforts to reconstruct the
West‘s hegemonic order in the region, the president‘s senior officials adopted a nearly
irrevocable position that sought to isolate and undermine those leaders considered to be
uncooperative. These one-dimensional, punitive policies inspired nationalist leaders,
such as Egypt‘s Gamal Abdel Nasser, to commit greater acts of defiance, which assured
more stringent Western condemnation and direct intervention.
In addition to undermining self-determination within states, American policies of
the 1950s also sought to redefine notions of multilateral diplomacy. The prevalent
climate of intolerance in international affairs, aided by the imposition of a particular
brand of ideological world order, made competing notions of order construct their own
sense of international legitimacy. Venues where the international community gathered
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became susceptible to subterfuge. During the Korean War, American policy-makers used
the United Nations to provide a veneer of legitimacy underneath which American policymakers installed their own sense of order.200 To circumvent the Security Council, where
a Soviet veto could nullify attempts to win world support for military intervention in a
future conflict, the U.S. delegation oversaw passage of what came to be known as the
―Uniting for Peace‖ Resolution. According to this measure, when a ―lack of unanimity‖
existed among the Security Council‘s permanent members regarding ―international peace
and security, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately [and make]
appropriate recommendations . . . to maintain or restore international peace and
security.‖201 In addition to circumventing the possibility of Soviet veto, the ―Uniting for
Peace‖ Resolution also ―side-stepped the [UN] Charter‖ by allocating authority to the
General Assembly ―where the United States controlled an unquestioned automatic
majority.‖202 Much like the British had done after consolidating control over the Suez
Canal, American officials sought to portray their national interests as universal interests.
Nowhere was this more visible than with the ―Uniting for Peace‖ Resolution designed to
provide international support for America‘s imposition of order.
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XI

In the roughly one hundred years marking the canal‘s construction, Zionism‘s
ascendance, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the Cold War, the world witnessed the
subjugation of multilateral diplomacy to the whim of individual national self-interest.
Private interests, such as de Lesseps and his Suez Canal Company, misrepresented
multilateralism by placating the desires of European and Middle Eastern leaders rather
than foment genuine, multilateral discourse. The masquerade continued with de
Lesseps‘s creation of a ―multi-national‖ Suez Canal Company in which two countries
held over ninety percent of the company‘s shares. Under Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli, the British government misunderstood and misrepresented its control over the
canal after acquiring Egypt‘s stake in the company. The Constantinople Convention of
1888 reinforced these misperceptions by allowing signers of the treaty to police
themselves. Meanwhile, actual enforcement of the treaty‘s terms rested with the feeble
Ottoman Empire and Egypt, a British protectorate. In following de Lesseps‘s model,
Theodor Herzl organized Zionist strategies for re-settlement of Palestine mainly through
the highly effective actions of numerous private organizations. Many of these
organizations put significant pressure on President Truman as tensions in Palestine grew
increasingly volatile.
The course of Palestine‘s partition, Israel‘s independence, and America‘s Cold
War concerns perpetuated the subordination of multilateral consensus to national interest.
Although United Nations Resolution 181 sanctioned partition, the measure passed as a
result of concessions the U.S. delegation made to reluctant member states. In effect,
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national self-interest determined the fate of the resolution rather than any serious
commitment to the resolution itself. Once passed, interest in seeing Resolution 181 put
into effect disappeared, allowing Zionists to pursue their own path to independence. The
United Nations served a similar purpose during the Korean War as American policymakers enlisted the institution to endorse a particular worldview.
Exceptions to these developments did exist; but as tensions in the Middle East
escalated in the early- to mid-1950s, the status quo remained dominant. Attitudes
emerging from the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 contrast the prevailing mentality
of misrepresenting national interest as the basis for internationalist appeal. The ARC‘s
attempt to bridge differences existing among competing notions of world order inspired
additional efforts by the mid-1950s. Coincidentally, these diplomatic anomalies
coincided with a new, internationalist sense of purpose within the United Nations. By
1956, these diplomatic trends would challenge the prevailing diplomatic discourse.
However, events in the Middle East during the early 1950s continued disguising
unilateral ambitions as multilateralism, which contributed directly to the intensity of the
Suez Crisis of 1956. Successful crisis management occurred only when multilateral
diplomacy gained the initiative.
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Chapter II

Unilateralism and the United Nations: International Affairs and the
Rise of Dag Hammarskjöld as UN Secretary General, April 1951
to July 1956

The conditions emerging from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
continued to plague international relations during the 1950s. De Lesseps and Disraeli
became the unlikely paragons of national leaders insistent on social and political
uniformity to ensure fulfillment of national interests. In Iran, the populist Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadegh wrestled with reforming his country‘s domestic and foreign
policies while relying on traditional methods of political corruption to retain political
power. The impasse resulted in disaster for Mossadegh. From Egypt, Gamal Abdel
Nasser observed Mossadegh‘s missteps and established his own strategy for creating a
populist autocracy. By 1954, Nasser was governing Egypt directly, implementing a
nationalist agenda that catered to a broader ethno-religious populace.
The United States also suffered from an increasingly dogmatic sense of
conformity. The Red Scare of the early 1950s cast suspicion on American citizens
including those who worked for the United Nations. While accusations of political
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subversion subsided by 1954, many American officials pursued foreign policies that
remained highly conditional. The result left the Untied States government in an
undesirable position of pursing collective security agreements that were largely beholden
to America‘s national security interests.
In the case of the Middle East, President Eisenhower‘s plans to create a defense
network failed to address the concerns of America‘s potential and actual allies. Attention
to Cold War security matters eclipsed the Arabs‘ more immediate concerns of Israeli
aggression. Realizing this disconnect, Nasser interpreted America‘s collective security
proposals as another form of imperialist exploitation. British officials, meanwhile,
objected to the Eisenhower administration‘s assumption of Middle Eastern initiatives.
Desperate to maintain some influence in the region, British policy-makers entered into
the American-inspired Northern Tier alliance. Involvement of a Western, imperialist
power undermined the independent intent of the agreement. As a result, America‘s
attempts to incorporate the Middle East into a military alliance were torpedoed by its own
ideological inflexibility and by the ulterior motives of its principal European ally.
The following analysis investigates not only these developments and the resulting
development of non-aligned ideology, the Czechoslovakian arms deal, the Aswan Dam
proposal as well as the heightened tensions surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute, but also
the concomitant developments taking place within the UN Secretariat‘s office. Contrary
to the escalation of international tensions in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world,
Dag Hammarskjöld‘s election as the new Secretary General of the United Nations and his
astute diplomatic skills offered an alternative to the ingrained status quo. Recognizing
the self-destructive tendencies of competing national interests, Hammarskjöld moved the
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organization away from endorsing a particular ordered worldview, as his predecessor had
done, and more towards a perspective encouraging exchanges of world opinion that
would facilitate broader, multilateral dialogue. In the case of American pilots captured
by the Communist Chinese and accused of violating Chinese airspace, Hammarskjöld‘s
ideas were put to the test. In this instance, as well as in future international crises, the
Secretary General served as the ideal diplomat for crisis resolution due to his role as an
honest broker. The UN‘s renewed sense of purpose, with Hammarskjöld at the helm,
proved indispensable during the Suez crisis and its negotiations.

I

When Mohammad Mossadegh became Prime Minister of Iran in 1951, it appeared
as if he supported a greater degree of political pluralism. As head of the nationalist party
controlling a majority of seats in the Iranian parliament, Mossadegh called for broad
reforms guaranteeing greater freedom and equality for all Iranians. 203 Soon after
Mossadegh took power, senior Truman administration officials, including Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, recognized that Mossadegh ―had enthusiastic support from newly
emerging groups in [Iranian] cities, including workers, shopkeepers, teachers, students,
government employees, and some religious zealots.‖204 These groups that Acheson had
identified as well as labor unions, women groups, and artists, organized themselves into
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vibrant ―social, political, or cultural associations.‖205 Support from these segments of
Iranian society provided Mossadegh with a great deal of political legitimacy. During this
period, Iran also benefited from a diverse, multi-party political system.
With regard to foreign policy, Mossadegh took a hard-line approach. He
advocated ―‗negative equilibrium,‘‖ intent on removing all foreign influences from
―Iran‘s social, economic, and political affairs.‖ 206 Indeed, there were stifling foreign
influences with which to contend. At the time, Western oil companies held substantial
concessions to Iran‘s abundant oil fields. According to some scholars, ―Iran produced
more oil than all the Arab states combined,‖ thanks largely to Britain‘s imperial
oversight.207 However, such prestige came with sacrifice. Through the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company (AIOC), leaders of Britain‘s oil industry dictated production quotas, prices,
and revenue shares for its members, including the Iranian government. 208 Mossadegh and
his people demanded complete control of their nation‘s natural resources and pursued this
course of action by nationalizing all oil operations in Iran. For some Iranian specialists
such as Shireen Hunter, Mossadegh‘s short-sighted policy-making contributed to an
antagonized worldview where ―deep suspicion of great power intentions‖ resulted in a
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hierarchical and ―polarized‖ sense of the international community divided between the
haves and the have-nots.209
Many Western policy-makers expressed concern over the precedent Mossadegh‘s
policies set for Western concessions throughout the rest of the world. During a cabinet
meeting, Britain‘s Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell wondered if the Suez Canal
would be next as other developing countries aspired to achieve ―financial freedom.‖ 210
While initially acting as a mediator between Iranian and British interests, Truman
administration officials acted in a biased manner by drafting an Anglo-American
proposal for Mossadegh‘s consideration. 211 The proposal stipulated that if the Iranian
government refused to relinquish control of the AIOC, then British interests were to be
compensated for company property as well as ―the profits that would be forfeited over the
life-time of the concession.‖212 Any remaining chance of establishing a constructive
multilateral dialogue between Anglo-American and Iranian interests suffered from the
boycotting of Iranian crude oil by American and British oil interests. Desperate for a
compromise agreement by 1953, Mossadegh hoped that ―hints‖ of Iran‘s moving into the
Soviet sphere of influence would garner sympathy in an America reeling from
unsympathetic McCarthyism. 213 To skittish Washington officials, nationalization
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smacked of socialism and Mossadegh‘s round-about rapprochement with the West only
confirmed his weakness.
Western officials grew impatient with the prime minister‘s unwillingness to yield
to Anglo-American standards. As historian Mary Ann Heiss put it, the West ―joined to
formulate a gender-based view of Mossadegh that denigrated him for departing from
what they considered to be acceptable Western norms—and that worked against their
stated goal of seeking a resolution [to the oil crisis].‖ Thinking that Mossadegh‘s
―fragile,‖ ―emotional,‖ ―impractical,‖ ―hysterical,‖ and ―neurotic‖ temperament made
negotiations impossible and that Mossadegh‘s pro-communist leanings threatened U.S.
interests, the newly-elected Eisenhower administration began preparing for a U.S.supported coup in Iran. 214 Fazlollah Zahedi, the man the CIA chose to replace
Mossadegh, was considered to be much more amenable. In his biography of CIA director
Allen Dulles, Peter Grose describes Zahedi as a Nazi collaborator during World War II
and ―a man who would follow orders.‖215 The search for a docile candidate for prime
minister served as part of America‘s plan to reinstate Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the shah
of Iran, as the new head of the Iranian government.
In the case of both Iranian and Anglo-American policy-making, initiatives
operated from an exclusive pretext. On the one hand, Mossadegh‘s ousting of foreign
business interests, while perhaps justified, remained provocative nevertheless. Over the
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course of his term as prime minister, Mossadegh also coped with satisfying an
increasingly restless polity. By 1952, he had resorted to rigging Parliamentary elections,
as his predecessors had done, in order to retain a governing majority. As a result, those
groups that had cheered Mossadegh‘s rise to power began questioning the sincerity of his
commitment to reform.216 Support disappeared completely when the prime minister
pressured Parliament to grant him greater control over the military in 1953. As historian
Richard Cottam concluded, Mossadegh‘s actions made erudite Iranians ambivalent
enough to watch his government collapse during the August 1953 coup d‘etat.217 On the
other hand, the West‘s most viable diplomatic effort represented British interests at the
expense of all other considerations. Given Iranian suspicion of Western motives, this
proposal could only have been construed as an ultimatum. Rather than deviate from this
unaccommodating course of action, the Eisenhower administration simply forged
ahead.218 When Mossadegh‘s actions impeded American interests, he was removed from
power, thus setting an early precedent for the Eisenhower administration and its stand on
independent nationalist movements. Political power shifted from elected officials in
Iran‘s parliament to the more autocratic office of the shah.
Having consolidated his political control over Iran with American assistance, the
shah dismantled the country‘s professional associations. Rather than earn the trust of the
middle-class only to lose it later as Mossadegh had done, the shah governed
autocratically. After 1953, the new regime ―either outlawed or rendered functionally
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impotent‖ virtually all secular associations, including the Iranian Parliament.219 The
Eisenhower administration indicated tacit approval of these measures by allocating over
one billion dollars in economic and military aid to Iran from 1953 to 1961 despite CIA
operatives having incited mass demonstrations during the 1953 coup.220 For a brief
period, Mossadegh had benefited from an eager and engaged citizenry. After the 1953
coup, the shah, along with the American government, subordinated civic discourse and
agendas to state interests.
In foreign policy, the shah pursued a course similar to that of his domestic agenda.
He introduced his policy of ―‗positive nationalism‘‖ which replaced ―‗negative
equilibrium‘‖ in name only. Nearly identical to Mossadegh‘s efforts, the shah‘s new
policy ―meant that we [Iranians] make any agreements which are in our own interests,
regardless of the wishes of others.‖221 From the start, the shah attempted to reconcile two
conflicting tendencies: engaging with the West and representing the wishes of his people
who demanded the charting of an independent course in Iran‘s foreign affairs. With
regard to Iran‘s oil policy, the shah agreed to re-configure the AIOC into a ―multinational
[oil] consortium‖ consisting of only four members: Iran, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France. According to historian Mary Ann Heiss, negotiations favored
American interests, specifically U.S. business and national security. 222 During a National
Security Council meeting in 1954, Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Appointed Consultant to the
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Secretary of State, commented that the consortium was ―perhaps the largest commercial
deal ever put together, with assets which might be over a billion dollars.‖ 223 Much like
the consolidation of Suez Canal Company shares, the sense of ―multilateral‖ consensus
was illusory at best, shielding hegemonic ambitions behind an image of broader
cooperation. Like French and Egyptian concentrations of Suez stock, the United States
and Britain dominated Iran‘s new oil consortium by controlling over eighty percent of
Iran‘s oil production.224

II

Between Mossadegh‘s rise and fall in Iran, Egypt had experienced a political
revolution of its own in 1952. Griped by a growing sense of nationalist sentiment,
members of the Free Officers Movement, a small organization within the Egyptian
military, seized control of the government. As early as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of
1936, the Egyptian government gained greater control over the country‘s Military
Academy including its admission policy. That same year, an impressionable Gamal
Abdel Nasser entered the Military Academy as one of fewer than a dozen Egyptians
hailing from various social and economic backgrounds. For the most part, officer corps
careers were reserved for those individuals of Turkish heritage and possessing an elite
social status.225 As a founding member of ―the Free Officers,‖ Nasser was one of a
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handful of military officers who ―adopted policies that tapped into the mainstream of
Egyptian culture and society‖ and coinciding nationalist sentiments. 226 In her book
Mobilizing Islam, Carrie Wickham describes the Free Officers as an organization
dedicated to ―egalitarianism.‖ 227 After Egypt‘s military debacle in the 1948 war with
Israel, the Free Officers became more politically active as Egyptians blamed King Farouk
for sending a poorly prepared Egyptian army off to war against the Jews. 228 Fighting in
Palestine introduced Nasser to like-minded individuals and ―the ideas which illuminated
the path ahead of [him].‖ 229 By 1952, Nasser and other members of the Free Officers
Movement led their country in revolution.
Afterwards, the extent of Egyptian social discontent alarmed Nasser. After
consulting with ―leaders of opinion,‖ the army officers realized that only the army could
ameliorate dangerous levels of factional tension. 230 Roughly a week after the Free
Officers‘ military coup, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), acting as a
provisional government, became permanent and called for the voluntary purging of
―undesirable elements‖ from ―parties and associations.‖ With regard to the nation‘s
institutions of higher learning, the government outlawed non-sanctioned student
organizations, fired non-compliant faculty and administration officials, and stationed
security personnel on campuses nationwide. 231 As one scholar put it, Nasser dominated
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political thought by establishing an ―ideological consensus‖ in Egypt. 232 When political
organizations resisted voluntary assimilation, the RCC abolished political parties,
including popular independent affiliations such as the Wafd party and the Society of
Muslim Brothers.233 The Society of Muslim Brothers, also known as the Muslim
Brotherhood, retaliated by attempting to assassinate Nasser on 26 October 1954.234
Similar to the shah in Iran, Nasser and his RCC sought to forge greater uniformity across
all aspects of Egyptian civil society.
Nasser‘s headlong pursuit of a monolithic order generated considerable dissent
not only between his regime and other competing factions, but also within the RCC. By
1954, Nasser‘s authoritarian sense of order upset leading RCC officials. Where some
RCC leaders including the president of the new government, General Muhammad
Neguib, supported reconciliation with elements once opposed to the revolution, Nasser,
the man wielding ―real power,‖ took a more absolute stand. 235 By November 1954,
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Nasser assumed complete political control after placing Neguib under house arrest. RCC
purges continued for some time. 236 Complete control over every political, economic,
social, and cultural dimension extinguished any opportunities for establishing
connections between diverging points of view. Without access, alienated interests were
either absorbed by the state, perished quietly, went into self-imposed exile, or resorted to
violence. Refusing to acknowledge—let alone acquiesce—to alternative perspectives
elevated despondency and insecurity not only among domestic organizations, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood, but also among regional and international organizations.
What is particularly fascinating about Nasser and his ideological assumptions is
the degree to which he fused his ideas of order with a broader sense of international
populism. In his book Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser
outlined his movement‘s basic principles. First, Nasser explained that Egypt‘s revolution
possessed the unique characteristic of experiencing both a political and a social
revolution simultaneously during and after 1952. Second, Nasser addressed Egypt‘s
acting as an intersection for three overlapping ―circles‖ encompassing pan-Arab, panAfrican, and pan-Islamic associations and their impact on economic development and
political cohesion. In the Arab circle, Nasser accentuated the roots of Arab civilization,
the Arabs‘ geo-strategic importance, and their access to cheap oil as the key strengths of
pan-Arab identity. Oil made the entire region indispensable to the rest of the world;
therefore, according to Nasser, this natural resource should be used to advance the
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interests of all Arab nations as a single bloc. In the African circle, Nasser proclaimed
solidarity with black populations experiencing similar strife in winning independence
from colonial rule. Nasser condemned imperial intrusions throughout the continent and
expressed a desire to create ―an enlightened African consciousness‖ through a Cairobased ―African institute.‖ In the Islamic circle, Nasser wished to reach out to the global
community of Muslims by establishing a ―Parliament of Islam.‖ Under this umbrella
institution, Muslims from all professions and backgrounds would dedicate themselves to
―mutual cooperation.‖237 Together, these spheres form the crux of the ideology bearing
Nasser‘s name.
Scholarly analysis of Nasserism has revealed a great deal about what inspired
Nasser and the lasting significance of his political philosophy. For some, Nasser‘s
realistic assessment of the Egyptian Revolution and its challenges makes his commitment
commendable. Few if any revolutionary figures were inclined to address their own
shortcomings, but Nasser tackled these issues candidly. 238 For others, Nasserist ideology
served as the latest manifestation of an emerging Arab identity. Notions of pan-Arabism
dated back to the 1920s and 1930s when the term ―Arab,‖ once used to describe the
Bedouin, began applying to all those who spoke Arabic. Early twentieth century Arab
intellectuals and writers, such as Muhammad Husain Haikal, had championed pan-Arab
unity. 239 Prior to the ending of World War II, Arabs were already beginning to organize.
From 25 September to 8 October 1944, officials from Syria, Egypt, Transjordan,
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Lebanon, and Iraq convened the Preliminary Conference on Arab Unity. These five
states along with Saudi Arabia drafted the Arab League Charter on 22 March 1945. The
new organization was to coordinate policies relating to ―financial and economic matters,
communications, cultural matters, questions of nationality, social questions, [and]
problems of public health.‖ 240 Ethnic solidarity proved popular with Egypt‘s bureaucratic
elites working within King Farouk‘s old regime just prior to the 1952 revolution. 241
Nasser continued the trend by including pan-Arab visionaries such as Haikal in an innercircle of advisers.
Perhaps more than any other revolutionary, Nasser had succeeded in fusing his
autocratic mindset together with the popular socio-political notions of liberty and massempowerment. Political analyst Raymond Hinnebusch recognizes that although Nasser
oversaw a one-party state, his ―modernization polices‖ enhanced ―the social base of
potential political participation.‖ 242 Compared to the developments in 1950s Iran, Nasser
succeeded in cultivating popular authoritarianism where Mossadegh and the shah had
failed. Nasser claimed to represent a diversified society both within Egypt and across
entire regions because he had incorporated them into his unitary national interests and
identity by dominating domestic professional associations and proposing the creation of
various international institutes designed to synthesize regional policy-making.243 In
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doing so, Nasser emulated Western leaders of the nineteenth century and the Eisenhower
administration of the twentieth century by creating the illusion that monolithic state
interests represented the broadest collection of values shared by the international
community.
Several International Relations specialists have advanced the understanding of
this phenomenon as it applies to the formation of nationalist identity. Benedict Anderson
believes that states used cultural instruments to perpetuate a homogenous sense of
nationalism. Language, especially vernacular language; newspapers; and museums
provide a sense of belonging by bestowing communal values to all members of a
particular group.244 Theorist Ernest Gellner abides by this constructionist view of
nationalism, adding that ―nations are not given, but are created by states and by
nationalists.‖245 Other scholars, such as Partha Chatterjee, contend that embracing
Anderson‘s ―models‖ helped distinguish ―Third-world nationalisms‖ such as
Nasserism. 246 Indeed, Nasser‘s actions reflected these tendencies precisely. As a leading
specialist in Arab political philosophy, Adeed Dawisha understood that ―the application
of Egypt‘s values to the Arab world gave rise to Egypt‘s aspirational goal . . . of ‗Arab
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unity.‘‖ This sense of solidarity would satisfy the need for political and ideological
legitimacy as well as ―the psychological needs of prestige‖ in the Arab world. 247 What
was best for one‘s own state was best for the world as a whole, and both revolutionaries
and reactionaries alike set about promoting a brand of world order that required
conforming to certain cultural standards.

III

During America‘s Red Scare of the early 1950s, socio-political paranoia affected
perceptions on an international level in ways that paralleled those events in Egypt and
Iran. As Cold War scholar Elaine Tyler May contends, Senator Joseph McCarthy‘s anticommunist rampage across national politics blamed the burgeoning ―cosmopolitan urban
culture‖ for the supposed demise of the country‘s ―self-reliant entrepreneurial spirit.‖
Tyler and others often associate McCarthyism with domestic purges. 248 According to
David Reynolds, McCarthyism ―helped stabilize the country in a new conformity.‖ 249
Yet, McCarthy‘s actions simultaneously bred contempt and ―disunity‖ between the
United States and Western Europe.250 As in Egypt and other regions of the world, quests
for conformity within American society negatively affected the international arena.
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Unlike other individual civil servants who had their loyalty questioned by the
government they served, United Nations‘ employees who happened to be American
citizens lay outside this domestic jurisdiction. According to historian Peter Heller, UN
Secretary General Trygve Lie accommodated McCarthyism by dismissing twenty-one
American employees who invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. By mid-1953, Dag
Hammarskjöld‘s election to succeed Lie made it so that he now had ―to reconcile a
member states‘ demand for a certain standard of national loyalty‖ with the international
organization‘s demand for non-partisan objectivity.251 Gingerly, Hammarskjöld faced off
against America‘s policies challenging not only UN integrity, but also the institution‘s
identity.
Hammarskjöld‘s record during this event is mixed. On the one hand, he won
concessions from the U.S. government whereby the Secretary General acted as ―the final
arbiter‖ regarding ―the validity of evidence‖ as to an employee‘s loyalty. In his first two
and half months as Secretary General, Hammarskjöld stated explicitly how ―a truly
international civil service, free from all national pressures and influences, should be
recognized, not only in words, but in deeds.‖ Sadly, he remarked, this ―principle‖ so
fundamental to UN effectiveness was over-shadowed by the organization‘s member
states.252 Of the points contested, Hammarskjöld‘s winning the right to evaluate
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employee loyalty under UN standards and not U.S. standards remained the most
significant.253 On the other hand, some critics say that Hammarskjöld differed little from
his predecessor. ―Hammarskjöld bowed,‖ self-proclaimed socialist and former UN
employee Conor Cruise O‘Brien writes, ―more gracefully and inconspicuously than
Trygve Lie, but bowed none the less, to prevailing American opinion.‖ 254 Hammarskjöld
may have yielded to the whim of America‘s political climate, but he also recognized the
corresponding decline of multilateral diplomacy and prepared the UN for filling this role.
As cultural expressions of UN member states became the standard in
conceptualizing international order, Hammarskjöld focused on defining the relationship
between rigid connotations of world order and the dynamics of multilateralism. During
the same speech in which he called for an independent international civil service, the
Secretary General proclaimed that ―the constructive will of the Member nations to put the
common international interest before national demands‖ determined the extent of the
UN‘s influence. In addition to developing an independent cohort of international civil
servants, Hammarskjöld called on UN Member States to re-engage in the organization‘s
―open debates‖ where perspectives of national interests could be scrutinized and
evaluated. Hammarskjöld argued that ―the debates generally tend in the long run to
reduce the differences between [diverging] positions.‖255 Contrary to the self-serving
trends dominating world affairs, Hammarskjöld‘s philosophical approach quietly
reminded the international community of the fundamental need for governments to
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understand world order in terms of interests that extend beyond the fulfillment of national
interests.

IV

Unfortunately, key diplomatic figures ignored Hammarskjöld‘s unique approach.
Beginning in August 1954, tensions escalated between Communist and Nationalist
Chinese regimes regarding the sovereign status of Quemoy and Matsu, two islands
located in the Formosa Strait between the communist-controlled mainland and the
nationalist holdout of Formosa Island. United States Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles sought to use the UN Security Council to distort international perceptions of
Soviet and Chinese activities. Bringing the matter before the Security Council, Dulles
hoped, would put the Soviet delegates in an untenable situation. If they vetoed a proposal
to have UN officials act as lead negotiators, then the Soviets would be seen as obstructing
international peace. If the Soviets supported the proposal, then the Chinese Communists
would be seen as the ―international outcasts.‖256 Instead of interpreting the UN‘s
potential as an independent organization that could add a new dimension to international
discourse, Dulles disregarded it by using the UN Security Council as an instrument for
endorsing an anti-communist agenda.
Roughly a year after Hammarskjöld‘s remarks calling for a more robust UN role,
another international problem concurrent to the Formosa crisis permitted the Secretary
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General to put his ideas into practice. Before stalemate yielded to armistice in the Korean
conflict, Chinese forces had captured eleven American airmen who had allegedly violated
Chinese airspace. On 14 November 1954—twenty months after their capture—a Chinese
military tribunal sentenced the airmen to prison. Resolution of this crisis made its way
quickly to the United Nations for a number of reasons. 257 First, the United States did not
officially recognize Communist China as a legitimate state. Therefore, American
officials could not negotiate without losing face by tacitly recognizing Communist
China‘s existence. Second, since armed forces involved in the Korean War operated
under United Nations auspices, American officials felt comfortable supporting UNsponsored negotiations. As a result, Hammarskjöld negotiated not on behalf of the
United States, not on behalf of the General Assembly that had mandated his participation,
but rather on behalf of the constitutional merits afforded him under the United Nations
Charter to maintain international peace. 258 Lastly, by characterizing his mission in a
constitutional context, Hammarskjöld served as the only viable mediator acceptable to
both Eastern and Western powers.259 In early January 1955, Hammarskjöld spearheaded
the international effort to reach a compromise.
From the start, the Secretary General displayed a tremendous amount of deference
and inclusiveness to build consensus. From New York, the Secretary General and his
entourage flew to London, Paris, and Delhi before heading on to Canton, Hankow, and,
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finally, Beijing. All along the way, Hammarskjöld conferred with British Foreign
Secretary, Anthony Eden; French Premier, Pierre Mendes-France; and Indian Prime
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Hammarskjöld said of these meetings that ―they represented
. . . a more complete picture of how matters looked from other angles—something which
is essential if this job is to be done properly.‖260 One journalist said of Hammarskjöld‘s
approach, the resourcefulness of personal diplomacy mirrored ―the old fashioned skill
that averted many world crises.‖261 Yet, important characteristics differentiated the
secretary general‘s approach from the diplomatic methods of Ferdinand de Lesseps.
Rather than fabricate consensus to fit a particular agenda, as de Lesseps had done in his
quest to construct the Suez Canal, Hammarskjöld met with national leaders to gather
advice and procure a more holistic view of the problem at hand.
Hammarskjöld‘s methods also hoped to foster greater harmony between
multilateral diplomacy and the fulfillment of individual national interests without
sacrificing one for the other. In a paradoxical sense, the Sino-American standoff
provided Hammarskjöld with the diplomatic leverage he needed to gain credibility as an
impartial party. According to Richard Miller, both China and the United States detested
the idea of backing-down. ―In this somewhat frozen state of affairs,‖ Miller continues,
Hammarskjöld ―served as an honest broker,‖ communicating Chinese and American
perspectives, while earning ―the confidence of both sides in the process.‖ 262 During a
press conference on 14 January 1955, the Secretary General declared, ―There was need to
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exchange information . . . so that the facts might be brought out clearly and possible
misunderstandings might be straightened out.‖ Hammarskjöld believed that by engaging
in what he called ―open diplomacy,‖ he had succeeded in providing both parties room for
diplomatic maneuvering. Any ―final decisions,‖ he continued, ―will emerge as unilateral
decisions and as part of a general development, more than as the result of any kind of, so
to say, settlement.‖263 Indeed, Hammarskjöld‘s analysis proved correct. In May 1955,
Chinese officials released the first of the American flyers. Rather than having conflicting
national interests heighten the sense of crisis, Hammarskjöld hoped to enlist their support
in resolving it by giving them an opportunity to appear as protagonists, advancing the
cause of world peace. Regrettably, no government proved very willing to continue this
trend of easing tensions either in the pacific or elsewhere in the world.

V

To the contrary, relations were strained not only among Cold War adversaries, but
also among allies. In matters pertaining to the Middle East, the earliest signs of
discontent between friendly nations emerged during the negotiations regarding the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954. Under the terms of this arrangement, all British military
personnel were to evacuate Egypt by 1956. This included the gargantuan military base
that defended the Suez Canal Zone. 264 After the evacuation, the Egyptian military would
assume responsibility for canal security. Daily operation of the canal, however, remained
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in the hands of the Suez Canal Company, whose largest share-holder was Great Britain.
According to modern Middle East scholar Douglas Little, U.S. officials encouraged these
concessions in order to prepare for American installation of security agreements with the
Egyptian government. Winning Nasser‘s support was necessary for preventing
communist infiltration into the Middle East.265 Yet, at one point during the negotiations
of 1954, Prime Minister Churchill argued, ―The situation must be avoided in which
people would think that the United States had driven the United Kingdom out of
Egypt.‖266
Attempts to forge a regional security agreement also suffered from fundamental
discrepancies regarding basic regional boundaries. In the negotiations that culminated in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‘s (NATO) creation in 1949, American officials
refused to include Greece and Turkey as founding members of the organization.
According to political scientist, Douglas Stuart, ―extension of the alliance into the Eastern
Mediterranean would blur the regional identity of NATO.‖ Instead, U.S. State
Department officials looked to involve Greece, Turkey, the United States, and Great
Britain in a larger Middle East Command (MEC) that would be associated with
NATO.267 The implied sense of autonomy that the MEC was supposed to enjoy
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disappeared as the Cold war intensified. From 1951 onward, British and, to some extent,
American officials campaigned to have NATO assume the lead in crafting the West‘s
Middle Eastern defense policy. 268
To complicate the context of Middle East security arrangements, shifts in political
power in both the United States and Egypt altered policy priorities. Guaranteeing the
terms necessary for creating a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) that involved
Egypt meant including provisions for the selling of weapons to the Egyptian government.
As early as November 1952, prior to Nasser‘s assuming complete control over Egypt,
General Naguib had agreed to America‘s terms.269 That same month, however,
Eisenhower won the presidency and, soon afterwards, began enacting his ―New Look‖
diplomacy. Instead of funding conventional weapons development and manufacturing,
the Eisenhower administration diverted funds to pay for nuclear weapons systems.270
Therefore, the ideal opportunity for including Egypt in a collective security arrangement
occurred at a time when senior U.S. officials were least likely to take interest.
Efforts made to initiate some degree of collective security suffered from
additional hurtles. During U.S. Secretary of State Dulles‘s meetings with Egyptian
officials in May 1953, the divide between American interests of containment and Arab
interests of improving Arab armed forces came into sharp focus. According to Adeed
Dawisha, Egyptian officials supported ―strengthening the already existing Arab
Collective Security Pact‖ to defeat potential communist threats. Contrary to the
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Americans, Egyptians believed that communist infiltration of the Middle East would
originate from domestic sources instead of coming from an overt act of aggression in the
Caucasus region located some five thousand miles away. 271 In his analysis of U.S.-Arab
relations, Salim Yaqub identifies how ―the United States and the Nasserist movement
applied their shared values inversely.‖ Where American officials wanted unquestioned
support for their Cold War objectives and reconciliation of matters relating to the ArabIsraeli conflict and Western imperialism, Arabs sought diplomatic independence in Cold
War relations and stronger pledges of American support for the Arab struggle against
Zionism and Western imperialism. 272 These perspectives are important in understanding
not only the scope of the divisions surrounding discussions of collective security, but also
in understanding the respective fixation on national interests that remained sacrosanct in
the eyes of those responsible for creating defensive alliances. Given this context, the
likelihood of success for constructive multilateral diplomacy was minimal.
Once Nasser consolidated political power in 1954, he began distancing himself
from any alliance with the West. Egypt‘s new nationalist leader considered any ―armsfor-alliance‖ deal as American neo-imperialism. Eisenhower‘s insistence on American
leadership in any collective security organizations only reinforced Nasser‘s
apprehensions.273 The same could be said for plans to have NATO assume a more direct
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role in Middle East security issues. Yet, even after Nasser‘s coming to power and his
successful Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in 1954, rank and file State Department officials
believed that Nasser would participate in America‘s collective security efforts in
exchange for U.S. weapons.274 These assumptions were erroneous. As historian Peter
Hahn put it, ―having just arranged the departure of British troops, [Nasser] would not
consider signing any agreement requiring the presence of American officers [in Egypt]
under any conditions.‖275 Additionally, the French sale of jet fighter aircraft to Israel in
late 1954 only reinforced Nasser‘s anti-imperialist suspicions of Europe‘s persistent
interference in the region.276 The following year relations among all parties deteriorated
further.
Stymied by Nasser‘s intransigence, U.S. diplomats succeeded in having Iraq sign
a mutual defense agreement with Turkey on 24 February 1955. Doing so deprived the
Soviet Union of gaining access to the Middle East by force without risking an expansive
war. Nasser was concerned that Iraq‘s participation in a regional defense pact might
challenge Egypt‘s control of pan-Arab loyalties.277 Determined not to be excluded,
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British officials joined what came to be called the Northern Tier alliance on 5 April.
British participation dashed American hopes of incorporating anti-imperialist countries
such as Egypt into any Cold War-oriented collective security arrangement. Many,
including officials in Washington, equated British participation with British command
and control of American-supplied armaments.278 Arab nationalists would not tolerate this
type of command structure. As a result, the alliance became, in the words of one scholar,
―quite toothless.‖279 This game of one-upmanship among Arab leaders as well as AngloAmerican allies accentuated international instability that remained characteristic of the
entire period of the mid-1950s.
Speaking at the Fifth Annual All-Jesuit Alumni Dinner, U.S. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles expounded on American perceptions of world peace and security. As
if to refute Hammarskjöld‘s efforts to negotiate among differing views of world order,
Dulles stressed the adversarial relationship pitting ―peace versus liberty.‖ He proclaimed
―that the craven purchase of peace at the expense of principle can result in destroying
much of the human spirit.‖ Should this happen, he continued, ―peace, under certain
conditions, could [cripple] the capacity for moral and intellectual judgment.‖ While
Dulles acknowledged the difficulty in attaining consensus in an increasingly
interconnected world, he concluded that the United States contributed to ―human
freedom‖ through active participation in the United Nations and by entering into ―mutual
security arrangements . . . with more than forty nations [worldwide].‖ 280 By advertising
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American principles as universal norms, Dulles perpetuated the misrepresentation of
multilateralism. Contrary to Hammarskjöld‘s view where the UN acted as a forum for
the exchange of principled perspectives to attain world peace, Dulles argued that peace
processes that sacrificed a nation‘s principles set a dangerous precedent. Indeed, Dulles‘s
generation feared the repercussions of unchecked appeasement, and perhaps rightfully so.
However, Dulles‘s Orwellian logic of representing ―human freedom‖ based on the
American model suggested that liberty was attainable if only the world conformed to
American perceptions of it.281
The differences with regard to world order began to encroach on one another—so
much so that they fostered international instability. The fact that Eisenhower based his
mutual security program on the desire to demonstrate American solidarity with ―the
independence and self-determination of all peoples‖ only agitated British officials and
their efforts to maintain an image of imperial omnipotence. 282 Yet, the Eisenhower
administration‘s empathy for Nasser‘s anti-colonial sentiments also had limits. Dulles
proved reluctant to encourage nationalist pursuits beyond fulfilling Cold War
objectives.283 Reacting to the diametrically opposed views of British imperial policies
and Egypt‘s nationalist agenda, the Eisenhower administration decided to forge ahead
281
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with securing its own (myopic) interests. As a result, America‘s alliances were not as
stable as Dulles had assumed when he attempted to portray American principles as the
basis for interdependency.
Dulles‘s remarks were part of a coordinated media campaign by the Executive
branch to garner Congressional support and appropriations for the mutual security
program. Like his Secretary of State, President Eisenhower equated peace with achieving
America‘s national interests. ―We [Americans],‖ Eisenhower surmised, ―are convinced
that our own continued economic, cultural, and spiritual progress [is] furthered by similar
progress everywhere.‖284 During a 20 April speech to Congress, the president called on
legislators to reallocate money earmarked for Europe‘s continued post-World War II
reconstruction and move it to fund economic, technological, and military development in
Asia. The president proposed transferring over $3.5 billion dollars—roughly two-thirds
of which went to military support—to friendly countries stretching from Japan to Turkey.
The injection of funds would, Eisenhower hoped, spur ―private overseas investment and
private enterprises abroad‖ and, thus, encourage ―loans rather than grants whenever
possible.‖285 Officials at the Bureau of Economic Affairs endorsed the president‘s
foreign aid policy. ―While recognizing and respecting the diversity of values and
institutions in other countries,‖ one report proclaimed, ―[the U.S.] must foster the
adoption of policies conducive to local investment and initiative . . . . [without] the
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appearance of ‗intervention.‘‖ 286 Though sensitive to the self-determination of states,
Eisenhower‘s efforts to extend America‘s influence in Asia upset the supposedly
harmonious relations existing between the United States and its established allies in
Europe. Additionally, the recommendation that the U.S. government engage in foreign
investment without ―intervention‖ demonstrates the indirect efforts made to extend
influence that began more commonplace after the Suez Crisis of 1956.

VI

America‘s deteriorating relations with Israel also suffered during this period.
After taking office in 1952, President Eisenhower distanced himself from the once cozy
relationship with the Jewish State and the ―Israel lobby‖ within the United States. As one
historian put it, ―Dulles admired the Israelis for their pioneering spunk and their
anticommunist zeal but resented their uncompromising approach toward the Arabs and
their unabashed involvement in interest group politics on Capitol Hill.‖ 287 Leading
Jewish advocates created the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations to streamline their message so as not to antagonize the president further.
Conference participants grew frustrated, however, over the loss of influence within the
Eisenhower administration. As historian Peter Hahn put it, Jewish leaders ―discovered
their ineffectiveness limited by the need to arrive at a consensus before each visit‖ with
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Eisenhower.288 The Zionist Movement intensified efforts to mobilize other means of
support. According to the analysis of U.S. State Department officials, Zionist
organizations affiliated with the World Zionist Congress strengthened ties with ―nonZionist supporters of Israel.‖ Cooperation included large-scale bond campaigns where
interested Americans could help off-set gaps resulting from U.S. government cuts in aid.
Previous Israeli bond drives had generated approximately $150 million in revenue.289
The Eisenhower administration‘s handling of relations with Israel demonstrates
the various complexities facing the increasingly diversified field of foreign policymaking. To their credit, administration officials moderated what had been America‘s
decisively pro-Israeli stance. The influence of powerful Jewish lobbies had been checked
in order to curry favor with Arabs. Yet, the means by which it was accomplished in some
ways perpetuated the rising tide of intolerance that was being expressed elsewhere.
Similar to the situations in Iran and Egypt, where national leaders were taking a hard-line
against outspoken interest groups, senior American officials began withdrawing from
outspoken groups which held dissenting opinions. While not as totalitarian as either the
shah‘s eradication of special interest groups or Nasser‘s infiltration of them, the
Eisenhower administration disengaged nonetheless. As a result, Israeli officials
responded with a heightened sense of foreboding.
News of London‘s eventual military evacuation from Suez and Washington‘s
extension of Cold War-oriented military aid to Iraq in 1954 delivered concussive blows
to Israel‘s foreign policy agenda and fueled support for the nation‘s political hardliners
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such as David Ben-Gurion. These events threatened the security of Israel so severely that
Israeli officials disregarded Egypt‘s refusal to join America‘s mutual security program. 290
As Michael Handel argues in his essay on Israeli security strategy, Israel‘s attention to
―short-range survival‖ and ―military solutions,‖ based on ―preemptive strategy,‖
disregarded ―longer-range planning and diplomatic options.‖291 Douglas Little offers a
more nuanced argument by acknowledging that Israel‘s moderate Prime Minister Moshe
Sharett attempted to establish secret negotiations with Nasser but that Israeli hard-liners
succeeded in derailing Sharett‘s plan.292
Similar to the terrorist activities used in 1947 and 1948, Israeli hard-liners
initiated plans to achieve their interests by escalating international tensions in the region.
In July 1954, an Israeli unit attached to the psychological warfare branch of Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) intelligence, activated an ―Egyptian-Jewish network . . . in Cairo
and Alexandria‖ to bomb ―American and British cultural centers and other sensitive sites
[in Egypt].‖293 The objective was to weaken American-Egyptian relations and thus
sabotage international support for Sharett‘s peace initiative. 294 In the wake of the foiled
plot, Israeli public opinion was ―infuriated by the torture of their agents‖ as well as the
sentencing and execution of some of the conspirators.295 Instead of criticizing the
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surreptitious nature of the operation and its intent to thwart peaceful negotiations, Israelis
expressed their solidarity with perpetrators acting in the name of national security.
The Israeli press was complicit in manufacturing this sense of public unity. Press
censorship and state-operated radio gave Ben-Gurion and other ideologues ample
opportunities to edit events to the point where they became ―wholly fictitious.‖ 296
Recording his memoirs years later, the Chief of Staff for the UN Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO), Canadian General E.L.M. Burns described how the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) instigated border disputes to galvanize Israeli opinion and thus
stimulate Israel‘s militarist mentality to enact strong defense policies.297 Jacob Blaustein,
President of the American Jewish Committee, warned Secretary of State Dulles of
Israel‘s domestic political condition and implored the secretary to support Sharett.298
Unfortunately, Blaustein‘s plea proved ineffective. The prime minister‘s conciliatory
approach to international affairs seemed increasingly untenable as Israelis gravitated
towards more reactionary policies.299
Israel‘s antagonistic outlook helped fuel persistent border clashes that occurred all
along Israel‘s frontier. Guerrilla activity from both Arabs and Israelis had occurred
periodically since the 1948 armistice. For the most part, the belligerents remained
content with targeting civilians in the countless raids which occurred between 1948 and
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1955.300 Wanting to appear resolute in the face of mounting security concerns, however,
Sharett yielded to Israeli hard-liners when he appointed David Ben-Gurion as the new
Defense Minister.301 Within two weeks of taking office, Ben-Gurion amended the IDF‘s
rules of engagement to retaliate directly against Arab military personnel. The night of 28
February 1955, two Israeli paratrooper platoons infiltrated the Gaza Strip inflicting nearly
seventy casualties, most of which were Egyptian soldiers. Despite what some historians
might label ―historical determinism,‖ this new Israeli policy made Nasser realize that he
could no longer guarantee his troops‘ security against raids and therefore could not
enforce strict orders preventing Egyptian retaliation. 302 Egypt‘s president also associated
Israel‘s action with a larger, Anglo-American conspiracy designed to overthrow his
government.303 To keep his grip on political power, Nasser grew increasingly determined
to up-grade the nation‘s arsenal.
Sharett also looked to bolster his own sense of security by forming an alliance
with the United States. During Truman‘s presidency, the Tripartite Declaration created
an Anglo-French-American alliance designed to maintain the status quo in the Middle
East following the 1948 armistice. Under the declaration‘s terms, these three Western
powers vowed to help defend either Arabs or Israelis against the aggressor in the event of
another Arab-Israeli war. To help prevent hostilities, the Western powers agreed to
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enforce an arms embargo on any Middle Eastern state planning aggressive military
action. Unable to procure weapons directly in 1954, Sharett requested the Tripartite
Declaration of 1950 be broadened to include an American pledge to protect Israel‘s
borders. If Sharett could not import weapons from the West, then he would attempt to
gain their allegiance in a collective security agreement. Amidst a period of intense Cold
War tensions, however, the United States was disinclined to become pre-occupied with
Arab-Israeli border disputes.304 Sharett‘s lack of diplomatic success combined with his
citizens‘ hard-line sympathies not only contributed to Sharett‘s political defeat in the fall
of 1955, but also served as key examples of the extent to which unilateralist policies
dictated international affairs. Under Ben-Gurion‘s leadership, the Israeli government
took to securing its own interests regardless of the consternation caused to the
international community.

VII

Newly independent countries struggled with similar inclinations as they asserted
themselves into world politics more effectively. The Asian Relations Conference of 1947
had laid some of the groundwork, but later meetings in the mid-1950s solidified an
independent sense of world order known as non-alignment. The Bandung Conference, or
Asian-African Conference, of 1955 marks the definitive origins of the non-aligned
movement and its foray into international politics. Located approximately one hundred
and twenty miles southwest of Indonesia‘s capital, Jakarta, Bandung hosted
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representatives from twenty-nine African and Asian nations.305 Agenda items focused on
strengthening relations among the participants, discussing strategies for solving ―social
economic and cultural problems‖ facing these new nations, examining ways of promoting
―world peace,‖ and exchanging views regarding the challenges of surmounting the biases
and stigma great powers attached to post-colonial powers.306 Disinterested in the bipolar, Cold War paradigm, non-aligned countries such as India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan,
Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Egypt, and many others sought to reverse the manipulative
behavior that imperial world powers exploited.
In coming together as they did, many conference delegates shared a suspicion of
an imposed sense of world order, especially one emanating from the West. Historian
Peniel Joseph describes the Bandung conference as ―part of an emerging Third World
solidarity that challenged white supremacy at the global level,‖ free from ―the Cold
War‘s ideological restrictions.‖ 307 Conference observers such as Australian journalist,
C.P. Fitzgerald, and expatriated African-American activist, Richard Wright, also realized
to varying degrees that the conference minimized the role ―doctrine and ideology played‖
favoring instead a greater ―breadth of mind.‖ Both men agreed that the West should be
sensitive to the perspectives expressed at Bandung. Yet, where Fitzgerald expressed
305
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some skepticism over non-alignment‘s idealistic rhetoric, Wright advocated the
―transnational humanism that [exceeded] narrow nationalisms of any kind.‖ Fitzgerald
worried that the divide was growing between Asian democracies, such as India, Ceylon,
and, at the time, Burma, on the one hand, and Western democracies, on the other. Asia‘s
free and independent electorate, he said, contested the ideological and economic allure of
Western democracies. Although these Asian democracies remained critical of Western
policies in many respects, Fitzgerald warned against Westerners categorizing non-aligned
ideology as communist infiltration. 308 Official reaction among American policy-makers
justified Fitzgerald‘s fears.
American reactions to the Bandung Conference confirmed the backhanded
attention paid to post-colonial nations. For the most part, U.S. officials viewed the event
only so far as it directly impacted Cold War interests. Particular attention dissected
Communist China‘s participation and statements made relating to Taiwan. 309 With
regard to other agenda items such as decolonization, the Eisenhower administration‘s
opposition to immediate liberation placed, as one historian put it, the ―First World . . . on
a collision course with the goals of Third World nationalists.‖ 310 The Eisenhower
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administration refused to send official observers to Bandung and failed to send official
greetings to the conference members as was customary for such occasions. 311
Furthermore, Eisenhower‘s Mutual Security Program was unveiled in an attempt to upstage the conference, by portraying the Northern Tier countries as allies in the fight to
contain communism. It was precisely this type of mentality that irritated non-aligned
leaders and provoked non-aligned fears of Cold War exploitation.
Although the participants at Bandung wished to advance their national interests,
these influences failed to dominate the proceedings. United States Representative Adam
Clayton Powell (Democrat-New York), another of America‘s unofficial observers,
testified to the rhetoric that both the Indian and Chinese delegations sometimes used in
unsuccessful attempts to control the proceedings. 312 According to scholar David Kimche,
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru convened the Bandung Conference in part to
check China‘s emergence as a regional power. Earlier in 1954, these two Asian giants
agreed bi-laterally to Panch Sheel, or ―five principles‖ emphasizing non-aggression,
equality, respect for territorial sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and
peaceful co-existence. At Bandung, Nehru hoped to extend Panch Sheel to others.
However, not everyone agreed with these principles. Krishna Menon, leader of India‘s
delegation to the United Nations and Nehru‘s trusted emissary, described the ―five
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principles‖ as poorly written. Nasser remained uninterested in them, too; other delegates
from Iraq and Turkey said they went against the United Nations Charter. 313 In other
cases, Indian and Indonesian attempts to spread ―‗positive neutralism‘‖ met with anticommunist rhetoric from other delegates.314 While en route to Indonesia, Richard Wright
noticed that the Egyptian delegation boarding the plane to the archipelago nation was
obsessed with winning support for the Arab cause. 315 Nasser even threatened to boycott
the conference if Nehru invited Israel. 316 As the conference opened, Wright described the
scene as ―brooding, bitter, [and] apprehensive . . . . Everybody read into it his own fears;
the conference loomed like a long-buried ghost rising from a muddy grave.‖ 317 Wright‘s
vivid metaphor seemed not only ominous, but also unjustified.
The remarkable characteristic of the Bandung Conference was that, despite
several attempts, the interests of no single delegation dominated the proceedings.
Participants agreed upon the representation of diverse interests and demanded respect of
that diversity. In a gesture of multilateral solidarity, the delegates issued an eleven-page
document listing recommendations for fulfilling non-aligned objectives. Known as the
Bandung Communiqué, the document called for strengthening mutually beneficial trade
agreements and facilitating cultural exchanges in areas such as education. Support for
human rights and ―the principle of self-determination of peoples‖ also commanded
considerable attention. With regard to world peace and cooperation, attendees called
upon the United Nations to expand its membership. According to the Bandung
313
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Communiqué, nearly a quarter of the nations represented at Bandung were ready for
immediate induction into the world organization. Additionally, the conference supported
UN-sanctioned self-defense, ―universal disarmament,‖ and ―abstention from . . .
collective defense [designed] to serve any particular interests of the big powers.‖ 318
Contrary to Iranian, Egyptian, American, British, or Israeli policy-making of the early
1950s, the conference‘s recommendations provided a more genuine and multilateral
consensus to which the participants were committed. Whether intentional or not, these
general recommendations symbolized a more constructive alternative in world politics by
contesting unilateralist perspectives attempting to represent a more multilateral agenda.

VIII

Multilateral diplomacy receded once again after the conference had concluded.
Returning to Egypt, Nasser focused on the country‘s security matters. In his biography of
Dag Hammarskjöld, Brian Urquhart argues that Nasser remained conciliatory towards
Israel in the wake of the February 1955 attack. By April, however, Nasser had opened
arms deal negotiations with the Soviet Union‘s Ambassador to Egypt. Keen on not
seeming beholden to the West‘s benevolence, Nasser decided to open a dialogue with the
Soviets and members of the Eastern bloc. The new Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev,
was also eager to improve relations with Third World nationalists to broaden the scope of
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the Cold War. In doing so, Khrushchev reversed his predecessor‘s guarded attitudes
towards Egypt.319
The United States and its staunchest allies, Britain and France, realized the
destabilizing effect Nasser‘s request could have on the region, but the members of the
Tripartite Declaration differed on how to handle the escalating tensions. In June 1955,
American Ambassador to Israel, Edward Lawson, met with Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe
Sharett. The prime minister confirmed ―that unless the United States, United Kingdom,
and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) were able to prevail upon the
Egyptians to stop shooting at Israelis inside Israeli territory‖ Israel would take matters
into its own hands. British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and Britain‘s Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, Harold Macmillan, wanted to pressure Nasser by having the
Tripartite allies make a show of force communicating the West‘s determination. 320
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles disagreed, opting instead to act
through the United Nations‘ Security Council. At a June 16 meeting in New York City
of the American, British, and French officials, both Dulles and American Ambassador to
the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., stressed the need for Security Council recommendations
to legitimize economic pressure. 321 American officials deserve some credit for their
willingness to recruit UN help in the event of an Arab-Israeli war. However, the motives
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for doing so remained centered around the imposition of a Western sense of world order
instead of facilitating a greater sense of multilateral diplomacy.
To a degree, the very nature of the West‘s Middle East foreign policy was
fundamentally flawed. On the one hand, the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 wished to
perpetuate the status quo. On the other hand, however, the Eisenhower administration‘s
desire to create a collective security organization in 1954 bred contempt among Arabs
and Israelis alike, which upset the status quo. Egyptians feared American intrusion.
Israelis feared American abandonment. And, as if to bring the conundrum full circle, the
U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade, reported to his superiors that should the U.S.
deny weapons to Egypt, the Arabs would ―interpret [America‘s actions] as being totally
partial to Israel.‖ Rather than admit the pitfalls of their own policies, senior officials in
Washington responded to Byroade‘s warning by reiterating the collective security
agreement necessary for any arms accord with Nasser. 322
Denied help from the West, Nasser turned to the Soviets for assistance. Unlike
the diplomatic quagmire American and Egyptian officials encountered in their arms deal
negotiations, relations between the Egyptians and the Soviets began improving as early as
1954. Egyptian negotiations with the communist bloc proceeded throughout the spring
and summer of 1955. Commensurate with these talks, border clashes between Egyptians
and Israelis became more aggressive. By September 1955, the Egyptian government had
resorted to training and equipping the fedayeen, a militant group emerging from within
322
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populations of disenfranchised Palestinian refugees. Israeli forces retaliated by seizing
―the Demilitarized Zone of El Auja, the strategic key to both the Negev and Sinai.‖ 323 On
12 September 1955, Egyptian and Czechoslovakian officials concluded an arms deal
agreement.
For Nasser, the arms deal tackled several of Egypt‘s chronic strategic and
economic problems simultaneously. First, Egypt succeeded in modernizing its military
forces. Nasser arranged to take delivery of 200 Soviet-built MIGs half of which were to
arrive by December 1955. Of these initial aircraft, thirty-seven were ―‗medium‘ bombers
(presumably IL-28s)‖ with the remaining sixty-three being MIG-15 fighter planes. Also
included in the cache of weapons were ―one hundred heavy tanks [including Joseph
Stalin Mark IIIs and Czech T-34s], six torpedo patrol boats, and two submarines.‖ 324
Russian technicians were to provide a ninety-day training course to Egyptian
personnel. 325
Second, the Czech arms deal helped revive Egypt‘s flagging economy. Instead of
having to pay cash as it would have done with any purchase of weapons from the United
States, cash-strapped Egypt agreed to pay for Soviet weapons with one of its few natural
resources dating back to the nineteenth century—cotton. The economic boost the arms
deal delivered to Egypt came none too soon for Nasser. In her assessment of Middle
Eastern economies, Robin Barlow notes that, after Egypt‘s 1952 revolution, ―general
stagnation‖ hit the country where agricultural output floundered as a result of abrupt land
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reforms and Egypt‘s fiscal obsession with maintaining balanced budgets to avoid
accruing additional debt.326 Early in 1955, American officials were also learning through
their embassy in Cairo that Nasser had trouble selling his country‘s current cotton crop,
which was necessary prior to planting for next year‘s harvest.327
After years of haggling with various world powers, Nasser finally concluded an
arms deal. The event was significant for several reasons. Nasser had achieved a
diplomatic coup that reverberated throughout the international community. The Egyptian
leader gained access to weapons systems that outclassed any others in the region without
sacrificing Egyptian autonomy. During a United States Special National Intelligence
Estimate (SNIE) meeting on 12 October 1955, various department heads agreed that
Egypt‘s purchases from Czechoslovakia tipped ―qualitative and quantitative superiority‖
in Egypt‘s favor in both tanks and planes. They also agreed that Egypt required a year or
so to integrate these weapons into his armed forces and use them effectively. 328
While by no means an example of multilateral diplomacy, the Czech arms deal
showed that the Soviets had proven themselves to be more effective at mastering the
appearance of multilateralism. Quickly after consolidating political control in Russia,
Khrushchev began improving relations with nationalist leaders in the developing
world.329 Unlike American proposals, the Soviets‘ terms for an arms agreement benefited
Egypt in several ways, not only in the more obvious strategic, political, and economic
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areas, but also, and more importantly, in catering to Nasser‘s sense of Arab
empowerment and pan-Arab solidarity. In Guy Laron‘s words, ―Nasser was able to
regain what the Baghdad pact was supposed to take away: his dominant position in the
Arab world.‖330 By 1 October 1955, the Arab League, Egyptian Bar Association,
Egyptian Army and police commands, Chamber of Commerce, Cairo‘s Greek and
Cyproit communities, the rector of Cairo‘s Al Azhar University, and Saudi Arabia‘s
Ambassador to Egypt all expressed their support.331 Khrushchev could appreciate
Nasser‘s perspective to a greater degree than Western diplomats dared. For Nasser, the
Soviet‘s appreciation and accommodation of pan-Arabism paid high dividends.

IX

Securing a supply of modern armaments allowed Nasser to deliver on promises
made in support of anti-colonial liberation movements. Since 1 November 1954, the
Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front, or FLN) had launched raids
nationwide against French colonial forces in Algeria. Within weeks, Nasser was shipping
rifles and heavy weapons to FLN-friendly intermediaries in Tripoli. 332 Introducing
additional weapons to the region, French officials feared, would help transform the
Algerian War into a war of attrition. If that happened, the war could attract greater
international attention, requiring the French government to expend additional resources to
justify its intervention.
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Egypt‘s involvement, as well as the various diplomatic strategies that each side
pursued, convey a substantial amount of international interest. Almost immediately,
French and pro-FLN factions began lobbying segments of the international community
for help. The French government had the paradoxical task of portraying the insurrection
as an internal matter that did not warrant the international community‘s attention, while
simultaneously soliciting military and diplomatic support from its Western allies. 333
Meanwhile, anti-colonial FLN sympathizers sought to bring international attention to the
inhumanity Algerian Muslims were experiencing. Proposals to debate the Algerian
Question in the General Assembly had had been circulated since 1954, but the UN
Steering Committee had voted against it.334 On 30 September 1955, three days after
news of the Czech arms deal with Egypt went public, the General Assembly of the United
Nations agreed to put the Algerian Question on the agenda.
French officials were appalled. Editorials in France‘s Le Monde newspaper
decried the hypocrisy of nations voting in favor of airing debate whose ―own conduct
[over what was considered to be domestic matters of state] was primitive.‖ 335 As historian
Matthew Connelly put it, the French thought U.S. diplomats ―could . . . command a
majority in the [UN‘s] General Assembly.‖ 336 Perhaps thinking back to UN Resolution
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181, where the United States corralled UN member states, French officials thought that
American influence was irresistible. When the opposite proved true and the UN voted to
debate the Algerian Question, French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay blamed his
American allies. Pinay also thought that ―the U.S. had not fully recognized the dangers
inherent in the fusion of the Bandung and Soviet blocs, which he considered the greatest
threat to the stability of the world.‖ 337 French officials looked to monopolize institutions
representing diverse perspectives in order to legitimize unilateral action. According to
New York Times reporter, Harold Callender, French officials tried desperately to project a
unified front in maintaining order in Algeria; but it was political divisions within France
that led the UN to act. Unable to exercise its influence effectively in the General
Assembly, the French delegation withdrew rather than admit its own limitations. 338
Similar to American involvement in UN Resolution 181, the Iranian government‘s
coercion of professional associations, Nasser‘s plans for pan-Arab unity, and British
efforts to remain relevant in the Middle East through the Baghdad Pact, French policymakers required a high degree of conformity in order to manipulate international
perception. During the height of the Suez crisis in October and November 1956, officials
from virtually every country suffered a similar lack of influential conformity.
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X

President Eisenhower adopted a parallel strategy to that of his French allies when
he attempted to fuse Western-led collective security arrangements with UN efforts to
maintain international security in the Middle East. While convalescing from a heart
attack in Denver, Colorado, Eisenhower delivered a 320-word statement on 9 November
1955 that affirmed his support for the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 as an instrument of
security. Later in the same statement, however, Eisenhower backed UN efforts to
institute a peaceful settlement serving as the basis for ―true security.‖ 339 The President‘s
dual endorsement proved counter-productive. Where the Tripartite Declaration enforced
the status quo of armistice, efforts—both UN-inspired and not—to achieve a Middle East
settlement depended upon hefty concessions. Dulles presented one such proposal
whereby Israel relinquished a sizable portion of southern territory to Arab control. 340
Additionally, any context involving execution of the Tripartite Declaration would involve
re-deployment of European forces to a region ardently anti-imperialist in its outlook. As
a result, Western-inspired coalitions would destabilize the region rather than bring a
sense of calm and order that UN officials were attempting to facilitate. Unfortunately,
Eisenhower continued to insist that these two initiatives remain interchangeable.
Fallout emerging from the Egyptian government‘s arms deal with the Soviets also
complicated an already intricate diplomatic scene in the Middle East. In addition to
perpetuating anti-colonial independence movements and elevating international attention,
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Nasser‘s actions armed him with additional diplomatic leverage to which American and
British negotiators responded.341 With help from the World Bank, British and the
American policy-makers agreed to finance the Aswan Dam project designed to
modernize Egypt‘s economy and utilities. Putting the dam‘s significance in historical
terms, U.S. Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. said that the project would be in
comparable economic terms ―larger than the total of all U.S. public works of this type
produced since 1900.‖342 The dam would tame Nile flooding, add nearly 1.3 million
acres of arable land—―equivalent to about 1/3 of the total acreage [cultivated in all of
Egypt in 1955,]‖ generate 10 million kilowatt hours of electricity per year, and stimulate
industry.343 In particular, Egypt‘s cotton industry stood to benefit mightily from the
enormous public works project.
The prospect of a cotton glut on the world market upset an already unstable cotton
industry. During a meeting with the interested parties involved in the Aswan Dam
proposal, Hoover admitted that the increased cotton production which would result from
the dam‘s completion gravely concerned U.S. cotton growers.344 America‘s cotton
surpluses throughout the 1950s undercut prices to the point where farmers could no
longer make a decent living. By 1955, eighty percent of North Carolina‘s acreage
allotment for cotton was measured in increments of six acres or less. On Capitol Hill,
politicians proposed a two-price system raising domestic prices to offset lower prices
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necessary for competing on in international market.345 Hoover ―hoped‖ that the world‘s
cotton glut would dissipate by the time of the dam‘s completion. Eisenhower believed
that U.S. population growth would compensate the world‘s cotton producing capacity. 346
In addition to potentially upsetting America‘s domestic cotton growers, who lobbied for
federal subsidies, U.S. involvement in the Aswan Dam project also challenged the
administration‘s basic principles of foreign aid policy.
Since 1954, the Eisenhower administration had grappled with the Cold War
dimensions of the socio-economic strategies of developing nations. Ideally, Eisenhower
wished to reserve foreign aid for private enterprises in what has been described as
traditional ―liberal international political economy.‖347 As a result, the president‘s
economic philosophy scuttled initiatives doling Western aid out to the governments of
developing countries. The administration even opposed ―multilateral development grant
funds‖ that the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld supported. Eisenhower feared
that developing countries would become dependent upon UN grants.348 During a 1
December 1955 National Security Council meeting at Camp David, Maryland,
Eisenhower‘s advisers debated the details of an Aswan Dam proposal. U.S. Secretary of
Defense Charles Wilson proposed recruiting Egypt‘s private investors to help fund
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construction. 349 Although palpable to Western capitalists, supporters of Wilson‘s
recommendation ignored long-held Egyptian resentments toward capitalist exploitation.
Failure to consider the Egyptians‘ economic philosophy made capitalist-oriented
motives moot. Nasser‘s contempt for private enterprise harkened back to his helping lead
Egypt‘s revolution. Along with foreign exploitation, high concentrations of wealth and
land ownership prior to the 1952 revolution resulted in government corruption, unfair
taxation, and exploitation of Egypt‘s lower social classes. 350 Wilson and others in the
Eisenhower administration also over-estimated the strength of Egypt‘s private sector and
under-estimated their loyalties to the state. As a Fulbright scholar living in Egypt during
the 1950s, Richard Mitchell observed that ―the capitalist, placing his own interests before
those of the nation, fails to use wisely the natural and human resources of the state.‖351
The governments of developing countries were often the only institutions capable of
handling massive infrastructural projects. In some cases, social elites in developing
countries ―preferred‖ state-sponsored modernization.352 Presumably, Egyptian
entrepreneurs could profit from new national infrastructure without taking any initial
investment risk.
Other administration officials questioned the ideological wisdom of any deal.
Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey raised concerns over providing funds for
enhancing Nasser‘s socialist-based economy. Making an unintended pun, Humphrey
understood the Aswan Dam as ―a case of ‗damned if you do and damned if you
349
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don‘t.‘‖353 On the one hand, the project stood to strengthen Egypt‘s economy
tremendously, reduce the nation‘s poverty, and thus reduce the chances of its shift to the
Soviet sphere. On the other hand, raising Egypt‘s cotton production only increased its
ability to procure additional Soviet weapons if necessary, while simultaneously
competing with U.S. cotton growers. Hoover also expressed reservations about the
extent of the dam‘s actual impact upon Egypt‘s socio-economic standing. He worried
that any arable land development would simply off-set Egypt‘s population growth and, in
the end, offer no improvement in the nation‘s standard of living. Smiling, Eisenhower
responded by quoting a memorable World War I cartoon: ―If you knows a better ‘ole, go
to it.‖354
The exchange at Camp David demonstrates both the potential success and
inherent failure of Eisenhower‘s foreign aid strategy. Remarkably, Eisenhower‘s
decision to go ahead with the loan proposal demonstrated a willingness to work with
national-socialist regimes while simultaneously fulfilling Cold War objectives of
containing communism‘s spread. Regrettably, however, the aid package proved
incompatible with Nasser‘s economic philosophy. The administration understood how to
strengthen relations with the Egyptian government through socio-economic development,
but it lacked the philosophical flexibility necessary for sustaining successful negotiations.
U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, announcement on 19 December 1955
that American loans would be extended to Egypt to help finance the Aswan Dam project.
The United States and Great Britain proposal included an initial offer of a combined $200
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million in loans while the World Bank pledged another $200 million. 355 As early as
1953, the World Bank had re-defined itself as a ―conservative institution,‖ extending
loans on a highly conditional basis. 356 Terms for the Aswan Dam project proved to be no
exception. The World Bank, working through the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), presented Nasser with terms, forming a partnership between
the bank and Egypt to ensure stability of the country‘s ―inflation‖ and ―creditworthiness‖
and to monitor Egypt‘s foreign debt.357 Conscious of Ismail‘s sale of Suez shares in 1875
which resulted in the sacrificing of Egypt‘s sovereignty to British officials, Nasser
interpreted the West‘s Aswan proposal as an infringement upon Egypt‘s selfdetermination. In a New Year‘s Day telegram to the State Department, Ambassador
Byroade explained the prime minister‘s hesitation:
Documents would become published and they would simply say on their
face to public opinion here that Egypt had surrendered its sovereignty and
independence in economic and financial fields to [the] World Bank.
[Nasser] talked at length as to why Egyptians are unusually sensitive, in
view [of] their history, to matters involving large foreign debt. 358
Tapping the Western-established World Bank resources meant agreeing to Westernoriented terms. The stipulations were perfectly logical and moderate. According to
Byroade, even Nasser ―realized [that the] bank must have safeguards upon its
investment.‖ Not wanting to have Aswan Dam funding slip away, Nasser offered several
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counter-proposals from changing World Bank procedures to using the bank‘s money
during the latter stages of the project.359 Both sides understood the impact the project
would have upon Egypt‘s modernization, but neither side was willing to make the
necessary concessions.

XI

This inability to interact with diverging opinions became symptomatic for
international affairs in general throughout 1956. By January, an earlier agreement among
U.S., French, and British officials regulating weapons shipments to the Middle East was
collapsing. Pressure from Israel for arms to counter those Egypt received from the Soviet
bloc continued to affect adversely U.S.-Israeli relations. Israeli Prime Minister Sharett‘s
inability to negotiate an arms agreement isolated him politically. Like an Israeli Disraeli,
Israeli Defense Minister Ben-Gurion manipulated deteriorating relations with Arab
neighbors and used ―officials and party functionaries, who played highly dubious roles
involving questions of dual loyalty‖ to weaken Sharett‘s position further. 360 Where
Sharett clung to the hope of allying with and receiving arms from the United States, BenGurion implemented a more unilateral approach. 361 Despite some difference of opinion,
historian David Tal agrees that Israel‘s growing belligerency, evident since Ben-Gurion‘s
return to government, alienated the Arabs. As American ambassador to Israel, Edward
Lawson, reported from Tel Aviv, Ben-Gurion grew ―extremely nervous‖ over Egypt‘s
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access to modern armaments while the West deprived Israel equal access. 362 The
growing sense of anxiety felt throughout much of Israeli society led to Ben-Gurion‘s
becoming Prime Minister on 2 November 1955. Only after Ben-Gurion‘s victory did the
U.S. allow France and others to supply weapons to Israel. Once this happened, status quo
agreements such as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 lost all meaning.
Nasser also pursued an increasingly unilateral agenda once both Mid-East peace
and Aswan Dam negotiations stalled. As a personal friend of the president and a former
deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Anderson became Eisenhower‘s special
representative to the Middle East. Two trips to the region in early 1956 convinced
Anderson, Eisenhower, and Dulles of Nasser‘s uncooperativeness. Much like the
controversy surrounding the Aswan Dam, Nasser could not agree to the open, formal
Arab-Israeli negotiations Anderson intended. Direct meetings would cost Nasser
politically at home—a price, Nasser suspected, he could not afford. In an October 1955
State Department communiqué, one Foreign Service Officer reported that Nasser‘s hardline with Israel was popular with the working class and labor leaders. Nasser used this
political momentum, but he did not trust it. 363 Even as late as 1956, Nasser continued to
fear ―overthrow and assassination.‖ 364 However, if properly enticed and supported by the
West, Egypt and Nasser would make unilateral and clandestine progress toward settling
Israeli-Egyptian disputes. Dulles interpreted the prime minister‘s view as a subtle form
of diplomatic blackmail to give Egypt time to stockpile weapons without having to
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formally recognize or participate in negotiations with Israel. 365 Nasser would control the
form and pace of Middle East peace and would be the sole pan-Arab representative.
As a result of Nasser‘s position, the West tried to isolate him while
simultaneously providing arms to Israel. Known as the Omega initiative, the United
States began covertly undermining Nasser‘s pan-Arab aspirations. Among other things
the plan denied Egypt the sale of Western-manufactured weapons, delayed Aswan Dam
negotiations as well as food shipments and other aid to Egypt, interfered with Egyptian
interests in Yemen and elsewhere in the Middle East, and generated support for Saudi
Arabia‘s leadership as an Arab alternative to Nasser.366 Meanwhile, the same day Dulles
expressed these views, he met with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban.
Dulles told him of America‘s unhappiness with Nasser and supported Israel‘s acquiring
arms from France and other Western suppliers. 367 All of this, however, happened in
secret. During an April Fools Day meeting with the British Ambassador to the United
States, Dulles unveiled his plans. He remained committed to pledging American
cooperation with Britain ―on a secret basis,‖ avoiding an ―open break with Nasser,‖ and
allowed French and Canadian arms shipments to Israel to proceed.368 The Secretary‘s
strategy represented the country‘s private actions regarding Middle East policy. Publicly,
the Eisenhower administration supported Hammarskjöld‘s efforts to ease Arab-Israeli
tensions.
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XII

Shortly after the New Year, the Secretary General made his first of two trips to
the Middle East. His maiden trip was part of a larger world tour designed to better
understand the international issues facing the United Nations. Three days after
Hammarskjöld‘s 24 February return to New York, he shared his initial impressions at a
press conference focusing predominately on conditions in the Middle East. With the
calculated candor that accompanied all his public statements, the Secretary General
believed that the Arab-Israeli dispute was ―dramatized‖ to the point of obstructing
compromise. When asked of the Cold War‘s impact upon the region, Hammarskjöld
replied:
I think the basic fact in the understanding of that area is that irrespective of
the side—Israel or Arab—there is a very strong wish to be independent
and to mould one‘s own fate according to one‘s own ideas. By
implication, you can see that pressures or imprudent discussion, from
whatever side it comes, is unhelpful.
Instead of ―imposing [its] will,‖ the organization could help foster ―reasonable progress
toward‖ all-purpose objectives ―to keep people from rushing into a conflict because they
cannot get everything at once or cannot get it in just the form that they would like.‖ 369
Rather bluntly, he identified national self-interest as a leading culprit in escalating ArabIsraeli tensions not only regionally, but globally as well. Hammarskjöld‘s second trip in
April suffered as a result of these myopic international conditions.
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By the end of March 1956, Security Council members convened to address rising
Arab-Israeli tensions. According to one of Nasser‘s closest confidents, Mohamed Heikal,
Israel‘s protest of an alleged 180 border incidents near Gaza during the previous four
months demonstrated the region‘s volatile instability.370 On 4 April, the Security Council
unanimously authorized Hammarskjöld to negotiate directly with the concerned parties to
re-establish ―the [1949] armistice demarcation lines,‖ and allow UN policing of those
borders.371 As if to emphasize the point even more, the day before Hammarskjöld‘s
departure to the Middle East, Israeli artillery shelled Gaza killing 59 people and
wounding 93 others. Egyptian-endorsed fedayeen raids followed. Similar to UN
involvement following the 1947 partition, Hammarskjöld‘s mission functioned as a tool
for imposing order. Yet, as witnessed in 1947, the most ardent UN member states calling
for order also served as the ones most involved in pursuing their own interests in the
region.
As Hammarskjöld hop-scotched around the Middle East, various interests
continued implementing contradictory policies. American activities serve as an excellent
example. In a 9 April telegram to Nasser and Ben-Gurion, President Eisenhower
expressed his full support for the Hammarskjöld mission calling upon both leaders to
practice ―high statesmanship.‖372 Ambassador Byroade even encouraged Nasser‘s full
disclosure to Hammarskjöld and Chief of Staff for the UN Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO), General E.L.M. Burns regarding Egypt‘s involvement in the
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fedayeen raids so as not to upset any possible cease-fire agreement.373 Between these two
communiqués, however, the White House received a message from Saudi Arabia‘s King
Saud pledging his cooperation with the United States, thus setting in motion America‘s
plan to shift support away from Nasser. 374 While the United States backed UN efforts to
instill order on the one hand, the American Superpower cultivated instability by
challenging Nasser‘s authority in the Arab world. American officials undermined the
legitimacy of the Arab world‘s chief representative at the exact moment that he engaged
in legitimate negotiations working toward a Middle East peace.
Sadly, the United States was not alone in these foreign policy follies. On 18
April, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden opened meetings with Soviet leaders Nikolai
Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev. In Heikal‘s words, ―Eden was anxious to get Russia to
become a signatory to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to ration the supply of arms to
Middle Eastern countries.‖ Nasser feared Russia‘s compliance with the declaration and,
with it, the potential threat to Egypt‘s steady supply of munitions. These fears played a
pivotal role in Nasser‘s search for alternative weapons suppliers and Egypt‘s official
recognition of China‘s Communist government on 16 May. 375 In turn, Egypt‘s move
alarmed U.S. officials who considered it further evidence of Nasser‘s shift to the
communist sphere.
Realizing the need for reconciliation with the West, Nasser acquiesced to the
terms accompanying the Aswan Dam offer. ―By the end of June,‖ writes historian Steven
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Freiberger, ―Dulles knew that Nasser had dropped the objections he had raised to the loan
in February.‖ Dulles also knew that Nasser had solicited the Soviets for a loan proposal.
Despite reassurances to the contrary, the Secretary‘s patience with Nasser expired. He
wanted to make an example of Nasser to others who considered practicing international
opportunism. 376 On 19 July, Dulles withdrew U.S. funding for the dam. Britain followed
suit shortly thereafter. Dulles legitimized his action by citing the lack of Congressional
support for allocating the funds.377 While true, Dulles‘s explanation was not presented as
the official reason for the loan cancellation. The official announcement blamed Nasser
for killing the loan proposal. ―Agreement by the riparian states,‖ the announcement
declared, ―has not been achieved, and the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to
assure the project‘s success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was
made.‖378 Why the Eisenhower administration let a chance to publicly chastise the
Democratically-controlled Congress slip away in an election year remains a nagging
question and reinforces the prevailing trend towards minimizing internal dissent by
focusing attention on international differences.
Nasser received word of Dulles‘s announcement as the Egyptian President left the
Brioni Conference. Unlike the more inclusive Bandung Conference, the Brioni summit
included Nasser, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Yugoslavian President
Josip Broz Tito. In H.W. Brands study of the non-aligned movement, this triumvirate
constituted ―the big three of the neutralist world.‖ 379 Continuing the work of the
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Bandung Conference, the Brioni gathering sought greater coordination of policies among
these distinguished leaders. According to Nasser‘s adviser, Mohamed Heikal, Tito also
wished to inform his colleagues of changes within the Soviet Union and its international
outlook resulting from what Tito had heard at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist
Party earlier that year.380 Nasser and Nehru were en route to Cairo when they learned of
the Eisenhower administration‘s decision to withdraw funding for the dam. 381 Heikal
argues, however, that Nasser was already aware of the Americans‘ plan nearly two weeks
prior to the official announcement.382 A week after Dulles‘s reversal, Nasser proclaimed
Egypt‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal to generate the extra revenue necessary for
constructing the Aswan Dam.
During this time of rising tensions in the international arena, Secretary General
Hammarskjöld made a second trip to the Middle East. This second journey had two
enlightening effects. First, it proved substantially more inclusive in its diplomatic
approach. As Richard Miller makes clear, the mission gave Hammarskjöld a first-hand
perspective and personal contact with the region‘s leaders. 383 The Secretary-General‘s
testy but durable relationship with David Ben-Gurion and Hammarskjöld‘s more
amicable relationship with Egypt‘s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi allowed for ―the
utmost frankness.‖384 An honest exchange of views and concerns accompanied these
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friendly meetings which approached the heart of genuine constructive dialogue rather
than add to the entrenched exchange of rhetorical noise.
Second, Hammarskjöld‘s trip demonstrated the highly complex forces at work
within the international community as a whole. Hammarskjöld remained reasonably
optimistic when reporting his findings to the Security Council in early May. His
observations revealed that the general intransigence came not from stubborn governance
but from the impracticality of the peace itself. According to a summary of the report,
―the demarcation lines [between Arab and Israeli lands] had . . . no basis in history or in
the distribution of population or private property and had to be observed in a situation of
great political tension.‖ Later, he requested that governments, people, and world opinion
at-large refrain from inciting unjustified animosity that would erode the confidence and
goodwill of the negotiations. Instead of participating in unilateral behavior that escalated
tensions, Hammarskjöld called for the concerned parties to engage in ―coordinated
unilateral moves‖ for the sake of compromise. 385 As a master of his craft, Hammarskjöld
showcased the diplomacy necessary for an international environment that could sustain
negotiation. He understood that national interests dictated foreign policy, but he also
realized that these interests could be as destructive as they were constructive. Without a
multilateral objective intent on establishing regional peace in the Middle East, little
chance lay in achieving any negotiated settlement.
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XIII

By the summer of 1956, government officials worldwide began applying
Hammarskjöld‘s internationalist perspective to serve their own purposes. Nationalist
leaders in the Middle East took an early lead in instilling greater domestic conformity to
convey steadfast solidarity on the world stage. The strong bonds between Iranian
nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh and Iran‘s professional associations deteriorated
rapidly as Mossadegh‘s regime resorted to corrupt political practices. After the 1953
coup, Iran‘s new leader, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relegated civic associations to serving
the interests of the state. Monopolization of similar groups also occurred following the
Egyptian revolution of 1952. Once in power, the Revolutionary Command Council
pursued social uniformity by infiltrating or disbanding organizations. Additionally,
Egypt‘s revolution embodied the independent desires of Egyptians, Muslims, Arabs, and
Africans. This dimension of Nasser‘s nationalist philosophy spread conformity not only
within a given society, but also across societies, thus internationalizing efforts to
synthesize anti-imperialist rhetoric and dominate the agenda of the broader movement.
American society experienced purges of its own during the McCarthy Era of the
early 1950s. Prior to McCarthyism‘s demise in 1954, American citizens serving as
international civil servants in the United Nations endured increasing amounts of scrutiny.
As the new UN Secretary General, Hammarskjöld exhibited a good deal of diplomatic
finesse between preserving the organization‘s non-partisan practices and catering to the
desires of its members. The experience altered the organization‘s sense of purpose from
reflecting a particular sense of world order to representing a genuine multilateral
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perspective in international matters. With Hammarskjöld at the helm, the United Nations
was going to re-dedicate itself to practicing multilateral diplomacy. He challenged UN
delegations to place the international interest above any particular national interest.
Attendees at the Bandung Conference grappled with the difficulties of putting
Hammarskjöld‘s ideas into effect. Leading delegates wished to influence the proceedings
to endorse specific interests that would enhance the international clout of a select few.
As a result, several observers noted that many delegates were initially suspicious about
the motives and agendas of their fellow participants. In spite of the agendas individual
delegations had set for the conference, the plenary session succeeded in establishing a
clear set of multilateral, non-aligned interests. Much like Hammarskjöld‘s philosophical
approach, the recommendations proposed in the Bandung Communiqué offered a more
genuine consensus that served as a constructive alternative to the imposition of order by a
single source.
Instead of realizing the significance of accomplishments such as these,
governments continued to portray national interests as emblematic of broader
international interests. Senior U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State Dulles, clung to a
principled version of world order that required a high degree of conformity.
Unfortunately, Dulles‘s efforts succeeded in fostering international instability. Nasser
grew frustrated over America‘s obstructionist policies regarding arms deals, collective
security arrangements, and socio-economic development. Israel‘s government plotted an
increasingly unilateral course in foreign policy due in part to the Eisenhower
administration‘s tepid relations with the Jewish state. A lack of good faith also
permeated Israeli foreign policy. In the words of Israeli historian Shimon Shamir, ―It
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must be borne in mind that the contacts in search for [an Arab-Israeli] settlement were
always by-products and side-shows of greater dramas.‖386 Frustration and alienation
upset Arab and Israeli relations not only with the United States, but also exacerbated the
already volatile tensions existing between Arabs and Israelis. Bloody border clashes in
the eastern Sinai and Egypt‘s arms deal with Czechoslovakia added to the sense of
foreboding. Meanwhile, Cold War allies such as Great Britain and France questioned
America‘s commitment to maintaining the status quo in the Middle East and North
Africa.
Imitations of multilateralism persisted as American and British policy-makers
appealed to Nasser‘s infrastructural needs through the Aswan Dam loan proposal. The
combination of Nasser‘s initial unwillingness to agree to the loan‘s terms and the
Eisenhower administration‘s insensitivity to Egypt‘s nationalist perceptions led to the
proposal‘s cancellation. Equally important, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development ignored Nasser‘s pleas to re-structure the loan proposal for the sake of
preserving Egypt‘s sense of fiscal autonomy. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez
Canal. As a result, the universe of unilateral activity proved to be expanding not only
within the world‘s societies, but also between them.
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Chapter III

The Mismanagement of Multilateral Diplomacy: National
Leadership and Its Short-Sighted Policies, February to October
1956

The familiar diplomatic trends displayed in the long lead-up to Nasser‘s
nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 continued to feed the likelihood of crisis as
summer turned to autumn. The lack of a more multilateral perspective on nearly
everyone‘s part triggered two crises that defined the year in the international arena. As
Egyptian officials squared off against Western interests, the Soviets imposed their
ruthless brand of autocratic order in Poland and Hungary. Behind the Iron Curtain,
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev experienced political unrest after his attempt to coat
Communist party principles with a more palatable sense of pluralism. Mass protests in
Poland during the summer of 1956 spread to other countries behind the Iron Curtain and
turned into outright revolution in Hungary by November of that year. During this same
period, the international community responded with varying degrees of indignation and
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indifference to Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Those countries most
concerned with canal control met in London to discuss alternatives. Although the
London Conferences of August and September 1956 represented a broader array of
international interests, the pretext for peaceful resolution to the crisis reflected the
interests and agendas of only eighteen nations. Failure to address the Egyptian
government‘s sovereignty meant that Nasser boycotted the proceedings. As a result, the
London Conferences lost nearly all legitimacy as a diplomatic gathering that brought
opposing sides together. In many respects, presentation of conference recommendations
to Nasser in Cairo generated considerable resentment that only amplified the severity of
the crisis. Deadlock led British and French officials to enlist the United Nations‘ help to
reduce the tension, but these initiatives masked their preparations for war. Additionally,
though many scholars credit the Eisenhower administration with instigating UN
participation in resolving the conflict, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other
senior officials hoped to steer clear of the organization. Investigating the circuitous
diplomacy occurring between February and October 1956 helps in recognizing when
negotiations should not only involve UN officials but should also be orchestrated by them
as well.

I

Much like the numerous British, Egyptian, and American examples of portraying
respective national interests as universal interests during the early to mid-1950s, the
Soviets also devised their own strategies for representing a broad array of perspectives.
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Building on its success resulting from the Czech arms deal of 1955 and with it the
Soviets‘ improved international image as a world power genuinely interested in the socioeconomic development of poor countries, the Presidium unveiled a new approach to
promote communist ideology worldwide. At the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist
Party, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev declared a return to a more pluralistic pursuit of
a communist utopia. 387 Early in his 25 February closed-door plenary session speech,
Khrushchev called for restoring Leninist principles by renouncing Stalin‘s ―cult of the
individual‖ and Stalin‘s brutal abuse of power. Khrushchev embraced the level of
opinionated debate Lenin had encouraged. Party Congresses under Lenin convened
regularly and debated ―at length all the basic questions‖ pertaining to domestic, foreign,
party, and state policies. ―Stalin,‖ Khrushchev continued, ―ignored the norms of party
life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership.‖ 388 Taking this
through to its logical conclusion, Khrushchev allowed for the possibility of pursuing
socialism by way of a variety of paths. 389 Like Eisenhower‘s attempt to associate the
West‘s Tripartite Declaration with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization,
Khrushchev made it the Soviet Union‘s responsibility to try to represent broader interests
387
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by permitting greater input from rank-and-file Communist Party members. Interestingly,
as historian William Taubman points out, Khrushchev consulted only a few Soviet
officials prior to his delivering the speech. Among those kept out of the loop were
leaders in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary. 390
Simultaneously, Khrushchev needed to expand his own political base of support
by converting opponents to his cause. To accomplish this, Khrushchev yielded
increasingly to the pressures of maintaining the status quo. According to historian
Richard Immerman, ―Khrushchev had actually developed second thoughts about [his
speech to the 20th Congress] shortly after delivering it.‖391 Part of this regret originated
from the fact that Khrushchev saw a need to appease his elder comrades within the Party.
The First Secretary‘s rise to power benefited from the support of younger party members,
but, outside this cadre, Khrushchev remained politically isolated. 392 To gain the
confidence of his peers, Khrushchev wrestled with the faulty paradoxes of his doctrine.
The Soviet leader, writes historian John Lewis Gaddis, wanted ―to civilize Soviet society
by eliminating Stalin‘s worst abuses‖ on the one hand, while on the other hand
attempting ―to disassociate himself and his colleagues . . . from the discredited tyrant.‖393
Much like the chagrin American officials expressed following Great Britain‘s entrance
into the Baghdad Pact, Khrushchev discovered that gestures of unity could become
political liabilities when calls for coalition-building took on a life of their own.
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Khrushchev‘s recognition of more than one route to socialism created ample
international acrimony. The new doctrine of ―hybrid socialism‖ contributed not only to
the growing Sino-Soviet split, but also inspired protests in Eastern Europe.394 After
researching newly-opened Soviet archives, Mark Kramer reexamines the repressive
policies Soviet leaders exacted on Polish and Hungarian protesters in 1956. Soviet-led
Polish troops crushed Polish workers on strike for higher pay and better working
conditions. By late June, Poland‘s Pozan riots left over fifty dead and hundreds
wounded. Soviet leadership was particularly concerned about the spread of unrest
―unless strict ideological controls were re-imposed.‖395 Incidents such as these show the
conditions Khrushchev attached to multilateral perspectives. Though more totalitarian in
their response to dissent, Soviet actions share similar characteristics with both Western
and Middle Eastern leaders and their desire to convey a greater sense of pluralism while
maintaining a firm grip on its manifestations.

II

Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal sought a similar objective. The night
before his 26 July speech, Nasser shared his intentions with his cabinet ministers and
RCC members. As Mohamed Heikal recalled years later:
Nasser told assembled ministers that he could have followed a different
course and asked [his advisers] for their opinions, but he had rejected this
idea, partly because he was absolutely convinced in his own mind that the
394

See Thompson, A Vision Unfulfilled, p. 387; Anthony Best et. al., International History of the Twentieth
Century, p. 347; Robert Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 249; and Little, American Orientalism, p. 178.
395
Mark Kramer, ―The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New
Findings,‖ Journal of Contemporary History 33 (April 1998), p. 168.

165
decision he had come to was the right one, and partly because what he was
proposing to do involved calculations outside the scope of their
departments.
Some subordinates applauded the news; most, however, sat stunned and offered
alternative proclamations to help allay their own fears. The prime minister would not
hear of it. The next day, speaking for the most part extemporaneously, Nasser‘s
announcement filled thirty-three pages of translated text.396
Justification for seizing control of the canal lay in Nasser‘s reaction to the West‘s
biased policies and Egypt‘s pursuit of equality among nations based upon Bandung
principles. Specifically, Nasser accused the United States of extending far greater
technical, commercial, and financial aid to Israel than to the Arab world, creating an
imbalance of power. He also accused the U.S. of supporting French imperialist efforts in
Algeria at the expense of Arab lives. Given these circumstances, Nasser proclaimed,
Egypt must marshal the few resources at its disposal for the betterment of the country and
its citizens. He argued that if the West reneged on deals such as the Aswan Dam loan
proposal, then Egypt reserved the right to seize alternative revenue sources such as the
Suez Canal to fulfill the nation‘s socio-economic development.397
Recounting the canal‘s imperial legacy, Nasser aimed to transform the structure‘s
image from one of exploitation to one of opportunity for Egypt. He told of Ferdinand de
Lesseps‘s promise that the canal would serve to benefit the country and its people, but
Nasser argued that the Frenchman had propagated a lie to fulfill an imperialist agenda.
The prime minister equated de Lesseps‘s actions with those of the World Bank‘s
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chairperson, Eugene Black. Both men desired to meddle in Egypt‘s internal affairs to the
detriment of the country‘s sovereignty. In Nasser‘s view, this opportunistic exploitation
was at an end. 398 The uttering of de Lesseps‘s name in the speech served as the
codeword for Egypt‘s military commanders to move into the canal-zone and seize
control.399 Like nearly every other aspect of the Suez controversy, history, too, was
drafted into service in the battle between inclusive and exclusive notions of diplomacy.
The man who helped demonstrate the effectiveness of monopolizing multilateral
perspectives in the nineteenth century served as the codeword for Nasser‘s own
harnessing of the multilateral pan-Arab, anti-imperial initiative in the twentieth century.
Indeed, the impulse to enlist history in this way was nearly ubiquitous. In her
book Eye on Israel, Michelle Mart describes how Americans throughout the 1950s
identified with Israeli settlement in a hostile land and its historical parallels to the
Puritans‘ hardships in the New World. 400 During a private 31 July conversation with
American diplomat Robert Murphy, Britain‘s Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold
Macmillan expressed his country‘s determination not to experience ―another Munich‖
even if it meant ending up as ―perhaps another Netherlands.‖ 401 Rather than appeasing
another megalomaniacal dictator as Britain had done with Hitler in Munich in 1938, the
British government and its people were willing to sacrifice their empire as the Dutch
Hapsburgs had done in the sixteenth century in an attempt to retain their relevance as a
world power. The truly fascinating aspect of these developments shows how the leaders
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of various countries took history and interpreted it to fit a particular national context.
British policy-makers adapted history‘s lessons to provide a particularly bleak outlook.
Rank-and-file Americans identified with and took solace in the rugged durability of the
Israelis—a kindred spirit in an unkind world. 402 For Nasser, historical experiences of
exploitation united Arabs, from which Nasser hoped to capitalize politically. In the case
of all three countries, governments and citizens alike incorporated the experiences of
others to fit their own historical perspective and encouraged others to think similarly.
In addition to empowering Egypt‘s citizens, Nasser used his nationalization of the
canal to unite the cause of all Arabs as well as those populations yearning for liberation
from colonialism. ―My own destiny,‖ he exalted, ―is tied to that of my brother in Jordan,
Syria, the Sudan . . . . That is how we are born in this part of the world with inter-related
destinies.‖403 By proclaiming solidarity with his fellow Arabs and Africans, Nasser used
the nationalization of the canal not simply as an opportunity for Egypt to unilaterally
thumb its nose at the declining empires of Europe, but more importantly as an
opportunity to serve as universal inspiration for all people struggling with freeing
themselves from their colonial past. A paradox emerged where Nasser hoped to
galvanize regional support and embody the nationalist zeal of the non-aligned world
without consulting those whose support he wished to enlist. 404
These efforts extended to Western powers too. According to Mohamed Heikal,
Nasser‘s efforts to win ―wider world opinion‖ included attempts to drive a political
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wedge between British and American leadership. In the weeks following Nasser‘s
nationalization of the canal, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden pressured U.S.
Secretary of State Dulles and other American officials into adopting a more aggressive
stance against Nasser. Careful not to lend any additional legitimacy to Eden‘s argument,
the Egyptian leader refrained from associating his seizure of the Suez Canal with Dulles‘s
abandonment of Aswan Dam funding. Instead, Nasser stated that his actions were a part
of a more long-term agenda. 405 Nasser‘s motives, however, were purely political,
focusing on generating as much international support for his actions as possible.
To a degree, Nasser succeeded in influencing many of his Arab allies. Initial
responses by other leaders in the Arab world idolized his political genius. In Syria, the
U.S. embassy reported that newspapers called the move ―‗historic‘‖ and that the
government ―proposed that all Arab states resign from [the] IBRD (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development) and International Monetary Fund and set up purely
Arab institutions to finance development [in] Arab countries.‖ 406 Populations in Lebanon
and Libya also cheered the event.407 Nasser won new admirers in Kuwait and Morocco
where prior support had been non-existent.408 Supporters in Sri Lanka also expressed
their solidarity.409 Nasser even garnered support from within Iraq—Egypt‘s chief rival
for Arab loyalties. According to U.S. State Department officials, influential opinion405
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makers, such as the ―Iraqi press and political leaders,‖ approved of the canal‘s
nationalization. 410 Nasser‘s political move was, for the most part, a public relations
triumph. However, dissenting voices were heard in Arab, non-aligned, and Western
camps.
Heads of state in Iraq, India, and elsewhere expressed their concerns over the
event. The same day Nasser delivered his speech; British Prime Minister Anthony Eden
honored visiting Iraqi dignitaries with a dinner party in London that evening. Hearing of
the Suez canal‘s fate, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, advised Eden to strike back
with abrupt force against Nasser.411 Because he was Nasser‘s rival for Arab loyalties,
Said‘s response is understandable. He stood to gain significantly from any weakening of
Nasser‘s position—but at what cost? Said‘s quest for solidarity clashed with a sizable
segment of his fellow Iraqi citizens. By 1958, these festering resentments boiled over
during Iraq‘s revolution, but in 1956 they proved that unity within supposedly
homogeneous groups was by no means a certainty in spite of efforts to demonstrate the
contrary.
Indian officials also balked at Nasser‘s unilateral maneuver. Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru conveyed his concerns to Nasser in a delicately worded
personal letter on 3 August. Later, communicating through his ambassador in Cairo,
Nehru cautioned Nasser ―that he had acted hastily and that public opinion in India was
likely to be unfriendly.‖ 412 Nasser‘s good friend and advisor, Muhamad Heikal,
remembered his boss‘s keen sensitivity toward gaining Indian support. India‘s position
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as ―the most important member of the Commonwealth, as well as of the Afro-Asian
community,‖ made it extremely valuable. The fact that Nasser‘s announcement followed
soon after meetings between Nehru, Nasser, and Yugoslav Prime Minister Josip Broz
Tito had concluded in Broni, Yugoslavia hinted at India‘s possible collusion in Egypt‘s
nationalizing the canal. As a result, Nehru was placed in a situation where he was
required to deny any prior knowledge of Nasser‘s plans in order to save face in the
international community. 413 While understanding Nasser‘s intent and respecting Egypt‘s
sovereign rights, Nehru also realized the international ramifications and urged Egypt‘s
lead in smoothing relations with the world‘s canal users.
Nasser took these comments seriously and quickly sought to ease his friend‘s
fears and those of the international community. He believed that without India‘s support,
the rest of the non-aligned world would turn their backs on Egypt. 414 In certain cases,
this seemed to be a plausible threat. Officials from developing countries expressed
consternation equal to if not greater than that of Nehru. In one instance, a Nigerian Emir,
passing through Cairo, shredded a message he was asked to sign endorsing the
nationalization of the canal. In another instance, the Sheikh of Kuwait offered his strong
rebuke of Nasser‘s act.415 Consensus in the West, opposing the canal‘s nationalization,
seemed equally unstable.
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III

Beginning 27 July, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden insisted on resolute
opposition to Nasser‘s action. At an emergency cabinet meeting, Eden shifted his
attention away from legal technicalities to favoring direct economic and political
pressure. Cabinet members agreed that from the perspective of jurisprudence, Nasser had
not violated any prior agreements.416 To allay their trepidation, the advisers began
redefining the canal as ―an international asset‖ that was too important to be controlled by
a single country. Subsequent discussions during the meeting, however, led to severe
lapses in logic. On the one hand, British officials supported the idea of transforming the
issue into an international dilemma. On other hand, Eden chided efforts calling for the
UN Security Council‘s involvement. Instead, Cabinet officials sought to confer with
French and American officials exclusively. Also noteworthy was the fact that once
British officials reached a consensus that Nasser‘s nationalization was a breech of
international trust, discussion focused more intently on the use of force. In essence, Eden
and his staff concluded that the British, French, and American governments would
determine the international interest, negotiate on its behalf, and decide on the appropriate
circumstances and application of military force. 417
Convincing members of his own government was not enough for Eden. Later the
same day, he drafted a letter to Eisenhower to coordinate policy responses. Eden took the
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liberty of presenting his interpretation of Nasser‘s move as a ―defiance of international
agreements‖ which, if dealt with quickly, would ―have the support of all the maritime
powers.‖ Seizure of the canal threatened ―the free world,‖ Eden argued, and its most
vital commodities such as oil. 418 According to British estimates, sixty million tons of oil
representing two-thirds of Western Europe‘s annual supply made its way through the
Suez Canal. 419 Using this argument of Western interdependence as a basis for action, the
prime minister alluded to the possibility of military intervention in his message to
Eisenhower, but left it as an option of ―last resort.‖420 Of interest here is the fact that
British officials passed off military force as a last resort when, according to historians
Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, they had already taken steps to create an
―overwhelmingly hawkish‖ sub-committee to handle the crisis. 421 Besides perpetuating
the double-dealing that occurred among Western allies, Eden‘s actions exhibited classic
characteristics of mistaking unilateralist policy-making for multilateralism. The day after
his talk with Macmillan, American diplomat Robert Murphy recollected in his memoirs,
―Eden was laboring under the impression that a common identity of interest existed
among the allies. That was not the American view, and I [Murphy] gave no
encouragement to that idea.‖ 422 As with Eisenhower‘s experience negotiating collective
security agreements in the Middle East, Khrushchev‘s experience in handling mounting
dissent following his ―secret‖ speech, and Nasser‘s experience following his
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nationalization of the canal, Eden‘s policy-making was built on political quicksand. In
every instance, each individual failed to represent accurately the multilateral perspective,
which only succeeded in escalating international tensions.
Britain‘s European neighbors as well as members from within the British
Commonwealth took a more accommodating view of the Suez crisis. As the ―seventh
largest user [of the] canal, Dutch officials were optimistic that Nasser would make some
effort to honor ―international commitments.‖423 Indeed, Nasser had promised to
compensate shareholders owning stock in the Suez Canal Company at fair market
prices. 424 Like the Dutch, Canada‘s Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester
Pearson believed that Egypt‘s control of the canal did not warrant alarm as long as
maritime transit remained undisturbed. 425 Officials in Washington also expressed their
reservations regarding military invasion during a 31 July meeting at the White House.
Among Eisenhower‘s circle of advisors, Secretary Dulles noted England‘s favoring
―ultimatum‖ over ―conference.‖ The Secretary‘s brother and Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, reported the British people‘s feverish support for
some sort of military response and numerous references equating Nasser‘s act with that
of Hitler and his re-militarization of the Rhineland twenty years earlier. 426
Allen Dulles‘s assessment of the British citizenry was a bit premature. Several
scholars have investigated British public opinion and its enthusiasm for Eden‘s policies.
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―For most of a public life spent largely in the resolution of diplomatic conundrums,‖
writes Eden biographer David Dutton, ―it was Eden‘s particular skill to move those
around him towards consensus forming the basis of action. But in the case of Suez Eden
began with a near consensus—at least in the domestic context—and had the misfortune to
see it fade away in the weeks which followed.‖ 427 Other historians differ with Dutton
only in a matter of degree. Within a week of Nasser‘s announcement, high-profile British
politicians such as Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell argued in the House of Commons
that force could only be justified after its endorsement by ―the public opinion of the
world‖ embodied within the United Nations.428 Britain‘s popular press echoed parallel
points of view. According to historian Ralph Negrine, by 5 August British newspapers
such as The Observer, The Guardian, and The Daily Mirror advocated UN
involvement.429 Despite Eden‘s efforts to spread his particular perspective, he seemed
aware enough of the fact that the successful return to an acceptable sense of world order
relied entirely upon U.S. endorsement. When it came to assuming a lead role, however,
the Eisenhower administration demurred.
By early August 1956, Eisenhower had begun imposing his own limits on
multilateral diplomacy. The same day Gaitskell advocated UN involvement in the Suez
crisis, British, French, and American allies condemned Egypt‘s ―unilateral seizure‖ of the
canal and its effect on ―the freedom and security‖ of all nations. The statement went on
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to call for convening an international conference to reinstate the canal‘s status as an
international asset.430 Egypt and the international community were to negotiate
independently of the United Nations. During an 8 August press conference, President
Eisenhower continued to distance himself from any efforts made to involve the world
organization. When asked if he supported Egypt‘s referral of the Suez issue to the United
Nations, the president expressed skepticism. Eisenhower raised the possibility of a
Security Council deadlock resulting from British and French veto powers and then
questioned the organization‘s overall ability to handle the matter with due haste.431
Given this lack of confidence, it is easy to identify the misunderstandings and
misrepresentations that occurred between Eden and Eisenhower. Where Eden interpreted
UN involvement as an impediment to his sense of British national security, Eisenhower
dismissed UN involvement because of the impediments resulting from his allies‘ national
security interests. Both men reached the same conclusion as a result of diametrically
opposed perspectives. For the next several weeks, however, Eden and Eisenhower
misconstrued each others motives. 432 For Eden, American endorsement of an
international conference meant that U.S. officials remained receptive to military options.
American policy-makers, on the other hand, took British participation in the conference
as a sign of good faith. The faulty basis on which these presuppositions were based
contributed to a false sense of multilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, the West‘s refusal to
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engage in negotiations through the United Nations thwarted a more genuine
internationalist alternative that would have included Egypt‘s support.
For Dag Hammarskjöld, the lack of confidence hurt. Throughout the late summer
of 1956, the secretary general continued grappling with problems facing enforcement of
the General Armistice Agreement in the Middle East; but new frustrations emerged after
Western leaders decided to exclude UN officials from mediation over Suez. When
reporters asked Hammarskjöld to comment on the canal‘s nationalization and the West‘s
response, he pointed out that apparently his advice was unimportant.433 Signs of
aggravation appeared as early as 24 and 25 July, when border clashes between Israelis
and Jordanians erupted once again. Hammarskjöld threatened to dump the entire ArabIsraeli dispute on members of the Security Council as stipulated by Article 99 of the UN
Charter, if the violence persisted.434 These half-nelson tactics had limited success, each
time resulting in diminishing effectiveness. As the head of UN operations in the region,
General E.L.M. Burns notes in his memoirs, from roughly the end of July to the end of
September, Israeli officials reported fifty-nine complaints of incursions along its borders,
leaving nineteen Israelis killed and dozens wounded. Jordan registered sixty-three
complaints against Israeli actions leading to seventy-two Jordanian deaths.435 Finally, in
a letter to Hammarskjöld, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion charged ―that the UN
observation posts in Gaza had been useless and that Israel would be unlikely to accept
them after 31 October.436 Besides foreshowing the ominous events that played out in the
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fall of 1956, Ben-Gurion‘s unilateral motives were indicative of world leaders for much
of August.
The general malaise expressed towards the United Nations by leaders of countries
both great and small also limited the scope of policy debate. As early as 9 August,
Eisenhower and his senior advisors expressed their fundamental opposition to Nasser‘s
nationalization of the canal. During a lengthy National Security Council meeting, the
president concluded that ―Egypt had gone too far.‖ Contrary to his own deliberative
approach to race relations, where he considered himself to be the representative of
moderates of all races, Eisenhower feared that ―chaos‖ would dominate the region if
Nasser got his way. 437 According to historian Michael Hunt, ―[Eisenhower] thought
‗dependent peoples‘ should submit to several additional decades of Western tutelage.‖ 438
As the National Security Council‘s discussion addressed the history of the Suez Canal,
analysis yielded to increasingly orientalist thinking. Secretary of Defense Charles
Wilson‘s observation that the Egyptian government once held substantial shares of canal
stock but sold them led Eisenhower to respond, ―harems were expensive.‖ 439
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By the end of the meeting, the president instructed the State and Defense
departments to lead the formulation of U.S. policy responses. Specifically, Eisenhower
stated that both departments ―should be jointly studying all possible contingencies which
might develop out of the [Suez crisis].‖ Seven contingency papers were drafted by midSeptember, but much diplomatic jockeying took place over the course of the intervening
weeks.
A 12 August meeting between America‘s bi-partisan Congressional leaders, the
president, and his senior staff included a lop-sided discussion that obstructed the nation‘s
objective involvement in any international diplomatic discourse. In a scene reminiscent
of Nasser‘s informing his advisers of his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal,
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles reported to the legislators assembled
that France and Britain had agreed to America‘s setting a diplomatic course to resolve the
crisis. Beginning 16 August, an international conference was scheduled to convene in
London which would negotiate acceptable terms for international control of the canal.
Yet, in the discussions that followed this announcement, Eisenhower and Dulles
scarcely veiled their contempt for Nasser and their sympathetic support for America‘s
two NATO allies. Contrary to their quest for a diplomatic solution, the president,
secretary of state, and at least one member of Congress equated Nasser‘s usurpation of
the canal to Hitler‘s aggressive acquisition of territory during the 1930s. Less-thandiplomatic French and British officials had expressed identical arguments as early as the
spring of 1956.440 Operating from this pretext, opportunities for open debate suffered
significantly.

440

Memo of Conversation, ―Notes on Presidential –Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting,‖ 12
August 1956, FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, pp. 189-190, 192, 196.

179
Eisenhower and Dulles stonewalled legislators who viewed the crisis through a
broader, more unbiased perspective. Representative Charles Hallack (Republican—
Indiana) and Senator Leverett Saltonstall (Republican—Massachusetts) inquired about
possible United Nations participation. Like the president‘s 8 August response to the
press, Dulles replied that a Security Council veto could halt progress and the General
Assembly held no authority to act on its own recommendations. As a result, the best the
world body could achieve was ―inconclusive debate and [general acquiescence]
amounting to de facto recognition of what Nasser has done.‖ 441 The fact that the
Eisenhower administration refused to recognize Nasser‘s basis for action casts further
doubt on America‘s diplomatic intentions. Additionally, Dulles conveyed
Hammarskjöld‘s own concern over British and French disregard for UN intervention.
Hammarskjöld, according to Dulles, was agreeable to partnership between the UN and
―any international board‖ established as a result of the London Conference. Yet, Dulles
conceded, Hammarskjöld‘s gravest concern lay with ―answers [that] were lacking with
respect to possible developments should no peaceful solution be obtained.‖
Hammarskjöld‘s reservations exemplify the crux of conflict on which the Suez Crisis
teetered.
Dulles‘s inability to recognize the relationship between the administration‘s
continued disregard for Nasser‘s perspective and Hammarskjöld‘s reservations regarding
viable arbitration served as another example of the discrepancies occurring between
national interests and multilateral diplomacy. Some Congressional members attempted to
show the folly of Dulles‘s perspective. For example, Senator Theodore Green (D-RI)
raised the prospect of internationalizing all the world‘s waterways. Dulles parried this
441
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thrust saying that it would conflict with America‘s national interests in the Panama Canal.
Green retorted, ―if everybody took that position no progress would ever be made.‖
Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) asked about Nasser‘s intentions and the
likelihood of his closing the canal. Both Eisenhower and Dulles said that canal closure
was not inevitable, but Dulles continued by saying that the Europeans‘ argued that Nasser
was not trustworthy. 442 Rayburn‘s question was the closest this eclectic group of policymakers came to addressing the practicality of Nasser‘s closing the canal. Denying access
would hurt Egypt‘s economic prospects as much as Europe‘s. Nasser‘s preoccupation
with socio-economic development might have offset the West‘s paranoia. Yet, few if any
government officials on either side of the Atlantic cared to consider these
(interdependent) connections.
These biased views doomed negotiations before they had begun. Evoking the
well-established practice of concealing national interests beneath the cloak of
international legitimacy, the London Conference lost credibility as a forum for mediation.
The same day that U.S. officials met in the White House, Nasser declined his invitation to
the London Conference. ―The proposed conference has no right whatsoever,‖ Nasser
proclaimed, ―to discuss any matter falling within the jurisdiction of Egypt or relating to
its sovereignty over any part of its territory.‖ 443 Instead, the conference became the latest
manifestation of mutually-exclusive tendencies that dominated diplomacy.
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IV

Delegates from twenty-two nations attended the London Conference. 444 For one
week in mid-August 1956, the conference set about drafting a multilateral agreement
designed to re-establish international authority over the Suez Canal. In his opening
remarks, Dulles repeated claims that ―the [canal], by reason of its internationalized
character, both in law and in fact, is the last place wherein to seek the means of gaining
national triumph and promoting national ambition.‖445 The basis of Dulles‘s argument
simultaneously encapsulated and ignored the history of the canal.
Prior to its construction, de Lesseps had operated from a quid pro quo context,
guaranteeing economic and political empowerment to any and all governments that
supported his ambitious project. The resurrection of the Ottoman Empire, a revival of
French pride, English economic dominance, Egyptian independence, all of these
inducements were unstable enough without de Lesseps‘s attaching a sense of multilateral
recognition of these promises by the international community. For Egypt, the allure of
independence served as the main reason for Ismail Pasha‘s concession. Nasser was
simply following through on that promise. Disraeli‘s purchase of Suez Company shares
satisfied Britain‘s national security concerns by providing economic peace of mind.
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Eden wanted to maintain that commercial insulation. During the summer of 1956, these
conflicted chickens were coming home to roost.
Analogous to the UNSCOP decision on Palestine in 1947, two views emerged at
the London Conference in 1956. The majority endorsed America‘s plan for outright
―international control and operation of the canal‖ and raised the prospect of using
military force if Nasser remained defiant. Presenting his proposal as the most inclusive
of opinions, reflective of ―actual conditions,‖ and projecting ―confidence for the future,‖
Dulles dismissed more accommodating alternatives and thus undermined the chances for
successful negotiation. ―Although [the secretary] certainly would have been happy to
have his plan implemented,‖ writes historian H.W. Brands, ―he knew that Nasser could
not accept it.‖446 Eugene McCarthy concurs, ―Dulles generally proceeded without
consulting, or even caring about, the opinions of other nations.‖447 Given Dulles‘s
disposition and these interpretations of it, the chances for a negotiated settlement
plummeted. Dulles‘s lack of faith may have been forgiven had others not felt similarly.
Contrasting the eighteen-nation majority, delegations from the remaining four
countries supported an alternative proposal. Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet
Union would have allowed Egypt to retain ownership of the canal while simultaneously
forming an international board of canal users capable of exercising ―‗advisory
functions.‘‖448 India‘s delegate, Krishna Menon, devised the plan, which paralleled
Nehru‘s earlier idea for drafting a new convention to replace the Treaty of 1888. Though
somewhat more attuned to Nasser‘s view, discord resonated regardless of Egypt‘s desire
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to appease India. Like the majority proposal, the minority‘s plan still imposed
stipulations upon Egypt. Nasser was willing to negotiate with the international
community, but he refused to yield to any agreement that imposed concessions as a
prerequisite. Consequently, neither the majority nor the minority views were particularly
inclusive despite their efforts to appear so.
To complicate matters, personality conflicts detracted from the London
Conference proceedings. Historian Hugh Thomas laments how ―India who could have
exercised an influence for compromise was unfortunately represented by Menon, who
always maddened British Conservative politicians and who acted as Egypt‘s
advocate.‖449 Some Egyptian officials themselves, however, took umbrage with Menon‘s
proposals and considered him ―a prima donna‖ at high-profile conferences such as the
one in London.450 Poor personal relations also plagued the diplomatic mission sent to
Cairo to negotiate directly the terms of the London Conference with Nasser.
The Menzies Mission, named for Australia‘s Prime Minister Robert Menzies who
headed the delegation, arrived in the Egyptian capital to explain the conference‘s
majority proposal and prepare for its implementation. A specter of foreboding
overshadowed the initial proceedings of 3 September and for good reason. Menzies
seemed, at best, a dubious choice to head the mission. Prior to leaving for Cairo,
Menizes had gone on public record opposing Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal on
legal as well as moral grounds.451 Picking up on this, Nasser, ―noting that Menzies
sounded even more like a nineteenth-century imperialist than British Prime Minister
449
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Anthony Eden, complained that the Western powers were trying to back [Nasser] into a
corner.‖452 An antagonistic tone overwhelmed the negotiations. Tensions infiltrated
discussions establishing the schedule of meetings. Menzies wanted a morning and
afternoon meeting each day; Nasser rejected this idea saying ―Mr. Menzies it looks as if I
may have a war on my hands and in the morning[s] I must be preparing for it.‖ 453
Scarcely hiding his contempt for Menzies, Nasser proceeded the next day to
explain his views. He began by questioning the validity of Dulles‘s view ―that the canal
must be insulated from the politics of any one nation.‖ The crux of Nasser‘s argument
rested on two key claims. First, he stuck by his view that the canal was within Egyptian
sovereignty and therefore outside the jurisdiction of international input. Second, Nasser
noted the hypocritical parallel between the political motives for Nasser‘s seizing the canal
and political dimensions of the London Conference proposal which threatened economic
and military retaliation if Egypt failed to comply. 454 In Nasser‘s opinion, the proposal‘s
ultimatum-like demeanor further justified his taking control of the canal. He refused to
yield to what he labeled ―‗international colonialism‘‖ and its Western sponsors. 455
Nasser‘s reference to colonial exploitation exposed the sensitivity Western
diplomats had to this infamous legacy. On one occasion, Nasser and Menzies sparred
verbally over the issue. Nasser alluded to ―trouble‖ should the international community
―impose‖ its will on Egypt. Menzies saw trouble as inevitable if Nasser failed to
relinquish the canal to international authority. As if to make his point more emphatic,
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Menzies packed his papers and prepared to walk out of the proceedings. 456 H. W. Brands
credits Loy Hendreson, the American delegate to the Menzies Mission, with singlehandedly salvaging the situation by interjecting his own sense of the mission‘s
significance as an avenue through which progress could be made to mediate between
Egyptian sovereignty and international commitments. 457 As a first-hand eyewitness,
Nasser‘s adviser, Mohamed Heikal, remembers the scene differently. Henderson took
this conciliatory tone after the delegates from Iran and Ethiopia objected to the use of
threatening rhetoric. Moments later, the Swedish delegate voiced his commitment to
negotiating with Nasser.458 Contrary to Brands‘s analysis, Heikal cites this consensual
vote of confidence as the reason for the mission‘s continuance.
The efforts of Loy Henderson and his fellow delegates were not the only
examples of the West‘s attempt to ease Nasser‘s suspicion. On 5 September 1956, as the
talks in Cairo continued, President Eisenhower also reacted to Nasser‘s sense of colonial
encroachment. Isolating Menzies even further, Eisenhower proclaimed that the United
States would not support the use of force in resolving the Suez crisis. 459 Menzies‘s hardline tact lost its meaning after news of Eisenhower‘s statement spread. 460 On his return
trip to Australia after talks with Nasser had ended in failure, Menzies met with President
Eisenhower in Washington. According to Hugh Thomas, Menzies told Eisenhower that
America‘s refusal to use force ―‗pulled the rug clean out from under [Menzies‘s]
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feet.‘‖461 The mission‘s official final report, however, blamed Nasser for his irrational
intransigence.462 The more likely culprit seems to have been Menzies‘s unwillingness to
negotiate.463 In many respects, the Menzies Mission accentuated the ruptures that not
only further debilitated relations between jaded adversaries, but also marked the
deterioration of trust between allies. This breakdown in diplomacy outside the United
Nations served as further evidence of the international organization‘s indispensability as
an alternative for multilateral diplomacy.

V

In spite of the unraveling of solidarity that was taking place, Western leaders
continued to act as if they enjoyed the full support of their allies. By early September
1956, the leaders of the various countries interested in resolving the Suez crisis attempted
to do so by their own means. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles rallied support
for a second London Conference. Dulles hoped to create a Suez Canal Users Association
(SCUA) to provide qualified canal pilots, collect tolls from SCUA members to be divided
between Egypt and the association, and, if possible, determine the canal‘s traffic
patterns.464 British Prime Minister Anthony Eden planned to have this second conference
serve his own purposes. Indeed, although Eden announced the convening of a second
conference of canal users, Dulles masterminded the concept. Eden understood his
country‘s participation as nothing more than a show of unity. Where Dulles hoped to
461
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allow time for reasoned negotiation to re-assert itself, Eden believed that his support of
Dulles would be reciprocated should force be necessary to resolve the crisis. 465 Not only
did the first London Conference fail to bridge the gap between Egyptian and international
concerns relating to the canal, it did not even change the mindset Western allies held
towards one another. As historian John Campbell put it, ―The discipline of both [Eastern
and Western] blocs seemed to be breaking down.‖466 Yet, each leader remained
convinced that the disparate course they pursued enjoyed the support of their allies.
Multilateral diplomacy had reached its lowest ebb.
Although some U.S. government officials began favoring UN participation,
Eisenhower‘s senior advisers continued to limit the organization‘s role to one of rubberstamping Washington-based policy. Anonymous bureaucrats began understanding the
dispute as more than a simple matter of bloc politics. According to a New York Times
article, ―Western diplomats‖ had recoiled from the prospect of UN deliberations for fear
of an Asian-African-Latin American coalition that could dominate the proceedings in the
UN General Assembly. Witnessing the diversity of opinion within the Afro-Asian bloc,
however, eased America‘s fears to the point where they could accept referral of the
matter to the world body. Discipline among Asian nations had been particularly elusive
during the first London conference. Where Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan had aligned with
the 18-nation proposal during the first London Conference, India, Indonesia, and others
had dissented.467
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Dulles hoped to capitalize from the re-alignments that were taking place to direct
the UN‘s course of action. During a 6 September meeting with Congressional leaders,
Dulles expressed his intention of using the Security Council to legitimize his plans for
international operation of the canal. International administration of the canal remained
―the fundamental issue‖ for Dulles, which automatically precluded him from considering
alternative perspectives regardless of their source. With little equivocation, Dulles
envisioned the role of the United Nations much as the Truman Administration had—an
instrument designed to endorse a particular brand of world order. Yet, the next day, he
accused his European allies of conspiring to use the UN in precisely the same manner.
After listening to British and French proposals to bring the Suez question before the
Security Council themselves, Dulles communicated his concern that the Security Council
would simply ―impose on Egypt a new treaty in the form of the 18-power proposal.‖468
Dulles deserves equal amounts of credit and criticism for his analysis. His suspicion of
British and French motives was credible; but Dulles failed to recognize similar pitfalls
within his own policy-making. Dulles‘s subordinates within the State Department were
more observant.
Rather than remain anonymous, Loy Henderson, the American member of the
Menzies Mission, voiced his opposition to Dulles‘s ―user‘s association.‖ Amidst efforts
to revive negotiations with Nasser over the original London Conference proposal,
Henderson reported to the State Department the ―difficulties and friction‖ caused by any
new proposals coming from Washington. Hearing of Dulles‘s Suez Canal Users
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Association (SCUA), Henderson said that it ―would be even more unpalatable . . . than
the 18-nation proposal.‖469 Dulles‘s views proved incompatible among allies,
congressional legislators, State Department subordinates, and even contested the
multilateral identity Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld wished to construct for the
United Nations.
To complicate matters, NATO allies also began to re-consider referring the Suez
crisis to the United Nations. Prior to the diplomatic fireworks occurring during the
Menzies Mission, a 2 September 1956 New York Times article described the multiple
majorities present at the London Conference. ―A majority of the twenty-two nations
favored international operation of the [Suez] canal,‖ writes Harold Callender, ―but
[another] majority opposed the use of force to impose this or anything else on Egypt.‖
The most vocal advocate for both majorities was the United States.470 Rather than affirm
overlapping majorities that the United States could influence and lead as Callender
implies, these fluid perspectives proved how delicate and complex the entire crisis had
become. Countless fissures such as these led Canada‘s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson
and Belgium‘s Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak to endorse UN action in the Security
Council. Speaking before the NATO Council, Pearson believed ―that a majority opinion
at the Security Council, even if it was vetoed there as it would be, might be an important
and valuable support for subsequent negotiations or action.‖ 471 For the first time in the
Suez crisis, senior-level governmental officials understood the pivotal role the United
469
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Nations could play in resolving the dispute. These opinions formed the foundation upon
which eventual compromise would be reached.
Soon afterward, other journalists picked up on variations of these multilateral
themes. Tracing the relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain, the iconic Walter
Lippmann identified numerous occasions where each ally had served to restrain the other
to benefit broader alliance interests. For example, Britain filled this restraining role when
the United States considered expanding the Korean War and the Indo-Chinese War after
the Dien Bien Phu debacle. ―In . . . these instances,‖ Lippmann writes, ―American
opinion was divided. And official Washington was sharply divided. The British stand
did much, it may have been decisive, to ensure the victory of the moderates.‖472
Lippmann‘s analysis implies the often overshadowed value multilateral
diplomacy possesses in times of tremendous crisis. Unlike the course of events
contributing immediately to the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the even longer history
surrounding the canal‘s nineteenth century controversies, contested opinions were not
abhorrent. Indeed, in Lippmann‘s opinion, they proved vital to international mediation.
―The old conventional weapons are ineffective against guerillas fighting with the support
of the native population. . . ., Lippmann concludes. ―Some day and somehow the
Atlantic nations and the liberated nations will have to come to a new understanding and
into a new relationship.‖473 Lippmann, Hammarskjöld, and even Loy Henderson
comprehended the new multilateral effort and sensitivity that crisis resolution required.
Policy-makers obsessed with advancing national interests, however, were not to covet
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multilateralism an as independent alternative unto itself, but rather as a means to a more
myopic end.

VI

Indeed, the intractable habits of key leaders remained unyielding. Like many
American, British, and French officials, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser also
turned to the United Nations for affirmation of his interests. After the Menzies Mission
failed, Nasser welcomed UN arbitration of canal disputes between Egypt and the canal‘s
users. According to historian Hugh Thomas, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and
French Prime Minister Guy Mollet rejected Nasser‘s proposal. 474 Similar to Dulles‘s
strategy, Nasser sought to embellish his image as a facilitator of multilateral interests
while simultaneously accentuating British and French imperialist belligerency.
As Nasser joined in the various efforts attempting to usurp multilateral initiatives,
so too did he have to mollify growing discontent from within the Arab world. Nasser
was eager to remain at the forefront of his pan-Arab cause, but his unilateral actions
regarding the nationalization of the canal threatened the political stability of key Arab
states. In Syria, the Cabinet resigned as a result of internal disagreements between its
Socialist and Nasser-inspired Nationalist elements.475 King Hussein of Jordan expressed
his resentment regarding Nasser‘s cavalier interference throughout the Middle East.
Hussein grew ―increasingly perturbed‖ by Nasser‘s self-appointed role as Arab
spokesperson; Nasser‘s unilateral actions, such as nationalizing the Suez Canal; and
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Nasser‘s subversive propaganda campaigns to undermine Arab rulers who opposed him.
By September, the Jordanian King shared his views with President Camille Chamoun of
Lebanon and President Shukry al-Kuwatly of Syria in an effort to subvert Nasser‘s
influence.476 President Chamoun also had to contend with mounting tensions between
Lebanese Christian and Muslim communities. Christian Arabs grew ―uneasy‖ about
Islam‘s dominance in Arab nationalism. In some cases, Arab Muslims looked to turn
these suspicions to their advantage. On one occasion, Muslims accused Arab Christians
of burning the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian flags at a Lebanese festival in an effort to
isolate the Arab Christian community. 477 Ethiopia‘s Ambassador to Egypt conveyed his
frustration ―that small nations in the Red Sea area were completely at Egypt‘s mercy and
felt uncomfortable.‖478
One country‘s support that Nasser could not afford to lose was that of Saudi
Arabia. On 23 September, Nasser traveled to meet with King Abdul Aziz bin Abdur
Rahman Al Saud. Oil was the main concern of the Saudi sovereign. With so much of
Western Europe‘s oil supply transported by naval tankers, the Suez Canal occupied a
vital ―part of the broader Middle East oil complex.‖ King Saud requested that Nasser
remain mindful of Egypt‘s commercial responsibilities and of the dire consequences any
stoppage in oil shipments or oil payments would have on Saudi Arabia. 479 Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his ―concern that the Saudi Arabian government is
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in grave danger of a Communist coup if its oil revenues should be denied or substantially
reduced.‖480
By mid-September a growing chorus calling for UN involvement resonated across
the Atlantic; but it did little to affect the diplomatic initiatives of major world powers.
United Nations officials continued to carry out their duties as stipulated in the Armistice
Agreement. These efforts provided UN officials with valuable, first-hand experience
from which they made astute observations. For example, Chief UN mediator, General
Burns, expressed concern over the escalating Suez crisis and its detrimental effect on the
already tense Arab-Israeli dispute. Should Europeans and Egyptians go to war, Burns
cautioned that Israel may join the fight in a series of ―arbitrary retaliations‖ against its
neighbor without fear of rebuke from the Security Council. Hammarskjöld agreed, but
the circumstances as they existed left the United Nations powerless. 481 To a limited
degree, Britain‘s Defense Minister Walter Monckton felt similarly. During an 11
September British Cabinet meeting, Monckton believed that ―any premature recourse to
force‖ would ―alienate‖ domestic and international public opinion. Monckton‘s primary
interest was gaining American endorsement of any military actions Britain made against
Egypt.482 Admittedly, American approval narrowed ―international public opinion‖
severely, but at the very least Monckton‘s assessment demonstrated some sensitivity to
the international community and its impact on domestic support.
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The same cannot be said for the Eisenhower administration. President
Eisenhower and his senior staff remained steadfast in their handling of Suez Canal
negotiations. Although Eisenhower realized in a letter to Eden that ―the most significant
[American] public opinion . . . seems to think that the United Nations was formed to
prevent [the Suez crisis from flaring into war,]‖ the president and his Secretary of State
continued to follow a diplomatic course outside the UN‘s jurisdiction. 483 Dulles unveiled
his Suez Canal Users Association during the Second London Conference, which began
on 19 September. Contrary to calls for UN involvement, Dulles questioned the
organization‘s ―authority‖ over drafting and implementing a new agreement.484 Dulles
also disagreed with General Burns over the notion that a potential war in Suez could
expand into a wider Arab-Israeli conflict.485
Rather than continue to assign credit to Dulles for his ability to identify occasions
when the United Nations was being manipulated to serve a particular set of interests as
was the case with British and French initiatives, Dulles took to undermining the integrity
of the organization directly. This included not only questioning the UN‘s capacity to
mediate crises, but also refuting the analysis of its officials in the field. Refusing to
consider referral of the Suez crisis to the UN simply because it conflicted with the U.S.
government‘s own proposals tarnishes the sincerity of the administration‘s commitment
to productive negotiations. As if to amplify the point, King Saud wrote President
Eisenhower criticizing Dulles‘s ―‗Users‘ Association‘‖ for its imposition of terms without
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addressing Egyptian needs. 486 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru echoed these
sentiments during an address to India‘s lower house of Parliament. 487 The Prime Minster
of Ceylon, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike described Dulles‘s idea as a ―‗giant step towards
war.‘‖488 Given this sense of foreboding, the Eisenhower administration‘s consideration
of alternative perspective remained mixed at best.
On 17 September, the same day Eisenhower received King Saud‘s letter, the
president‘s National Security Council unveiled its seven contingency plans in preparing
for any eventualities in the Suez crisis. One plan titled ―‗The Suez Canal Situation is
Referred to the UN in the Absence of Military Action,‘‖ called for ―side-stepping the UN
Security Council in favor of either forming a UN subcommittee to resolve the crisis or
486
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relying on the ―intervention of the Secretary-General.‖ Another contingency, forecasting
British and French military intervention in Egypt, recommended reversing the president‘s
opposition to invasion and providing ―political and logistical support‖ for its two NATO
allies.489
Given the scope of these strategies, it is clear how disjointed the U.S. approach to
the Suez crisis had become. On the one hand, the Eisenhower administration remained
open to a broad spectrum of responses. This provided the U.S. with a good deal of
flexibility in policy-making. On the other hand, these recommendations contradicted
earlier proclamations, including objections to military intervention, which Eisenhower
had already endorsed publicly. Dulles‘s reservations regarding the extent of independent
UN involvement in negotiations serves as another contradictory example. By September
1956, Dulles was more inclined to use the organization to endorse his own brand of
compromise.
As the calendar turned to October, solidarity surrounding the SCUA proposal
remained highly conditional. France remained adamant about the association‘s noninterference in internationalizing the canal. In fact, French Foreign Minister Christian
Pineau refused to sign the final report of the Second London Conference that officially
―proposed an association of canal users.‖ Pineau was of the opinion that French policymakers ―should retain freedom of action to refuse measures deemed contrary to [their]
interests.‖490 Japan and Pakistan sent observers only; and Ethiopia flirted with the idea of
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joining them. Iran agreed to participate with the condition that the SCUA refrain from
―any use of force against Egypt.‖491 According to a 6 October New York Times article,
objections to force included ―economic . . . or any other kind of warfare [used] to break
Egypt‘s control [over] the canal.‖ 492 British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd admitted in a
private meeting that ―the Scandinavians would not come into SCUA without the UN
having been involved.‖493 Nevertheless, the users‘ association was agreed to. When
Nasser heard the news, he declared that any attempt made to implement the SCUA
through force of arms would be interpreted by Egypt as an act of war. 494 This tepid
response from America‘s allies and Nasser‘s unequivocal reaction to the SCUA allowed
others to follow through with their own strategies for crisis management.
Beginning on 5 October, British and French officials began presenting their case
to the UN Security Council. In their opening statements, Selwyn Lloyd and French
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau repeated the position taken by those eighteen nations at
the London Conferences by emphasizing the international rights of unfettered access to
the canal and demanding a degree of international authority over its administration.
Lloyd conceded that nations retained the right to nationalize ―undertakings,‖ but argued
that the canal‘s status as an international artery made any discussion of nationalization
―irrelevant to the matter before the Security Council.‖ 495 Framing debate in such a way
automatically disqualified Egypt‘s claims. In doing so, Lloyd attempted to steer the
Security Council to support the course of action set by the 18-nation proposal.
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Additionally, Lloyd explained that ―if one government is to have the power to control the
canal, the confidence of those countries that the present patterns of their trade and
economies can be maintained will be sadly shaken.‖496 Here, Lloyd isolated Egyptian
interests while insisting that Britain‘s commercial interests were synonymous with those
of the international community.
The French Foreign Minister‘s remarks were blunt and bleak compared to his
British counterpart. According to Pineau, the Suez crisis represented ―the limits‖ placed
on national sovereignty. These restrictions, Pineau continued, stemmed ―from treaties
freely concluded.‖ Therefore, ―international treaties must be respected.‖ In other words,
the Egyptian government had an obligation to abide by the terms of the 1888 Convention.
That obligation superseded unilateral actions taken on behalf of national interests. As a
result, Pineau concluded, no negotiation was necessary because the Egyptian government
had breached international law, which the United Nations was required to uphold. 497
Pineau‘s argument is intriguing for a couple of reasons. First, he interprets
international treaties as a restraining influence on countries engaged in pursuing
unilateral objectives. Yet, French and British policy-makers, including Pineau, had
plotted their own interventionist course to take back the canal and were planning to use
the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 as the basis for the intervention. Ironically, this
international agreement was originally designed to maintain the status quo, as American
officials had tried to do in 1954-1955. Pineau sets a dangerous double-standard where
one treaty restrains Egypt‘s intervention in Suez while another treaty authorizes British
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and French intervention. Second, by presenting his case as an ultimatum, Pineau set the
stakes for peace at all or nothing. If the Security Council approved the British and
French proposal and Nasser refused the terms, then Britain and France would be within
their rights to invade Egypt in an effort to enforce the international community‘s will as
expressed through the Security Council. As Anthony Nutting put it in his own
recollection of the Suez crisis
If in a world which had undertaken to respect the Charter of the United
Nations, [the British and the French] were going to revert to nineteenthcentury methods to settle a dispute, they must find a twentieth-century
pretext for doing so. If they were going to commit an assault, they must
appear to be wearing a policeman‘s uniform. 498
This forecast satisfied the key prerequisite of attaining the moral authority that British
Prime Minister Anthony Eden had requested prior to any use of force. 499 It also
demonstrates exactly how British and French officials used the United Nations to serve
their own national interests, thus undermining any hopes of genuine multilateral
diplomacy.
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VII

The full extent of this deception emerged during a series of private meetings
between, Lloyd, Pineau, Hammarskjöld and Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi.
From 9 to 13 October this quartet met in the secretary general‘s office and signified the
first direct talks between the ―main protagonists‖ since the nationalization of the canal. 500
Hammarskjöld mediated which was ―beneficial to the individual nations and . . .
consonant with the opinion of the larger world community of the United Nations.‖ 501
The secretary general set an objective tempo by asserting himself when the ministers
encountered deadlock. For example, when Lloyd introduced five principles as a basis for
negotiation, Fawzi objected to their being a simple re-statement of the principles agreed
to at the London Conferences. Hammarskjöld declared that their origin should not
preclude them from mere discussion. Fawzi concurred that, presented ―in a new
context,‖ the principles may be acceptable. 502 By the time these private talks concluded,
a total of six principles served as the skeletal framework for compromise. The principles
were as follows:
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(1)

there should be free and open transit through the canal without
discrimination, overt or covert—this covers both political and
technical aspects;

(2)

the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;

(3)

the operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of
any country;
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(4)

the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by
agreement between Egypt and the users;

(5)

a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;

(6)

in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal
Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by
arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions
for the payment of sums found to be due.503

Although the United Nations served as the ―new context‖ through which the principles
could be agreed to, Lloyd and Pineau reverted back to the unacceptable context of the
London Conferences.
On Sunday, 14 October, Lloyd and Pineau introduced a draft resolution re-stating
the six principles to which Lloyd, Pineau, and Fawzi had agreed. However, credit for
these principles went to the eighteen-nation proposals coming from the First London
Conference. Furthermore, the draft resolution legitimized the rights of the SCUA to
collect canal tolls and function as stipulated by the Second London Conference. These
latter portions of the draft resolution betrayed the spirit of the UN proceedings by
sabotaged compromise for the fulfillment of national interests. The British and French
governments saved face by portraying the Egyptian government as having acquiesced to
the London Conference recommendations. The Soviet Union‘s Foreign Minister, Dmirti
Shepilov, and Yugoslavia‘s non-permanent representative on the UN Security Council,
Kosa Popovic, protested these efforts as an affront to world public opinion. Popovic
argued that ―this part of the draft . . . based on the 18-power proposals . . . [has] already
proved unable to make agreement possible.‖ Instead, Popovic offered an alternative draft
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resolution that omitted references to the London Conferences. 504 Ten minutes before
midnight on 14 October, the Security Council ―unanimously approved‖ the six principles
while the Soviets, backed by the Yugoslavs, vetoed proposed resolutions that would have
established international control over the canal. 505
Throughout the entire proceedings, progress was always kept in check. In his
memoirs, Selwyn Lloyd recalls ―[the French] thought that the exercise at the United
Nations would be futile but they agreed to act in concert with [England].‖ 506 Once in
New York, Pineau shared his pessimism with U.S. Secretary of State Dulles and took the
opportunity to lobby for Nasser‘s removal from power.507 British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden had expressed the same sentiments as early as 3 October during a Cabinet
meeting. Lloyd remained somewhat out of the loop with regard to his superior‘s
perspective. The British Foreign Minister had left for New York to attend the opening
session of the Security Council the day before Eden shared his thoughts. 508 On the other
hand, Pineau remained fully informed of the British and French plans for armed
intervention in Egypt.
Indeed, events at the United Nations were to deflect international attention while
military plans were finalized for implementation if negotiations in New York collapsed.
Pineau, and later Lloyd, carried out that responsibility. As late as 11 October, Reuters
news service reported Pineau as saying there was ―no basis for negotiation.‖ 509 By the
final day their private meetings with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, Pineau and, now,
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Lloyd, under instructions from Eden, thwarted compromise by equating the six principles
to the London Conference proposals. 510 Any diplomatic breakthrough, short of Egypt‘s
complete agreement to international control of the canal, would have scuttled their true
intentions of using the UN to justify military action.
Since September 1956, French, Israeli, and British heads of state and senior
officials met in secret outside Paris. Details surrounding military intervention called for
an Israeli attack on the Sinai region in response to persistent cross-border fedayeen raids.
Once initiated, these hostilities would provide a context for Anglo-French forces to seize
the Suez Canal and guarantee its continued operation as stipulated by the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement of 1954. Thirty-six to forty-eight hours after the war began, Britain and
France would issue their appeal to have Egyptian and Israeli forces withdraw ten miles
from either side of the canal to allow for Anglo-French units to take control of the
waterway. Though straightforward in theory, British, French, and Israeli officials
disagreed over the political conditions necessary for war in addition to the wartime
strategic priorities.
Israel‘s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and its Military Chief of Staff Moshe
Dayan grew increasingly frustrated by their allies‘ pettiness. As late as 22 October, Eden
set exacting terms to which his co-conspirators were to comply. The first condition
required a ―legal, political, and moral justification for the invasion of Egypt by Britain
and France.‖ Achieving this mandate became the motive for taking the Suez controversy
510
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to the United Nations Security Council. As Anthony Nutting so eloquently phrased it,
―aggression was less likely to be interpreted as such if those committing the act were
considered enforcers of international consensus.‖511 The other condition said that,
although, England would not join Egypt in an attack against Israel, the British
government retained the right to come to Jordan‘s aid if Israel attacked it. Ben-Gurion
took issue with the notion that Israel should act as the ―aggressor, while the British and
French appeared as angels of peace to bring tranquility to the area.‖ 512 Israel would not
play the stooge to enhance the image of others.
Differences of overall strategy also plagued the final round of discussions. As
Selwyn Lloyd‘s secretary remembered decades later, where the Europeans wanted
Israel‘s invasion to pose sufficient threat to the canal thus warranting Anglo-French
intervention, the Israelis ―main objective‖ was conquering Shram al-Sheikh. Securing
this post at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula would open Israeli access to the Gulf of
Aqaba and transform the Israeli port of Eilat into a major center of commerce.513
Contrasting the Western Europeans‘ focus on limited war aims, namely taking back the
canal, Ben-Gurion and Dayan took this opportunity to sell the idea of re-defining the
balance of power throughout the entire Middle East. Their plan‘s most ambitious act had
Israel and Iraq splitting Jordan in two, each absorbing a portion for itself. As the Israeli
leadership saw it, Iraq‘s new authority would serve Britain‘s interests through the

511

Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 12.
Dayan, Moshe Dayan, pp. 211-212. Historian David Tal concurs by stressing the fact that ―the decision
to go to war was not an Israeli initiative; it was in fact the result of a proposal by France to punish Nasser in
kind for nationalizing the canal.‖ See Tal, ―Israel‘s Road to the 1956 War,‖ p. 75. Historian Terence
Robertson refutes Tal‘s argument saying that ―the origins of the Suez crisis lie in Israel, where the decision
to fight a preventive war was deliberately timed to take advantage of what Israeli leaders thought to be
widespread disenchantment with Colonel Nasser and his politics. See Terence Robertson, Crisis: The
Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. xvi.
513
Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, p. 98.
512

205
Baghdad Pact; and France could possibly re-impose itself in Lebanon and Syria.
According to Dayan, war in Suez would initiate a series of steps in fulfilling Israel‘s
vision of a new order. However, French and British concerns over the canal shelved the
scheme.514
As a result, relations remained far from chummy. Dayan observed that ―it [was]
possible that [the allies‘] very inability to tune into each other‘s wavelengths made [the
Israelis on the one hand and the British and French on the other] feel it was useless to
engage in further clarifications or mutual attempts at persuasion.‖515 Later, Dayan
confesses, ―Britain‘s behavior toward [the Israelis], hardly ‗gentlemanly,‘ also aroused
suspicion and mistrust.‖ As if to reinforce the point, Dayan changed Israel‘s battle plan
to secure the southern portion of the peninsula before seizing the northern and most direct
route to the canal along the Mediterranean shoreline. 516 Altering this detail undermined
the validity of the proclamation British and French officials had scheduled after hostilities
had commenced. How could the Anglo-French concern for canal security be accurate
when Israel‘s main thrust was to take such a circuitous route across the peninsula?
Britain, France, and Israel coordinated plans only on the shallowest of levels. The
alliance remained one of convenience rather than conviction.517
Still, in spite of these considerable differences, the three parties patched together a
superficial agreement. Known as the Sevres Protocol, Britain, France, and Israel scripted
courses of action. After Israel‘s initial invasion operations began on 29 October, the
British and French governments planned to submit an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt
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calling for a cease-fire and access to the canal-zone. Israel was to secure routes to the
Gulf of Akaba and refrain from attacking Jordan. Lastly, these ―arrangements‖ were to
―remain strictly secret.‖518
Although these invasion plans remained secret, U.S. officials had authorized its
NATO allies to supply Israel with weapons. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles encouraged
French and Italian officials to supply weapons to the Israelis as early as May 1956. 519 By
June, French officials promised delivery of six-dozen Mystere-class warplanes and forty
Super Sherman tanks to the Israeli government. During a 15 October meeting of senior
State Department officials, American intelligence-gathering revealed that Israel
―[possessed] sixty of the seventy-two French jets, far in excess of the twenty-four that
had been reported officially.‖ 520 While discussing the rising tensions between Israel and
Jordan and prospect of war, U.S. officials noted how, as a fighter jet, the Mystere would
be virtually useless in any Israeli-Jordanian conflict since ―Jordan has no aviation.‖ 521
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By mid-October 1956, American officials wrestled not with the conspiratorial
actions of there allies but rather with their own self-inflicted bewilderment. The
Eisenhower administration longed for the best of both worlds where it sanctioned the
shipment of arms to aid Israel on the one hand while remaining adamantly opposed to
any justification for war on the other hand. Additionally, while officials in Washington
refused to participate directly in the arms race between Egypt‘s Soviet armaments and
Israel‘s Western-manufactured weapons, Eisenhower and Dulles reserved the right to
control the flow of munitions through America‘s NATO allies. This might have
succeeded had the United States required NATO‘s compliance with the arms embargo.
Instead, U.S. officials enlisted its allies for provisioning the Israeli military. The
schizophrenic nature of these policies was the greatest challenge the U.S. government had
to surmount.

VIII

Many other governments faced similar circumstances where independent courses
of action plotted for the sake of multilateral benefit provoked crisis rather than preventing
it. Soon after the Soviet Union‘s 20th Congress, Khrushchev realized that in his haste to
seize the political initiative by appealing to a broader spectrum of socialist ideology, he
had to devote greater amounts of time and energy to containing the forces he had helped
unleash. Poland‘s Pozan riots tested the limits of Khrushchev‘s tolerance, but more vocal
dissent followed in the fall of 1956. Next to front page headlines of the Soviet‘s UN veto
of the British and French proposals regarding operation of the Suez Canal lay news of
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Hungary‘s and Poland‘s continued experimentation with broadening communism‘s party
line. Local party newspapers in Hungary forecast the return of ―rehabilitated comrades‖
such as Imre Nagy and the pursuit of independent ideas. In Poland, the government
acknowledged the injustice of past purges and began reconciliation by honoring the
memories of those political outcasts who had paid with their lives. 522 Before the end of
October, Imre Nagy returned to power in Hungary.
British and French officials also experienced political turbulence as they
attempted to manipulate multilateral forums to justify the use of force. After Nasser‘s
nationalization of the Suez Canal, British, French, and American policy-makers
coordinated their response. Reminiscent of de Lesseps‘s dependence on quid pro quo
agreements that satisfied European, Ottoman, and Egyptian interests, British policymakers used similar means to influence the Eisenhower administration in 1956. By
agreeing to participate in the London Conferences, British and French officials thought
they had earned American support for military operations if diplomacy failed. When it
seemed as if negotiations might succeed with UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld
acting as the lead mediator, the British and French Foreign Ministers sabotaged the
proceedings. Like the Americans and the Soviets, the British and French suffered from
the catch-22 brought about by their own policy-making. The British and French became
entangled in their own efforts to have international organizations, convened for the
purpose of keeping the peace, authorize the use of military force.
Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser suffered from the same selfdeluding policies. Nationalization of the canal was a unilateral act Nasser could use to
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win the favor and represent the plight of anti-imperialist, non-aligned interests
worldwide. In many respects, however, Nasser‘s action upset some of Egypt‘s staunchest
allies. Having acted without consulting even his closest advisors, Nasser was quick to
rehabilitate relations. For example, Nasser traveled to Saudi Arabia to speak directly
with King Saud and address his concerns regarding oil shipments through the canal.
Nasser also showed greater receptivity to the international community as a whole when
the United Nations began debating the Suez issue. 523 Nasser‘s government stifled ―press
attacks on the U.S. in the hopes [that the American government] would work out [a]
solution which Egypt could accept.‖524 Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi
reflected his superior‘s amiable nature at the UN. Although meetings with the British
and French Foreign Ministers were brusque, Fawzi had a better rapport with Terry Duce,
chairman of the massive Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Duce represented
Western oil interests ―as well as some of the large banks‖ who wished to negotiate with
the Egyptian government. According to Mohamad Heikal, Duce considered tankers
―more reliable‖ and less vulnerable than pipelines. As a result, access to Suez remained
vital. 525 Unfortunately, these constructive exchanges, made possible in part by the United
Nations, yielded to less compromising alternatives.
The subjugation of the United Nations to the national interests of particular
member states not only demoralized the most stoic of international civil servants such as
Hammarskjöld, but also ignored the value of the institution as an objective analyzer of
international affairs. Contrary to the foresight exhibited by UN officials, the Eisenhower
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administration‘s unwillingness to acknowledge connections between Arab-Israeli
disputes and the Suez situation resulted in a debilitating lapse in awareness of diplomatic
deterioration. When the Suez War began on 29 October and the full scope of British and
French involvement was revealed, Eisenhower was incensed. 526 Yet, as early as 4
September New York Times reporter Dana Adams Schmidt described ―Washington‘s
misgivings about the continued British-French military build-up [in the Eastern
Mediterranean].‖527 Eisenhower may not have known the extent of military planning that
had been set in motion, but he was aware of the preparations and the threat it posed to
maintaining peace. Additionally, in the weeks preceding the conflict, America‘s attempt
to achieve national interests through multilateral means at the London Conferences
undermined the basis for negotiations and contributed to the Eisenhower administration‘s
inaccurate assessment of the entire crisis. In spite of these developments, many scholars
credit the U.S. government with leading world opinion in condemning the Suez War. 528
Yet, rather than craft the pivotal UN resolutions responsible for resolving the conflict, the
Eisenhower administration merely endorsed the measures set forth by other delegates.
British and French policy-makers also severely miscalculated the crisis and
opportunities for multilateral diplomacy. By late October 1956, senior advisers ignored
the fact that the United Nations provided Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi with a
diplomatic environment where he could accept negotiated terms that Hammarskjöld
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presented. British and French posturing had become so fixated on their own national
interests that any role the United Nations assumed other than the one stipulated by the
British and French governments was intolerable. Such preoccupation dictated not only
the terms of compromise, but also the diplomatic venues that were to receive credit for
compromise. Examples such as these confirm the detrimental effects national interests
had on multilateral diplomacy—especially when government officials attempted to
impose prescribed principles on the international community. As experienced in the past,
these efforts helped precipitate crisis rather than avert it. By the end of October 1956, the
mismanagement of multilateral diplomacy resulted in war.
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Chapter IV

The Midnight Hour: The Suez War and Diplomatic Efforts to Halt
Its Expansion, October to November 1956

With the birth of the Atomic Age a group of American scientists created the
Doomsday Clock to represent humanity‘s flirtation with self-destruction. Since the end
of the Korean War, the hands remained at an ominous two minutes to midnight. Four
years after the Suez crisis scientists reset the clock to read 11:53 p.m. As their web site
contends to this day, one reason for stepping away from the brink lay in quarantining the
Suez War and keeping it from mutating into a larger conflict. The scientists‘ summary
timeline credits the superpowers for their willingness to compromise, but nothing is said
of the UN‘s role in facilitating successful crisis management. 529 Yet, as witnessed in both
the Hungarian crisis and the Suez crisis, superpower influence played a central role in
escalating each crisis. Detailed examination of the transcripts of late-night General
Assembly speeches, meticulous negotiations, as well as the international reactions to the
529
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UN‘s flurry of activity reveals a veritable multitude that should share in the laudatory
praise traditionally heaped upon so few. By December 1956, these combined efforts,
represented by nearly all-night debates on the floor of the United Nations‘ General
Assembly, kept the one clock that should never reach midnight from doing so.
Contrary to the UN‘s facilitation of inclusive, multilateral negotiations that
ultimately led to resolution of the Suez crisis, diplomatic initiatives of the countries
directly affected by the crisis had placed national interests before the collective interests
of the international community. In many respects, leaders of the various countries
involved had little recourse. Escalating tensions triggered policy-making that was more
reactionary in nature. Call it realpolitik or simple human nature, these actions and
reactions were justifiable. When national leaders attempted to enlist the support of the
international community to suit their own purposes, anxiety continued to fester.
Throughout the 1950s and during the height of the Suez crisis, national leaders
had improved upon well-established practices of presenting national interests as being
emblematic of a broader set of international interests. Following in the footsteps of
Ferdinand de Lesseps, Eisenhower, Eden, Nasser, and others seemed unlikely to separate
unilateral and multilateral agendas. Eisenhower administration officials had attempted to
use Cold War bi-polarity to justify creation of a defensive military alliance in the Middle
East. British officials seized on collective security as a means of continuing some
measure of their own presence in the region despite the growing nationalist backlash
against the West‘s imperial powers. In the non-aligned camp, Nasser and others tried to
harness the movement‘s universal agenda to serve their own purposes.

214
By the mid-twentieth century government officials worldwide had developed a
precarious paradox where policies put into effect for the supposed purpose of
representing multilateral interests resulted from increasingly unilateral decision-making.
By October 1956, these officials had miscalculated severely the negative impact these
methods had on international diplomacy and crisis management. American, British,
Soviet, and Egyptian officials in particular clung to shaky assumptions that they
commanded a sense of solidarity within their respective blocs of influence at the exact
moment when solidarity was declining. The result led to the climax not only of the Suez
crisis, but also the Hungarian crisis, and revealed the UN‘s indispensable value as an
institution of multilateral diplomacy.

I

As British, French, and Israeli officials conferred just outside Paris in October
1956, Hungarians tested their political independence. About the same time that the
British, French, Israelis squabbled over war aims and strategic timetables, Hungarian
students and workers united behind a 16-point resolution calling for immediate political
change. Among its most adamant proposals, the document demanded the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Hungary, the return of former Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy to
political power, new elections, economic re-organization, Hungary‘s implementation of a
more independent foreign policy, and the ―complete freedom of opinion.‖ 530 In many
ways, these ideological shifts from behind the Iron Curtain paralleled Bandung principles
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of non-alignment as Hungarians plotted a distinctly independent course for themselves.
Imre Nagy championed this cause by favoring ―democratic coalition [over] one-party
dictatorship . . . [and] ideological warfare by neutralism and peaceful co-existence.‖531
According to one unidentified eyewitness observing the country‘s revolutionary events, a
sense of equality and unity replaced the Hungarian peoples‘ mutual suspicion.‖ 532
Inspiring as these sentiments were in contributing to a prominent sense of Hungarian
identity, they also helped dispel the misrepresentations of multilateralism that had helped
precipitate the Hungarian crisis. Hungarians were not simply rebelling against Soviet
oppression; they were exposing the Soviets‘ double standard of claiming to represent
multilateral interests while cracking down to ensure greater conformity.
Khrushchev had hoped to balance Soviet policy-making on this premise, but as
much as it reoriented political loyalties in Eastern European countries, such as Poland and
Hungary, it also disoriented officials within the Soviet government. Local populations in
Poland expressed open support for Wladyslaw Gomulka, a former victim of Stalin‘s
purges. Gomulka‘s political career was resurrected in October 1956 when he was
reinstated to the Polish United Workers‘ Party and became party leader soon afterwards.
Kremlin officials feared that Gomulka‘s return to power could result in Poland‘s exit
from the Warsaw Pact. According to Soviet scholars Mark Kramer and William
Taubman, Khrushchev used considerable political and military pressure in his
negotiations with Poland‘s new government. In Taubman‘s words, ―Khrushchev
exercised prudent restraint.‖ However, Taubman goes on to say that the most
challenging obstacles to negotiations were Khrushchev‘s insensitivity to Polish interests
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and his vacillation between political enticements and military intervention. Fortunately
for Khrushchev, Gomulka appeased the Soviets after hearing that Soviet tanks were
heading towards Warsaw.533 Having successfully brought Gomulka‘s independentlyinclined Polish government under control by mid-October 1956, Khrushchev thought that
he could manage Nagy, too.
Originally, Imre Nagy was appointed as Hungary‘s Prime Minister in 1955 as a
conciliatory move designed to create parity between Stalinist-era communist hard-liners
and new reformers. This initial experiment failed. Nagy was removed from power after
a few months and expelled from the Communist party for his dissenting opinions. 534 By
the autumn of 1956, however, Khrushchev was willing to deal with Nagy once again
despite new efforts to keep the reformer out of power.535 Nagy‘s political rival was Erno
Gero, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Hungary. After Nagy was removed
from power in 1955, Soviet officials supported party hard-liners such as Gero. As
Nagy‘s popularity grew, Gero had reason for concern. His interest in preserving the
status quo would be upset by Nagy‘s return to office. Of particular interest, however, is
the role Moscow played in heightening tensions between these factions in Hungary,
rather than mediating between Gero and Nagy.
Always worried about maintaining order, Soviet policy became exceedingly
opportunistic. Within roughly eighteen months, Soviet leadership had reversed its
position between stalwart conservatives and progressive reformers for a third time.
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According to one scholar, the Soviets‘ impulsive policy-making led officials in Moscow
to chastise Gero for exaggerating the potential threat Nagy‘s resurgence might have had
on maintaining party order and ―[stampeding] Moscow into an ill-advised commitment of
Soviet troops [in Hungary].‖ 536 In many respects, Khrushchev‘s indecisiveness only
worsened matters. Yet, Soviet opportunism and indecision reflected the Kremlin‘s
understanding of the relationship between multilateral legitimacy and fulfillment of
unilateral national interests. In Poland, Gomulka served as the country‘s leader as long as
he conformed to the Soviets‘ agenda. Khrushchev hoped to recreate this situation in
Hungary with Imre Nagy. Unfortunately, this relationship between multilateral and
unilateral interests was incredibly unstable. As Kramer points out, during the height of
the Soviet-Polish standoff, tensions bordered on civil war. Polish soldiers in the Red
Army remained loyal to the Soviet Union. Poland‘s internal security forces, however,
―were fully willing to fight on behalf of the new Polish regime.‖ 537 In Hungary, the lines
of loyalty were more clearly drawn.
Following through with their 16-point plan, Hungarians chose Imre Nagy to lead
the country once again. Political police, known as the Allamvedelmi Hatosag (AVH),
tried to repress Nagy‘s reformist movement. On 25 October, these police officials fired
into a massive crowd gathered to hear Nagy‘s inaugural speech as Hungary‘s newly
elected leader. 538 Forty-eight hours later, the Red Army engaged the rebellious
Hungarians.
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That same day, 27 October, the Soviets mobilized their diplomatic resources in
the United Nations Security Council to face-off against the international community. The
Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Arkady Sobolev, disavowed Hungary‘s sovereignty,
arguing instead that the issue remained a domestic dispute between Hungary‘s rival
political factions and therefore lay outside the UN‘s jurisdiction. Sobolev then took the
diplomatic offensive by accusing the United States of inciting rebellion within several
sovereign countries in violation of UN principles. For example, Sobolev noted how in
1952, the United States Congress appropriated $100 million for funding political dissent
across Eastern Europe.539
Although President Eisenhower was reluctant to disturb the Cold War status quo,
the administration‘s ―rollback‖ rhetoric made it impossible to simply ignore the
Hungarian cause. The result led to a paradoxical impasse during the Hungarian crisis.
On the one hand, ―[Eisenhower] instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to
maintain caution and avoid giving Moscow any reason to suppose that the United States
had either instigated or would support the Hungarian rebels.‖ 540 On the other hand, ―to
maintain their political prestige, . . . it was most important for the United States to
conceal their inadequacy as best as they could from international public opinion.‖541 Just
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as American policy-makers suffered from their own shortcomings in handling the Suez
crisis, the same officials were attempting to deal with Soviet intervention only to confront
nearly identical obstacles. Where the Eisenhower administration sought to enlist arms
suppliers for Israel while sustaining the status quo in the Middle East, Eisenhower also
wished to encourage independence for Soviet satellites without having to enforce it. In
doing so, the Eisenhower administration created another paradox for itself with regard to
the Hungarian situation where the U.S. government sought to advance Cold War interests
without escalating Cold War tensions. Fortunately for Eisenhower, Khrushchev was
suffering from similar bouts of indecision and proceeded to withdrawal. By 30 October,
both Nagy and the Soviets agreed to a cease-fire.

II

As events in Hungary quieted, the events in Suez exploded.

On the evening of

29 October 1956, Israeli forces launched their invasion of the Sinai in dramatic fashion.
A squadron of C-47 transport aircraft dropped an Israeli airborne company east of the
Mitla Pass, approximately twenty to thirty miles from the southern section of the Suez
Canal. 542 To confuse the enemy further, four WW II-vintage P-51 Mustangs flew over
the peninsula cutting overhead telephone lines with their propellers and wings skirting
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just four yards from the ground.543 Thirty minutes after these missions commenced, the
commander of the UN observer station at El Auja, along the Egyptian-Israeli border,
reported being expelled from his post at the hands of the Israelis. 544 UN observation
posts such as the one at El Auja were a part of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO). According to its mandate, UNTSO was responsible for
supervising the General Armistice Agreement, including the policing of the border,
following the Arab-Jewish War of 1948.545 Elsewhere along the border, Israeli
formations punched through Egyptian defenses. The Israelis‘ advance displaced innocent
UN observers and enemy Egyptian forces alike. On 30 October at 2:17 a.m., roughly
seven hours after Israeli forces began their attack, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General
E.L.M. Burns, issued a cease-fire. 546
Throughout that late October day, the full measure of diplomatic double-dealing
unraveled in the hours and days following Israel‘s invasion. A meeting between the
Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, and the Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, William Roundtree, began with Eban
―categorically rejecting [any notion] that Israel would attack‖ and ended promptly when
both parties learned of news to the contrary. 547 As the clock struck midnight in the Sinai,
officials in Washington met with British and French embassy liaisons to discuss evoking
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the Tripartite Declaration. Representing Great Britain, J.E. Coulson argued that the
declaration ―would be inoperative.‖ Egypt detested the document‘s premise and refused
to allow the return of Western troops to Egypt. Without this concession, Coulson
concluded, Britain could not engage in any military campaign against Israel. 548 What
seems to be the supreme irony here is that America‘s own allies quashed any idea of
tripartite action even before the declaration was brought before the United Nations for
consideration. In all likelihood, the proposal would have been vetoed by the Soviet
Union, but British officials did not care to let it get even that far.
Coulson was correct to question the chances of Egypt‘s acquiescing to tripartite
intervention, but the British government‘s assessment was insightful only so far as
supporting a pre-determined military option independent of the United Nations. These
entrenched perspectives remained incapable of quelling the rapid series of events
unfolding in the Middle East. The Sevres Protocol549 required ample amounts of
instability generated by the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Without it, the British and French
basis for intervention was lost. In other words, these European governments had staked
the securing of their national interests on encouraging conflict. The task ahead of British
and French officials was to get the international community to condone their strategy.
They were not alone. The Security Council deliberations of 30 October foretold the
difficulty policy-makers experienced in restoring order.
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Members of the UN Security Council agreed that a cease-fire was imperative but
many of the proposals continued to place national interests ahead of international peace.
U.S. Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., called for immediate action through
the UN Security Council beginning with a cease-fire and a return to the status quo
antebellum. Later that day, Lodge‘s draft cease-fire resolution called for Israel‘s
withdrawal from the Sinai, implored other UN members not to interfere in the conflict,
and authorized the Secretary General to take charge of the conflict resolution process and
provide status reports to the Security Council. Although Lodge‘s resolution reflected the
sentiments of the council as a whole, some delegates felt it did not go far enough.
Yugoslavian Representative to the UN, Dr. Joza Brilej, endorsed Lodge‘s cease-fire
proposal but noted that Israel‘s concerns over cross-border fedayeen raids should have
been handled through the General Armistice Agreement ―for which Israel has displayed a
growing contempt.‖ Arkady Sobolev, the Soviet representative, supported the resolution
noting, however, the absence of any condemnation of Israeli aggression. Sobolev also
expressed his concerns over the ultimatums issued by Britain and France. 550
Concurrent with Lodge‘s cease-fire proposal, British and French officials issued
their own conditions for a cease-fire as set by the Sevres Protocol. Along with the
cessation of hostilities, Egyptian and Israeli forces were to withdraw ten miles from either
side of the Suez Canal, and allow for Anglo-French occupation of the canal-zone to
ensure its unfettered operation. If either of the Egyptian or Israeli governments failed to
comply with these terms within twelve hours, ―Anglo-French forces would intervene with
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the means necessary to ensure that their demands [were] accepted.‖551 In his address to
the UN Security Council, British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Pierson Dixon, argued that
because British and French forces were being deployed to Egypt to re-establish peace, the
operation had the best interests of the world community and UN principles at heart. 552
Many representatives in the Security Council rejected the ultimatum and Dixon‘s attempt
to sell it to the world body. Sobolev favored Security Council measures being taken ―for
the maintenance of peace and security‖ instead of leaving countries to pursue their own
course of action. Brilej concurred, saying that the West Europeans‘ proclamation had the
uniquely paradoxical nature of threatening to use force ―at a time when such earnest
efforts are being made to achieve a peaceful and mutually acceptable settlement to the
Suez problem.‖553
The conundrum Brilej identified was one of the often overlooked yet enduring
legacies spanning the canal‘s existence. Since de Lesseps‘s personal campaign to build
the waterway in the nineteenth century, the imposition of a single perspective that
misrepresented a broader set of competing interests not only disregard those interests, but
also simultaneously undermining the project‘s original vision of fostering global
economic and cultural exchanges. In addition to contributing to increasingly popular
notions of nationalist identity, de Lesseps‘s methods also inspired foreign policy-making
that operated from a similarly exclusive pretext. The combination of greater self551
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awareness and persistent efforts to subordinate multilateral diplomacy to support
unilateral purposes created diplomatic gridlock. The West‘s unsuccessful negotiation of
a collective security agreement in the Middle East stands as an excellent example. A
similar fundamental flaw plagued Western European efforts to act as the guardians of
international peace in the autumn of 1956.

III

Not even the initial outbreak of war could curtail entrenched habits where national
interests sought to dominate decision-making inside the international community. Few, if
any, officials realized that the Suez War occurred in part because of the pervasive
inability of diplomats to distinguish between their own interests and any broader
multilateral agenda. The best that anyone could do was to point out the hypocrisy
embedded within the various policy proposals as Brilej had done after hearing the British
and French offer their ultimatum. The longevity of these habits as traced from Ferdinand
de Lesseps to the West‘s Middle East security plans of the early 1950s to the London
Conferences helps epitomize an old adage: ―‗Insanity‘ is best defined as applying the
same methods and expecting different results.‖ By the end of October 1956, the pace of
events in the Sinai and in Eastern Europe eclipsed completely the various strategies
designed to contain them.
One reason for these shortcomings was each proposal‘s inability to address the
immediate concerns of the combatants as well as breed a good deal of suspicion and
resentment. Following Sobolev‘s speech, Egypt‘s UN Representative Omar Loutfi
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deflected calls for cease-fire by insisting upon Egypt‘s right to self-defense as allowed
under the UN Charter. Israel‘s Abba Eban, only slightly more informed than during his
previous day‘s meeting with Roundtree, justified the attack by arguing that the fedayeen’s
cross-border infiltrations threatened Israeli security. Eban also expressed Israeli
―contempt‖ for Sobolev‘s ―accusation‖ that Britain and France ―had prompted Israel to
[attack] Egypt.‖ Rejecting this notion further, Britain‘s Sir Pierson Dixon declared that
―both [Egypt and Israel] . . . have shown such repeated disregard for the resolutions of the
Security Council that [the British and French ultimatum] should have the general support
of the Council.‖554 The Israeli and British perspectives convey the general lack of good
faith that afflicted virtually all members of the Security Council. In Dixon‘s case, the
British Ambassador sought to capitalize on this situation to expand support for British
and French intervention. The British government failed to realize that this justification for
taking unilateral measures made the crisis more acute.
Eban and the Israeli government were guilty of the same ignorance. Eban
transformed Israeli interests into international interests. Incredibly, he made these
connections with an amazing degree of nonchalance, rivaling that of the British
delegation. From Eban‘s perspective,
World opinion is naturally asking itself what these fedayeen units are,
what their activities imply for Israel‘s security, whether their plans for the
future are really full of peril for Israel, and whether this peril is so acute
that Israel may reasonably regard its elimination as a primary condition of
its security and indeed of its existence. 555
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Issuing his own ultimatum, the ambassador declared, ―World opinion must choose
between two candidates for its confidence: . . . the men, women, and children of Israel
[or] these fanatic warriors of the fedayeen groups.‖ ―World opinion,‖ Eban concluded,
―must decide whom to trust.‖556
Advertising national interests as multilateral interests irked influential segments
of the international community. Convinced of their own course of action, the British and
French Ambassadors to the UN vetoed Ambassador Lodge‘s draft resolution calling for a
cease-fire in the Sinai. Sabotaging their staunchest allies‘ efforts to achieve peace
exposed the duplicitous degree to which the British and French were willing to go not
only to secure their interests, but also to protect their ability to do so as they saw fit.
With the cease-fire dead in the Security Council and the deadline for evacuation of the
Canal Zone having expired, British and French bombers began attacking Egyptian
positions along the canal. 557
United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld could not tolerate this kind
of Machiavellian belligerence. Speaking before the Security Council on 31 October,
Hammarskjöld excoriated the two delegations. He noted how, in addition to
compromising the authenticity of any negotiations that had occurred previously, British
and French motives had threatened the basic principles of the UN Charter. ―The
principles of the Charter are,‖ Hammarskjöld argued, ―by far, greater than the
Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are
holier that the policies of any single nation or people.‖ ―A Secretary General,‖ he
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proclaimed, ―cannot serve on any other assumption than that—within the necessary limits
of human frailty and honest differences of opinion—all member nations honor their
pledge to observe all Articles of the Charter.‖558 Much like his 1953 assessment of the
UN‘s purpose as an organization where the international interest superseded the interests
of any one member state, Hammarskjöld remained beholden to that premise amidst the
Suez crisis. By 1956, he, as well as others, began to comprehend the volatility that
followed when UN member states attempted to fuse international interests with national
security concerns.
Regarding the Atlantic alliance, the British and French ultimatum to Egypt and
Israel destroyed any vestiges of good faith President Eisenhower held for his European
allies. Writing to his friend Al Gruenther, President Eisenhower confided, ―I don‘t see
the point in getting into a fight to which there can be no satisfactory end, and in which the
whole world believes you are playing the part of the bully and you do not even have the
firm backing of your entire people.‖ Like Nasser had done during his nationalization
speech, Eisenhower drew parallels between contemporary events and the past. In
particular, he equated British Prime Minister Anthony Eden‘s action to ―the Victorian
period.‖559 Historian Richard Immerman and others interpret the president‘s metaphor as
a reference to traditional ―gun-boat diplomacy.‖560
Even members within the British Commonwealth expressed their dismay.
According to historian Thomas Millar, Eden‘s government kept Commonwealth
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countries abreast of developments in the lead up to the Suez War. British officials had
also collected input from the Commonwealth governments. Information regarding
military intervention, however, was not shared. Eden‘s ultimatum and subsequent
invasion of Egypt stunned members of the Commonwealth. 561 Like Yugoslavia‘s UN
Representative, R.S.S. Gunewardene of Ceylon deplored the use of aggressive force to
preserve peace. Indeed, Gunewardene remarked, ―the events of the last few days have
demonstrated the tremendous weight of world opinion that has been brought to bear
against the reckless use of force.‖562 In Canada, Foreign Minister Lester Pearson called
for tempered discontent in responding to the British government‘s actions. 563 With such
a lack of consensus, even from within the British Commonwealth, international attention
turned to the United Nations for mediating the crisis.

IV

With any type of Security Council action at an impasse, as a result of the veto,
attention turned quickly to the General Assembly. Dr. Joza Brilej authored a Security
Council resolution to move the Suez issue to an Emergency Special Session of the
General Assembly as allowed by the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution of 1950. Immune
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from the Security Council‘s permanent member veto, the resolution passed and
deliberation began late in the day on 1 November. The President of the United Nations,
Rudecindo Ortega, of Chile, presided over the plenary session and ended his opening
remarks by noting the pervasive international support for the emergency meeting. No
sooner had Ortega finished his speech then the French representative rose to record his
objection to the proceedings. The Egyptian UN Ambassador, Omar Loutfi, registered his
complaint regarding the launch of British and French bombing raids on Egyptian targets.
Referring to the Treaty of 1888, Loutfi argued that Egypt reserved the legal right to
defend the canal. He also questioned the ―‗temporary measure‘‖ Britain and France were
planning to take in occupying the Canal Zone. Loutfi warned that in 1882, the last time a
―temporary measure‖ had occurred, occupation of the Canal Zone lasted almost threequarters of a century. For Egypt, reassurance rested with multilateral diplomacy and its
―condemnation‖ of aggression championed foremost by the two Superpowers. 564
Pierson Dixon addressed the assembly a short time later. Like the French
delegate before him, Dixon questioned the validity of the emergency session and its
ability to resolve the Suez crisis. From the British perspective, the United Nations had
not arbitrated the Arab-Israeli conflict successfully on previous occasions. Now,
according to Dixon, Arabs and Israelis were exploiting the Security Council‘s
ineffectiveness and internal discord to gain a territorial advantage in the Middle East.
These developments and the speed at which they progressed justified immediate British
intervention. Dixon equated the Suez crisis to the Korean War. ―On that occasion,‖
Dixon argued, ―the Member of the United Nations which had forces on hand and was in a
564
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position to intervene at once courageously did so.‖565 The pivotal difference between
1950 and 1956 was the role and function of the United Nations. Under Trygve Lie, the
UN in 1950 subordinated itself to the interests of its member states. Hammarskjöld
envisioned a more independent—or more appropriately a more interdependent role—for
the United Nations. Additionally, discussion within the Security Council in 1956 had not
authorized, nor entertained the idea of discussing, armed intervention and appeared
unlikely to do so.
As Dixon continued his statement, the differences between Britain‘s unilateral
basis for action and the UN‘s call for a multilateral approach to conflict resolution grew
considerably. Dixon assigned blame to the Egyptians‘ and Israelis‘ unilateral policies. In
Egypt‘s case, Dixon noted how Nasser ignored UN recommendations calling for Israel‘s
maritime access to the Suez Canal. 566 The Israeli government‘s decision to invade the
Sinai Peninsula, on the other hand, threatened canal security and the transmission of
international commerce. 567 Where much of the international community began
identifying the pursuit of unilateral policies as the source of international crisis, British
officials interpreted the same conditions as justification for their own unilateral activity.
British policy-makers had scripted their country‘s sacrifice to be portrayed as a service to
the international community.
John Foster Dulles appeared equally susceptible to the same misperceptions.
During his often quoted ―heavy-hearted‖ speech at the first emergency session, the U.S.
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Secretary of State believed that the UN General Assembly held ―the moral judgment of
the world community.‖ Consequently, Dulles decreed ―the united will of this
Organization to have an impact upon the situation and perhaps to make it apparent to the
world . . . that there is here the beginning of a world order.‖ Dulles even referred to this
―united will‖ as ―the constituted authority.‖ 568 Yet, like Dixon, Dulles could not escape
the temptation to depict a pluralistic forum such as the UN General Assembly in such
monolithic terms. As historian Townsend Hoopes put it, the Secretary‘s speech was ―a
sermon, an appeal to the ideals of Western Man and an implied demand that these ideals
must be met at least by the leading nations of the Western world.‖ 569 Although the
General Assembly may have contributed to a sense of international solidarity, this
awareness emanated not so much from a ―united will‖ as much as from an environment
where various perspectives could be presented and discussed.
When Dr. Tingfu Tsiang, the Nationalist Chinese permanent representative to the
United Nations, addressed the assembly, he alluded to the distinctions between moral
conformity and multilateralism. Tsiang believed that the ―restoration of peace [in the
Middle East]‖ depended on the ―co-operation of all parties.‖ While not perfect, Tsiang
continued, the six principles presented to the Security Council in October served as the
best prospect for resolving the Suez crisis. ―If the Assembly adopted a resolution which
primarily and instantly could restore peace, and at the same time would go far to remove
the causes of war,‖ Tsiang suggested that, then, international opinion would appeal to
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―the opinion of the moderate people‖ in Israel, Britain, and France. To achieve this,
Tsiang endorsed General Burns‘ original cease-fire proclamations requiring an immediate
end to armed aggression and Israel‘s withdrawal. 570 Compared to Dulles and Dixon,
Tsiang‘s tone conveys a more inclusive approach to resolving the crisis. Rather than
mandating a moral consensus as Dulles implied, Tsiang‘s emphasis lay with forging
practical support to which each side could attach their own moral justification.
Many UN representatives contributing to the debate aligned themselves between
Dulles‘s moral focus and Tsiang‘s more practical approach. After a recess, the General
Assembly reconvened at 9:50 p.m. on 1 November. The Philippines‘ permanent
representative to the UN, Felixberto Serrano, respected the spectrum of discussion, but
concluded his remarks by supporting the U.S.‘s cease-fire proposal which re-instated the
status quo ante bellum. Representatives from Colombia and Ecuador also favored the
U.S.‘s draft resolution. As debate continued late into the night, Ecuadorian
representative, Jose Trujillo, commended President Eisenhower for ―applying . . . the
same [international] law to friends and enemies‖ alike. However, not all supporters of
the resolution upheld this sense of moral duty. Jordanian and Syrian representatives
contended that the resolution failed to condemn the British, French, and Israeli breach of
the UN Charter‘s principles. None the less, these representatives acknowledged the need
to act promptly to prevent the entire Arab world from coming to Egypt‘s aid and thus
expanding the scope of the conflict.571 Practicality motivated Jordanian and Syrian
support. Though imperfect, the resolution being debated would stave off the prospect of
expansive war.
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After a second recess, the assembly agreed to limit debate due to the unstable
nature of the crisis and the immediate need for multilateral action. Reconvening at ten
minutes to midnight, the General Assembly heard from Israel‘s Abba Eban. Picking up
where he left off in the Security Council, Eban persisted with rallying world opinion to
Israel‘s aid. ―We [Israelis] know,‖ he confessed, ―that Israel is most popular when it does
not hit back, and world opinion is profoundly important to us,‖ but the lack of ―peaceful
coexistence‖ between Arabs and Israelis left the Jews no choice but to ensure ―selfpreservation.‖ Eban claimed a special relationship between Israel and international
opinion. This ―uniqueness‖ and ―eccentricity‖ was slowly transforming the
―consciousness of mankind.‖ 572 These exhaustive efforts to sway the multilateral mind
were stale and uninspiring. 573 Although Disraeli‘s political legacy of portraying national
interests as universal interests remained irresistible, it also proved to be highly ineffective
during the most intense period of the Suez crisis.
As if to amplify the point, Eban criticized the U.S.-sponsored cease-fire proposal.
―It will not do,‖ he argued, ―to go back to an outdated and crumbling armistice regime
designed by its authors to last for a few months and now lingering for eight years in
growing paralysis of function.‖ 574 Clearly, the U.S.‘s sense of order based on the status
quo ante bellum was unacceptable. The result afforded representatives from other UN
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member states an opportunity to exert their own broader influence in resolving the Suez
crisis.
India and its delegation played a substantial role in this new faction. In noting the
Security Council‘s support for the emergency session, Indian representative Arthur Lall
also counted forty-nine of the UN‘s seventy-six members among the majority who
supported a more multilateral decision-making process. This simple acknowledgement
conveyed as sense of independence from the elite Security Council while promoting a
sense of interdependence within the General Assembly. After conveying Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru‘s concern that twentieth-century practices were reverting back
to the ―predatory practices‖ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Lall questioned
the validity of ―vital interests‖ as a legitimate argument for unilateral intervention. ―This
violent approach to the safeguarding of vital interests,‖ Lall concluded, ―is . . . plunging
the world into chaos.‖ To illustrate his point, Lall referred to the fact that British and
French intervention on behalf of keeping the Suez Canal open had actually succeeded in
shutting-down the canal. 575 With Israeli ground forces pushing deep into the Sinai desert
and British and French warplanes attacking from the air following the twelve-hour
deadline, Nasser ordered the scuttling of ships in the canal to prevent any other country
from seizing the waterway in tact.576
The Suez crisis pivoted on the wide differences existing between unilateral action
and the rapid mobilization of multilateral initiatives. At the moment when the
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governments of a select few countries embroiled themselves in war, much of the
remaining international community was constructing a practical alternative to conflict.
Rather than weaken and delay progressive crisis management, debates occurring in the
General Assembly helped institute a stronger foundation for re-instituting peace. Input
came from various portions of the globe with fluctuating degrees of enthusiasm. In fact,
considerable disagreement surrounded the draft cease-fire resolution and implementation
of the peace process. At the very least, however, numerous UN representatives
recognized the severity of the crisis and the policies responsible for it—specifically the
determined attempts to fuse national interests and multilateral agendas into a unitary
policy.
The crisis and the prospect of an expansive war may deserve some credit for this
epiphany, but international civil servants such as Dag Hammarskjöld had forecast this
role for the UN for some time. In his first address to the General Assembly as the
Secretary General in 1953, Hammarskjöld called for the international organization to
expand its role in global affairs. He was a proponent of having the UN act as
independent arbiter. Hammarskjöld and the UN enjoyed early success in negotiating a
dispute involving Communist Chinese and American interests regarding American pilots
captured during the Korean War. As a result, the secretary general and his fellow
international civil servants were well-prepared for and receptive to managing the Suez
crisis. By November 1956, UN representatives were also broadening their sense of
understanding.
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V

After the pre-vote debate concluded and the General Assembly passed the ceasefire resolution by a more than 6 to 1 ratio, Canada‘s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson took
the rostrum. In the early hours of 2 November, Pearson explained his nation‘s abstention
during the vote moments earlier. To Canada‘s disappointment, fellow delegations
ignored the disconnection between resolutions ending the fighting and resolutions making
the peace. Pearson‘s main objection was the absence of a ―provision . . . supervising or
enforcing the cease-fire.‖577 Repeating the concerns of previous speakers, Pearson
agreed that simply returning to the status quo solved nothing. ―Such a return,‖ Pearson
argued, ―would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be
a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately
another explosion.‖ To remedy this bleak forecast, Pearson suggested organizing ―a
United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political
settlement is being worked out.‖ Instead of an observer status like that of the UN Truce
Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the new UN force would represent ―a truly
international peace and police force.‖578 Pearson‘s plan marked more than just a shift

577

Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87.
ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 35-36. See also Pearson, Mike,
Vol. II, p. 247. According to historian Bruce Thordarson, Pearson had raised the idea of an ―international
police force‖ during a 1 November Cabinet meeting. The idea, Thordarson goes on to say, had existed for
some time. See Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87. According to Brian Urquhart, the idea dated back to
November 1955 when General Burns suggested inserting UN troops along the Egyptian-Israeli border. See
Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 176. See the footnote at the bottom of the page. Adlai Stevenson, the 1952
and 1956 Democratic nominee for President was another early advocate for stationing UN troops along the
border. Speaking in Charlottesville, Virginia on 11 November 1955, Stevenson criticized the Eisenhower
administration for demonstrating ―little initiative within or outside the United Nation in devising measures
to prevent . . . border clashes.‖ Stevenson speculated as to whether the UN should act more independently
in this particular situation. Eisenhower rejected Stevenson‘s idea. Surprisingly, during the 1956
Presidential campaign, Stevenson decided not to use the UNEF proposal as an occasion to advertise his
578

237
from the moral condemnation of force to the more mechanical matters of peacekeeping.
His call for a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) marked a paradoxical twist in the
diplomatic discourse.
In one sense, Pearson‘s move served as a calculated response to his country‘s
predicament. Canada depended heavily upon strong ties between the United States,
Britain, and France. Destruction of this trans-Atlantic alliance threatened to place
Canada in a position of choosing between cold war and imperial allegiances.
Additionally, Pearson and his colleagues shuddered at the prospect of having Canada‘s
―two mother [Britain and France] countries reprimanded for their aggression.‖ 579 He saw
UN intervention as imperative to relieving Canada‘s allies.
While admitting his desires to rescue his allies‘ image, Pearson also recognized
and respected the ascendance of multilateral diplomacy. ―This was 1956, not 1876,‖
Pearson recollects in his memoirs, ―and [the British and French] course was doomed to
failure and ultimate disaster‖ when pitted against the international community. 580
Unobtrusively, the Canadian Foreign Minister rallied support for his UNEF proposal
prior to announcing it at the plenary session. 581 Pearson courted votes from UN
representatives of non-aligned countries, especially India. 582 One scholar contends that
Pearson abstained during the vote pertaining to the U.S. cease-fire resolution so as not to
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jeopardize non-aligned support for his international police force resolution. 583 Pearson
was especially qualified for this role of rallying multilateral consensus. He understood
the complexities of international negotiation. Entering Canada‘s Department of External
Affairs in 1928, Pearson went on to represent his country at ―various international
conferences in Geneva, including sessions of the League of Nations.‖ 584 Similar to
Hammarskjöld‘s career path, Pearson‘s exposure to these international settings provided
him with the knowledge and foresight necessary for navigating sensitive diplomatic
situations.
Scholarly consensus is by no means united with regard to assigning credit for
these initiatives. In stark contrast to the pro-Pearson perspective, historians analyzing the
Suez crisis from various other viewpoints praise the Eisenhower administration for its
inspiration. Russell Braddon argues that Dulles led, personally, the General Assembly in
demanding a cease-fire.585 Cole Kingseed contends that Eisenhower not only called for
referring the Suez crisis to the UN Security Council, but also convinced Lester Pearson to
introduce his pivotal UN police force resolution. 586 Diane Kunz agrees, saying that
Pearson represented U.S. views while serving as an ―honest-broker.‖ Kunz argues that
Pearson remained untainted by the British and French deception, yet, compared to
Hammarskjöld, Pearson still commanded the respect of those European powers.587
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What is truly fascinating about these interpretations is not only how Pearson‘s
role satisfied the immediate concerns of those interests involved in the Suez crisis, but
also how his efforts are portrayed to satisfy historical analysis of the event. Assigning
credit seems more important than analyzing the mechanics Pearson employed to achieve
compromise. These analyses assume that because the American-sponsored cease-fire
enjoyed such overwhelming support that those who supported it also supported the U.S.‘s
perspective of the crisis. Many key delegations did not. Conversely, Pearson made a
whole-hearted effort to earn the endorsement of a broad segment of the General
Assembly for his UN emergency force proposal. If the Eisenhower administration was
genuinely concerned about establishing such a coalition, why could it not master-mind
such imaginative initiatives during the two London Conferences?
Instead of possessing the embittering overtones of unilateral imperialism or the
insufficient return to the status quo ante bellum, creation of a UN military police force
satisfied the needs of a skeptical audience by appealing to a broad set of interests.
Support for Pearson‘s plan included UN member states that held diametrically opposing
perspectives. Britain‘s Pierson Dixon seemed relieved at the prospect of introducing an
international force and thus diffusing Britain‘s concerns. 588 John Foster Dulles expressed
both his and Eisenhower‘s ―complete agreement‖ with Pearson‘s idea. Leonardo Vitetti,
the Italian Ambassador to the UN, favored Canada‘s appraisal of the situation and
identification of the need for international intervention. Libya‘s representative to the UN
throughout the Suez crisis by exerting ―[American] diplomatic and economic pressure on its allies.‖ See
Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, pp. 64-65. Historian Herman Finer, on the other hand , blames
Dulles for ―stringing along‖ America‘s allies and flinching in the face of Soviet aggression. Together,
these actions, according to Finer, undermined the UN‘s effectiveness. See Finer, Dulles Over Suez, pp.
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echoed Pearson‘s concerns over how the UN, as an institution of world opinion, would
implement the Charter‘s principles. Likewise, U Win of Burma considered Pearson‘s
proposal the organization‘s most important work and essential to repudiating ―gunboat
diplomacy‖ for all time.589

VI

Though initially skeptical of the idea, Hammarskjöld also endorsed Pearson‘s
proposal within hours of first hearing of it. Hammarskjöld worried that organizing and
deploying the UNEF could not respond quickly enough to contain the crisis. 590 Rarely
one to let his vanity consume him, however, the Secretary General held ―an imaginative,
constructive, and forward-looking approach‖ that accommodated the commitment to
multilateral crisis resolution.591 Hammarskjöld dispatched his executive assistant,
Andrew Cordier, and Undersecretary Ralph Bunche to meet with Pearson and hash out
the numerous details surrounding Canada‘s proposal. Having played such an integral
part in the General Armistice Agreement of 1948, Bunche‘s return to Middle Eastern
matters marked his first and overdue involvement in the Suez crisis. 592 That evening as
Pearson, Bunche, and Cordier conferred, Hammarskjöld met privately with Iran‘s UN
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representative, Djalal Abdoh. Speaking on behalf of the entire Afro-Asian bloc, Abdoh
requested that Hammarskjöld ―intervene personally to negotiate a cease-fire.‖593 Rather
than handle matters himself as he was prone to do earlier that spring and summer,
Hammarskjöld yielded to the collective spirit that proved instrumental to resolving the
crisis.
Other attempts at accommodating multilateral interests were unsuccessful.
Minutes taken during a 3 November White House conference involving President
Eisenhower, Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., and other senior officials
reveals just how feeble and out-of-touch administration officials were when it came to
representing a broader set of viewpoints. For example, when Undersecretary for Near
Eastern Affairs William Roundtree reported that Washington‘s message to Nasser met
with a favorable reply, Roundtree described how these telegrams had helped clarify
America‘s foreign policy agenda. ―For the first time,‖ the meeting minutes declare,
―[Nasser] realized that the U.S. was not simply playing the British game in the [Middle
East].‖594 Identifying this early November communiqué, as the ―first time‖ that Nasser
understood America‘s motives in this crisis conveys the persistent narrow-mindedness
not only of Nasser but also of U.S. officials. So eager were the Egyptian and American
governments to pursue their own interests, they paid little attention to the perceptions
those policies conveyed. Once again, insensitivity to how others perceived of certain
policies contributed to the intensification of the crisis.
In another example, Hoover and Rountree met with the Ambassadors of Iraq,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia later in the day on 3 November. Lebanon‘s
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Ambassador Dr. Victor Khouri began by expressing the Arabs‘ heartfelt wishes for
Dulles‘s recovery from surgery and Arab thanks for America‘s encouraging role taken
regarding Suez.595 Speaking for the administration, Roundtree called for re-establishing
the status quo before any new proposals could be suggested. Having achieved this
through the UN cease-fire resolution (which the belligerents had yet to accept),
Roundtree unveiled two new draft resolutions that Lodge was scheduled to introduce to
the UN General Assembly that evening. 596 This scenario, linking postwar changes to an
initial return to the status quo, was the fundamental flaw of the U.S. government‘s
approach to crisis management. In the case of the Suez crisis, successful crisis resolution
required changes to the status quo in order to facilitate peace. These two actions needed
to be addressed simultaneously. American officials failed to consider this prerequisite.
The Arab ambassadors sensed this when they asked how the U.S. government would
respond if the cease-fire failed. The administration, Hoover and Roundtree replied,
would formulate strategies in response to events as they unfolded. The Arab
ambassadors expressed their fervent desire for an infusion of American leadership. 597
Unfortunately, U.S. officials had done so by plotting policies that were unresponsive to
the situation at hand. In many respects, the policies put forth represented U.S. interests
more than those of the international community.

595

According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles suffered from ―acute appendicitis.‖ Later, news leaked
that the Secretary of State was suffering form ileitis. See Memo of Conversation, ―Visit of Group of Arab
Ambassadors to Under Secretary,‖ 3 November 1956, FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, p. 949.
596
The first draft resolution focused on easing Arab-Israeli tensions; the second addressed the Suez crisis.
597
Memo of Conversation, ―Visit of Group of Arab Ambassadors to Under Secretary,‖ 3 November 1956,
FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, pp. 949-951.

243

VII

At first, as the First Emergency Special Session reconvened on 3 November at 8
p.m., the prospect for American leadership seemed promising. Omar Loutfi, Egyptian
Ambassador to the UN, announced that the Egyptian government would observe the
U.S.-sponsored cease-fire resolution. During his opening remarks, however, U.S.
Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., reminded the assembly that despite
overwhelming international support for the cease-fire, hostilities continued. Lodge
proceeded to unveil the Eisenhower administration‘s plan for creating long-term stability
in the Middle East. To start, the U.S. Ambassador criticized the UN organization for
failing to neutralize threats to regional peace. ―While the temptation is strong to place the
whole blame on the States directly concerned, the fact is, as Secretary Dulles reminded
us, that the United Nations must also share responsibility for what has happened.‖598
To rectify the situation, Lodge proposed two draft resolutions designed to
restructure the postwar order. The first draft resolution called for replacing the
inadequate Palestine Conciliation Commission with another committee consisting of five
member states answering to the conflicting parties and the UN General Assembly. The
second proposed resolution called for creating a three-nation panel responsible for
clearing and securing the Suez Canal as an ―international waterway‖ and negotiating a
peace between the belligerents. The Convention of 1888 and the six principles adopted
by the Security Council were to serve as the foundation for negotiation. 599 Even amidst
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war, American officials pressed for international control of the canal as established
during the unsuccessful London Conferences. Like so many other senior bureaucrats in
the Eisenhower administration, Lodge persisted in linking peace to earlier efforts that had
already proved fruitless. As historian Michael Guhin put it, ―The American post-attack
public policy followed from its pre-attack stances.‖600 In this regard, U.S. policy differed
little from those of its British and French allies. All attempted to use the war as
justification for their own prefabricated policies. As a result, little consensus lay in
endorsing these draft resolutions.
The best and most ironic example of the opposition facing Lodge‘s resolutions
occurred when Iraq‘s UN delegate Muhammad Jawad expressed his government‘s
criticism. Where the Iraqi ambassador to the United States had supported American
leadership, Jawad lampooned the Superpower‘s plans. Jawad argued that Lodge‘s first
proposal did more harm than good to Palestinian interests because ―instead of
recognizing [their] rights, [the proposal] suggests, and then only en passant, that they
should be treated in a humane way.‖ Had Lodge and other members of the U.S.‘s UN
delegation been more sensitive to the genuine interests of others rather than incorporating
them into America‘s own interests, such disillusionment might have been avoided.
Jawad considered Lodge‘s proposals as tantamount to ―appeasement‖ in the face of
British, French, and Israeli aggression. At one point, the Iraqi delegate despaired
When one cannot make an aggressor abide by the rule of law, then one
accepts his interpretation of the law and his method of implementation. What
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more can an aggressor ask than to commit aggression and persist in carrying it out
despite the decisions of a world assembly?
Failure to hold the aggressors accountable would compromise the UN‘s principle
purpose, Jawad concluded. 601 He was not alone. Distancing himself from his American
loyalties, Felixberto Serraro of the Philippine delegation expressed similar reservations as
did the Soviet and Saudi Arabian delegates.602 Lodge‘s admonishment of the
international community not only alienated the audience that had requested American
leadership, but his actions also sacrificed an opportunity for engaging in multilateral
diplomacy so that the U.S. government could advance its own interests.
Fortunately, other UN ambassadors proposed more objective alternatives for
reestablishing peace. Later, during the 3 November plenary session, India‘s Arthur Lall
introduced a more popular draft resolution. Instead of addressing long-term issues facing
the Middle East, Lall‘s proposal, representing ―the opinion of the delegations of almost
all the Asian and African countries,‖ addressed the immediate concerns stemming from
the Suez crisis. Because the British, French, and Israelis continued flouting the UN
cease-fire, India and a bloc of nineteen other nations called for the Secretary General to
take direct control of the situation to oversee enforcement of the cease-fire process and
provide a status report within twelve hours.603 Such broad support provided a more
legitimate strategy for quelling the conflict rather than use the opportunity to advance
already unpopular agendas. Considerable support lay in endowing Hammarskjöld with
the authority necessary for dealing with the crisis. All that remained was to create
instruments through which to carry out his responsibilities.
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Again, as with Hammarskjöld and Pearson, experience in multilateral diplomacy
helped Lall not only comprehend the need or compromise, but also marshal the support
necessary for mediating the Suez crisis. Lall was a central figure in the international
activism exhibited during this time in Indian diplomacy. Lall‘s intelligence won the
confidence of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who chose him to represent India
in international affairs. Since India‘s independence in 1947, Lall had served as Consul
General for India in New York, the first Trade Commissioner in London, the country‘s
ambassador to Austria as well as the ambassador to the UN. These experiences meant
that Lall adopted a more moderate outlook when compared to India‘s other delegates to
the UN.604 Born in 1911, Lall was considerably younger than either Pearson or
Hammarskjöld, but his commitment to multilateral diplomacy shared a similar
professional trajectory.
Canada‘s Lester Pearson followed Lall‘s speech with his own announcement for
creating the UNEF. Pearson‘s private discussions the previous day had enlisted the
Secretary General‘s support and that of his staff. Careful not to upstage Lall‘s idea,
Pearson introduced his peace-keeping force as a ―supplementary responsibility‖ for the
Secretary General. Unlike the American proposals that favored creating international
boards staffed by the member states, decision-making under the Canadian and Indian
model rested outside the direct hands of member states. Greater multilateral diplomacy
endowed Hammarskjöld with the authority and trust to act appropriately in the interest of
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international peace and security. As the scholar Mark Zacher put it, Hammarskjöld had
groomed himself and the organization for an occasion such as this one ―by providing the
Member States with a resourceful instrument for direct action in the Secretary General
and his staff.‖605
What some members of the international community realized was that peace and
security could be more easily achieved independent of nationally-interested doctrine. As
Reiz Malile, Albania‘s UN delegate, put it, ―In our time, those who try to tamper with the
destinies of other peoples merit universal censure. Times have changed. It is madness to
think that a people can be crushed by force.‖ 606 Skeptics may argue that the Suez crisis
simply reflected a brief period in history where multilateral and national interests
converged. However, given the U.S.‘s efforts and those of other major world powers to
influence the course of debate, early November 1956 marked the brief ascendance of
multilateralism over that of more unilateral national interests. The most representative
body of world opinion had outflanked those individual nations intent on imposing their
own sense of order. According to Brian Urquhart, ―creation of a UN force thus became
the key to the resolution of the [Suez] crisis.‖ With the UNEF now sanctioned by the
General Assembly, Hammarskjöld charged Bunche with issuing yet another cease fire,
which was promptly sent to British, French, and Israeli officials at seven a.m. on 4
November. 607
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VIII

Seven o‘clock in the morning in New York City was one o‘clock in the afternoon
in London. Eden‘s Egypt Committee met for the second of two meetings that day at 3:30
p.m. The only consensus able to be reached was to have the full Cabinet debate the issue
of going ahead with an invasion in light of the UN‘s call for a cease-fire and insertion of
the UNEF. Eden argued, unpersuasively, that the lack of a UNEF actually legitimized
Britain‘s reasons for invading. At 6:30 p.m., the full Cabinet debated their course of
action, serenaded by the muffled catcalls from protesters congregating outside. 608 Eden
laid out three options: proceed with invasion plans as a vanguard for the later UNEF,
suspend military operations for twenty-four hours, or hold off invasion indefinitely.
After a lengthy debate, Eden polled his advisers. 609 As historians Anthony Gorst and
Lewis Johnman describe it, ―for the first time [in the crisis] a [Cabinet vote] revealed that
some six Cabinet ministers had serious reservations about continuing with the military
action.‖ Six of the eighteen ministers were for postponing or abandoning invasion
plans—including both the Navy and Air Force ministers. 610 In spite of these objections,
the majority of the British Cabinet sided with Eden. Within twelve hours Britain and
French airborne forces landed near Port Said, the northern mouth of the Suez Canal.
Meanwhile, domestic support evaporated. Britain‘s opposition party leader Hugh
Gaitskell lampooned Eden‘s justification for invasion as a spearhead to precede the
arrival of United Nations troops. ―Nothing,‖ Gaitskell noted, ―was said about this in the
608
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[British and French] ultimatum to Egypt.‖ Furthermore, no mention of it made its way
into Dixon‘s speeches either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. Editors
at the British daily, The Observer, apologized to readers for thinking that the British
government would respect its ―international obligations.‖ 611 Even the Archbishop of
Canterbury considered the invasion unjustified and antithetical both to United Nations
principles and the majority of world public opinion.612 Legal arguments supporting
intervention also wavered.
Despite official pronouncements favoring Eden‘s policies, defections plagued the
prime minister‘s office of legal council. According to a 29 October memorandum titled
―The Right of Intervention,‖ Britain‘s Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir believed that
intervention was legitimate if the Suez situation threatened British shipping, British
nationals living in Egypt, or international commerce. As debate preceding the invasion
intensified, other legal specialists argued against intervention and its authorization under
international law. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, argued
that intervention would create a situation that endangered British nationals in Egypt,
when one had not existed previously. Britain‘s Attorney-General, Sir Reginald
Manningham-Buller suggested shifting debate from international law to acting promptly
―in the interests of the nations of the world and in conformity with the intensions
underlying the [UN] Charter.‖613
Such a strategy raised two major concerns, which eroded political support for
Eden‘s government. First, Fitzmaurice and his like-minded colleagues questioned the
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constitutionality of the proceedings that formulated these policies. Increasingly, Eden
depended on counselors that devised justification for military intervention. Restricting
input combined with ―the practice of bypassing the regular channels of legal advice,‖
Fitzmaurice warned, ―always leads to trouble.‖ 614 Second, to justify invasion, the legal
minds Eden trusted sought to manipulate UN principles by having them serve British
national interests. These tactics not only served as another example of the pervasive
tendency to confuse national interests with a multilateral agenda, but the tactics also
sabotaged the British government‘s domestic and international credibility. Eden‘s
opponents wasted no time in maximizing the loss in confidence. During a 4 November
television and radio broadcast, Gaitskell criticized Britain‘s use of its UN Security
Council veto saying that ―[Britain] should have been acting on behalf of the United
Nations and . . . should have had world opinion behind us.‖ At the same time, Gaitskell
echoed earlier calls for the prime minister‘s resignation. 615

IX

Across the Atlantic, Democrats and Republicans in the United States prepared for
the Presidential election of 1956. President Eisenhower faced off against his own
political rival: Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic Party nominee. Behind in the polls,
Stevenson went on the political offensive attacking Eisenhower‘s policies including the
president‘s stand on the Suez crisis. During an 18 October speech in Youngstown, Ohio,
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Stevenson described Eisenhower‘s ―diplomatic strokes‖ in the Suez as ―erratic, naïve,
and clumsy . . . through which Russia gained welcome to the Near and Middle East.‖
Appraising the situation further, Stevenson alleged, ―the administration [lacks] any real
capacity to adjust its policies to new conditions.‖616 Yet, Stevenson offered few
substantial changes to America‘s foreign policy. 617 Although he made a valid point
concerning Eisenhower‘s unresponsive foreign policy, Stevenson limited his argument to
the Cold War context Eisenhower had maintained throughout the crisis.
The president felt little need to change his stance. Overall, the administration
basked in the glow of economic growth and relative peace and security. In an 11
September telephone conversation between Dulles and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon,
Stevenson‘s foreign policy speeches were discussed. Nixon called the Democratic
nominee‘s proposals ―irresponsible.‖ The like-minded Dulles thought the country could
not ―afford [a] trial-and-error president at this time.‖618 As Election Day neared,
Eisenhower hoped to coast to the finish smoothly. In historian Cole Kingseed‘s words,
―the president sought to have his administration present a calm and united front to the
American public.‖ Realistically, Eisenhower had little to worry about. The Democrats‘
virulent attacks on the president‘s policies represented a losing campaign in the midst of
death-throes rather than an actual threat to its opponents. In the words of a Stevenson
biographer, Eisenhower‘s credentials in foreign policy made any political attacks
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Stevenson launched seem feeble and petulant.619 As Kingseed himself mentions, by the
end of October 1956, ―Eisenhower decided to cancel the remainder of his campaign
appearances to prevent [international] events from getting out of hand.‖ 620 Even with the
Suez war raging in early November, its effects were not felt at the polls. The November
7th front-page headlines called Eisenhower‘s re-election ―a landslide.‖ 621 Winning almost
ten million more popular votes than Stevenson out of almost sixty-two million votes cast
and an Electoral College count of 457 to 73, there was little that could have kept
Eisenhower from a second term.
For British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Election Day in the United States
combined with the rapid formation of the UNEF had upended European efforts to take
the canal by force. Eden had hoped to deploy forces so as to catch the United States and
the United Nations off-guard, making the invasion a fait accompli. Amidst mounting
pressure from his own constituents and the international community alike, Eden agreed to
a cease-fire effective midnight 6 November. Within roughly thirty-six hours after putting
troops into Egypt, the British and French operation had become a political quagmire.
British and French forces had not secured the entire Canal Zone. Eden could not afford
to press the attack and continue to suffer from the repercussions of international
reprimands. Dwindling oil reserves, a plummeting British pound, and loss of face in the
world community could not be surmounted, despite Secretary of State Dulles‘s second-
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guessing Eden‘s decision to halt operations. According to historian Michael Guhin,
Dulles contended that had the British and French fulfilled their objectives, the United
States government could have taken a more conciliatory stance by recognizing their de
facto control of the canal. 622 French Prime Minister Guy Mollet also urged Eden to delay
his cease-fire announcement a few days until Anglo-French forces had secured the
canal. 623
As it turned out, Eden‘s announcement coincided with news that the Soviets were
planning to intervene directly in the Suez crisis. Senior Soviet official Nikolai
Bulganin‘s 5 November letter to British and French officials denounced the ―predatory
war‖ being waged against Egypt. Hoping to advance Soviet interests by representing the
sentiments of the international community, Bulganin alluded to nuclear brinkmanship if
British and French military operations refused to desist. To bring peace to the Middle
East, Bulganin reiterated earlier proposals calling for depositing ―volunteers‖ in the
region to help facilitate the peace process. Contrary to the UNEF, the use of ―volunteer‖
forces would include Soviet and American personnel. The parallels between the Soviets‘
suggestion and the British and French argument for direct intervention in Egypt
demonstrate the continued insensitivity shown toward genuine multilateral diplomacy
that minimized the role national interests played. Although Soviet threats had little if any
effect on British decision-making, certain parts of the world equated Eden‘s cease-fire
with his receipt of Bulganin‘s note.624
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With pressure to end hostilities coming from the international community in the
form of monetary chaos, from domestic dissent in British public opinion, and from Cold
War adversaries, the influential role played by the United Nations was overshadowed.
Yet, for all the proposals and rhetoric offered by government officials preoccupied with
securing peace on their terms, the United Nations was the only institution with adequate
credibility to act. Danish Ambassador to the United Nations Karl Eskelund remarked that
salvation ―from the edge of catastrophe‖ came ―not by threats or bluster but by the action
of the United Nations.‖ Eskelund continued, ―We [UN members] are breaking new
ground, but I feel sure that we can reap a rich harvest from that ground in terms of peace
and security.‖ The UN representatives from Ecuador, India, Iraq, Uruguay, Yugoslavia,
and even America‘s own Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. shared in their colleague‘s
confidence. 625
Eskelund‘s analysis distinguishes between individual nations‘ efforts to create
stability and the United Nations‘ own initiatives. Of these two perspectives, the forum of
world opinion proved more adept at resolving crisis and conflict. The organization
capitalized on its somewhat oxymoronic status. On the one hand, most of its influential
members had challenged the institution‘s central premise by instigating instability. Yet
doing so allowed the United Nations to endorse alternatives to which even the most
reluctant of nations yielded. Although countries, such as Britain, France, Israel, Egypt,
and the United States, never abandoned their attempts to manipulate multilateral
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diplomacy to suit their own interests, they could not escape from acknowledging the
UN‘s pivotal role in abating the Suez crisis.
By the first week of November 1956, President Eisenhower was pressuring BenGurion to abide by the UN‘s resolution calling for a cease-fire and deployment of an
international peacekeeping force. The president threatened to end all U.S. public and
private aid to Israel and abstain from procedures in the United Nations aimed at expelling
the Israeli delegation from the international organization. 626 According to historian
Richard Miller, Eisenhower‘s ―effort was part of [the administration‘s] plan to regain the
initiative it had achieved with its initial stand and the first resolution.‖ 627 Israeli historian
Avi Shlaim describes Ben-Gurion‘s reaction as ―bitterly disappointed. [Ben-Gurion] had
grossly misread the international situation and now had to pay the price.‖ 628 Momentum
would revert back to nationally-interested parties soon enough, but not before multilateral
diplomacy left its historic mark upon the international community.

X

Capitalizing upon its momentum, the UN General Assembly convened the next
day, 7 November, to approve the UNEF‘s structure and mission. The collective body
formed an Advisory Committee to handle UNEF‘s operational parameters. In addition to
the Secretary General, the committee included representatives from seven nations: Brazil,
Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan. While some committee
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participants may have had their own interests in quelling the violence, such as the
Canadian government‘s desire to repair strained relations between the U.S. and Great
Britain, all of the UN committee participants understood these motives to be secondary to
the immediate concern for resilient stability and peace. Committee members and UN
officials moved ahead as quickly as possible. Hammarskjöld and his subordinates
wanted to assemble and deploy UNEF troops in order to keep hostilities from flaring up
again between Egyptians, Israelis, and Europeans while simultaneously preventing any
opportunity for the Soviet Union to send their own military contingent to the region. 629
Given the intensity of ill-will existing between the combatants and the degree to
which various governments had contributed to amplifying the Suez crisis, officials at the
United Nations faced considerable challenges in making the UNEF a reality. Shortly
after the General Assembly authorized creation of the UNEF, Hammarskjöld contacted
General Burns asking his advice as to the size and composition of the proposed UN
Emergency Force. Ideally, Burns favored a division-sized force complete with
reconnaissance units, a tank brigade, and fighter-aircraft units. Such a deployment would
be capable of withstanding aggression or challenges to UNEF authority and legitimacy.
Burns requested unit contributions no smaller than a battalion from those member states
interested in offering personnel. Burns also requested that the soldiers be expected to
serve for at least one year.630 In typical fashion, however, Burns quickly adjusted his
requirements to the realities established by a demanding pace of events. By midNovember, the first UN troops would be arriving in Egypt.

629

See Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 88; and Charles Henry, Ralph Bunche: Model
Negro or American Other?, (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 148.
630
Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 187-188.

257
Hammarskjöld entrusted UN Undersecretary Ralph Bunche with vetting member
states willing to offer UNEF military unit contributions. According to Brian Urquhart,
Bunche became quite popular as UN ambassadors lobbied for inclusion in the emergency
peacekeeping force.631 From early- to mid-November Romania, New Zealand, the
United States, Burma, Iran, and the Philippines volunteered but were rejected. 632 Criteria
for UNEF participation eliminated many prospects which posed challenges for
assembling the UNEF in a timely manner.
For example, nations with ample reserves to devote to the UNEF were ineligible
mainly due to politics. As belligerents in the Suez War, French and British forces would
make a mockery of any peacekeeping force them included them. China‘s UN delegation
remained ambivalent to the crisis. Although communist China had opened official
relations with Egypt in the spring of 1956 when Nasser recognized the communist regime
as China‘s legitimate government, China‘s representation in the United Nations remained
under Nationalist control. In a show of support for Egypt, China‘s communist
government had recruited 280,000 Chinese ―‗volunteers‘‖ to help Egypt repel its
invaders. According to historian Richard Miller, Nasser gave serious consideration to the
Chinese as well as the Soviet offers of assistance. 633 Superpower involvement, however,
risked further escalation of tensions as well as the fueling of Cold War anxieties. As
General Burns notes, mutual suspicion also disqualified Eastern European countries and
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the ―‗Mediterranean powers‘‖ who happened to be NATO allies. Burns argues that these
satellite states of Superpower spheres of influence would have been susceptible to
puppeteering.634 However, with Hungary‘s revolt, Soviet officials may have been more
worried about extending any higher profile to rambunctious elements within their spheres
of influence.
Once these hurtles were cleared, Hammarskjöld and the UNEF faced the
challenge of deploying the force while simultaneously addressing the skepticism of those
most directly affected by it. As Urquhart put it, ―the stationing of a UN force on the
sovereign territory of a member state had never occurred before and would have aroused
the sensibilities of any sovereign government‖—particularly the Egyptians who endured
colonial rule and invasion.635 To remove any misperceptions, General Burns flew into
Cairo on 8 November to inform Egypt‘s senior officials directly. Two issues blocked the
immediate deployment of UN troops. First, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egypt‘s Foreign
Minister, expressed concern over Canada‘s inclusion in the UNEF. Fawzi and other
Egyptian officials questioned Canada‘s motives and impartial integrity because of its ties
to the British Commonwealth. Second, the Egyptian government voiced concern over
UNEF‘s simply replacing Western troops with an international force to operate the Suez
Canal.
To ease these anxieties, both Hammarskjöld and Burns relied upon UNEF‘s
mandate as authorized by the UN General Assembly. No single country determined the
force‘s course of action or its operational guidelines. Additionally, the United Nations
634

Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 189-190. Superpowers and their satellites would not even enjoy
indirect influence over UNEF. In deliberations pertaining to the Advisory Committee‘s composition, the
General Assembly defeated Poland‘s nomination of fellow Soviet satellite Czechoslovakia. See ORGA,
Doc. A/PV. 567, 7 Nov. 1956, pp. 108 and 125.
635
Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp. 184-185.

259
had no jurisdiction over canal operations. Although peacekeepers would occupy the
canal-zone initially, the force‘s objective was to separate the belligerents, not to seize
territory. In one unpublished communiqué, Hammarskjöld warned Nasser that ―any
wavering from Egypt‘s side now would undoubtedly isolate Egypt in world opinion
which so far had been its best protection.‖636 At this point, the UN Secretary General was
more concerned about organizing the UNEF and having it establish a buffer between the
warring parties.
In spite of these early challenges, progress was made. By 12 November, Nasser
agreed to Colombian, Swedish, Finnish, Indonesian, and Yugoslav participation in the
UNEF.637 Burns held his second face-to-face meeting with Nasser, who had designated
Brigadier General Amin Hilmy as his chief liaison officer to the UNEF. Preparations for
quartering UNEF troops and all the accompanying needs went rather smoothly. In
Burns‘s own words, ―of course, from time to time there were arguments and difficulties,
but one felt in dealing with [Hilmy] there was always goodwill, and a sincere intention to
treat UNEF as one would treat an ally in wartime, at the least.‖638
The good relations established early on proved infectious. Hammarskjöld arrived
in Egypt on 16 November, the day after the first contingent of UNEF troops had arrived.
During a series of meetings lasting three days, Hammarskjöld and Nasser settled upon the
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―good faith‖ agreements. The Secretary General vowed to respect Egyptian sovereignty
while the UNEF retained its autonomy with regard to enforcing the cease-fire.
Additionally, Nasser and Hammarskjöld agreed that the Egyptian government reserved
the right to request UNEF‘s removal but to base that request on ―the completion of the
force‘s task.‖639
This kind of agreement epitomized multilateral diplomacy. Hammarskjöld was
receptive to Nasser‘s heightened sense for national sovereignty and accommodated
Nasser‘s concerns. For example, the Egyptian government would work with the UN to
determine UNEF assembly areas and deployment both during and after all invading
forces had withdrawn. Also, the role UNEF personnel played in the Suez Canal Zone
was temporary and solely dependent on the presence of Anglo-French forces.
Hammarskjöld would have to consult Egyptian officials if the national composition of
UNEF changed or expanded. In return, Nasser not only respected Hammarskjöld‘s
representation of multilateral interests, but Nasser also catered to those interests by
promising not to evict UNEF personnel without referring the matter to the UN General
Assembly. 640 Each party respected the interests of the other on a fundamental level.

XI

As the situation in Suez moved from acrimonious to accommodating, the situation
in Hungary became more volatile. The cease-fire and withdrawal of Soviet forces from
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Hungary, that began being implemented by 29-30 October, broke down over the course
of a few hours. The short-lived cease-fire allowed Soviet forces to reorganize and redeploy within Hungary.

By 2 November, Soviet military strength inside Hungary,

measuring between 75,000 and 200,000 soldiers and 1,600 to 4,000 tanks, began a bloody
and methodical march back towards Budapest.641
With the resumption of hostilities, a second round of diplomatic activity at the
United Nations ensued. Beginning on 1 November, Imre Nagy, Hungary‘s Prime
Minister, cabled Hammarskjöld proclaiming Hungary‘s neutrality and negation of its
Warsaw Pact alliance with the Soviet Union. Nagy requested that the United Nations and
―the four great Powers‖ help defend Hungary‘s neutral position. 642 Meanwhile the Soviet
Union‘s Ambassador to the UN, Arkady Sobolev, continued to insist that Soviet force
was necessary for isolating subversive activities in Hungary sponsored by the Western
powers. On 3 November, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. took new action in the United Nations
Security Council. Lodge presented a draft resolution calling for the Soviet‘s immediate
end to ―intervention‖ in Hungary, the Soviets‘ ending ―the introduction of additional
forces into Hungary,‖ international recognition of Hungarian sovereignty, and UN help in
the distribution of humanitarian aid. 643 Not surprisingly, the Soviet delegation vetoed
Lodge‘s proposal. Paralleling the script followed during the UN debates relating to the
Suez crisis, a later Security Council vote succeeded in moving debate of the Hungarian
crisis to the General Assembly.
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Unlike Suez, events in Hungary moved at such a pace that no proportionate
multilateral or unilateral response could be mounted. ―Caught by surprise and embroiled
in the crisis over Egypt,‖ writes historian John Thompson, ―the Western powers reacted
slowly to the thwarted Hungarian uprising. They judged direct support to the
revolutionaries too risky and instead settled for aiding Hungarian refugees.‖ 644 Keeping
Hungary within the Soviet sphere of influence was imperative to the communists‘
security interests. Once the leadership in Moscow reversed course and intervened with
impunity, the fate of Nagy‘s government was nearly sealed. Any Western efforts to
exploit Hungary‘s defection from behind the Iron Curtain would have risked a wider
confrontation directly involving the two superpowers. The Suez crisis did not pose such
an immediate threat to either superpower, thus allowing the UN to exert a greater degree
of influence.
Time also factored into determining the viability of UN intervention in the two
crises. Where the Suez crisis dragged on for months, the Hungarian crisis was
suppressed in a few weeks. Seventy-two hours after appealing to the world organization,
Nagy‘s government struggled to survive. The same day that Ambassador Lodge
presented his draft resolution, Janos Kadar, one of Nagy‘s own Cabinet officials, split-off
to form his own rival government—one friendlier to Soviet influence. Early in the
Sunday morning hours of 4 November, Soviet troops and tanks entered Budapest intent
on extinguishing Nagy‘s government. By two-o‘clock that afternoon, the last Hungarian
radio transmissions, pleading for help against Soviet aggression, died out. Soviet control
re-imposed itself within Hungary over the next several days.

644

Thompson, A Vision Unfulfilled, p. 388.

263
Only after these events transpired did the General Assembly convene. Lodge
continued pressing for UN action on behalf of Nagy‘s government. He recalled how the
Soviet Union itself had initially supported Nagy and acquiesced to his new ―‗liberal
socialist government.‘‖ Lodge pointed out the peculiar creation of a rival government at
the exact moment that the Soviets began their invasion. Lodge concluded that Nagy
remained the legitimate leader of Hungary and that, therefore, the United Nations should
act upon his calls for assistance.
UN delegates from America‘s NATO allies supported Lodge‘s conclusions. Sir
Pierson Dixon of Great Britain called for an ―immediate cease-fire‖ as a ―first step‖ in
assisting Hungary. Canada‘s Lester Pearson, the architect of the UNEF, proposed that a
similar UN force be deployed to Hungary. 645 These proposals came too late to be of any
help to Nagy. Sobolev responded by saying that the Nagy government actually
represented counter-revolutionary elements responsible for repressing the peoples‘ will.
Elaborating upon his point, Sobolev said, ―The government of Nagy fell apart, and the
Revolutionary Peasants and Workers Government has been set up. [This new
government] includes some members of the Nagy Cabinet who remain true to the
Hungarian people.‖646 Compared to the French and British attempt in the UN to present
their actions in Suez as a fait accompli, the Soviets had succeeded in presenting the
Hungarian situation in precisely such a context.
Sobolev also attempted to seize the diplomatic initiative only to be outflanked by
the General Assembly‘s recommendations. Further discussion of the Hungarian
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situation, Sobolev argued, favored ―Fascist elements‖ opposing the interests of the
Hungarian people. Because Britain, France, and the United States sponsored the
continuation of debate, the Soviet Ambassador declared that the whole matter was a ploy
to distract the United Nations from the abuses occurring in Egypt.647 By the end of the
second emergency session, the General Assembly agreed upon a resolution insisting that
the Soviet Union end its intervention in Hungary, empowering the secretary general to
investigate matters surrounding the Hungarian issue, and requesting that the Hungarian
government permit UN observers into Hungary.
Opportunities to capitalize on these terms disappeared when British and French
forces invaded Egypt on 5 November. World public opinion fixated on Egypt throughout
the most crucial period of the Hungarian crisis. In the eyes of many specialists, the
escalating Suez War was a greater threat to world peace. As historian Richard Miller put
it, ―Hungary was strictly a big-power struggle and [Hammarskjöld‘s] influence could not
have materially changed it.‖ The confusion and rapidly changing circumstances, such as
Nagy‘s initial triumph followed by his government‘s precipitous demise, made UN
participation difficult to define.648 After nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Suez crisis
remained in a fluctuating state where governments sought to shape world opinion. Nagy
and the Hungarian crisis enjoyed no such honeymoon. During the General Assembly
debates on the Hungarian crisis, UN delegates from Asian and African countries
remained silent. Several nations, including Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Saudi
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Arabia, and Yugoslavia abstained from voting on the 4 November resolution. 649 Had
they objected to the Soviet‘s repressive measures more vehemently there is little basis
that it would have altered the outcome. Soviet military dominance was so swift and
complete that more organized protest could have continued to have been ignored.

XII

The blistering pace of events occurring at the height of the Suez crisis and the
Hungarian crisis revealed the extent to which national interests had marginalized the
broader diversity not only between generalized spheres of influence, but also within
them. Khrushchev grappled with the consequences of his earlier policies sooner and for a
more prolonged period than his Western counterparts. Khrushchev‘s attempt to usurp
reform agendas proved to be more successful in Poland than in Hungary. Wladyslaw
Gomulka‘s return to power in Warsaw and Imre Nagy‘s return in Budapest gave the
Kremlin leadership pause, but only to varying degrees. Where Gomulka yielded quickly
to renewed Soviet imposition, Nagy‘s government defiantly called the Soviets‘ bluff. By
doing so, the progressives in Hungary at least exposed the Soviets‘ utter disrespect for
representing a more inclusive array of interests.
The Suez crisis and the subsequent Suez War served the same purpose for the
leading Western powers. After the full extent of British, French, and Israeli complicity
began to unfold, attention turned to monopolizing international opinion to condone or
condemn military intervention. In addition to alienating the United States from its
649
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staunchest NATO allies, the efforts to occupy the UN‘s attention also fractured the
British, French, and Israeli alliance. British Ambassador to the UN, Pierson Dixon,
sought to soften British policies by portraying British intervention as necessary for
securing global trade or acting as a vanguard for future UN action. Meanwhile, Israeli
Ambassador Abba Eban delivered a blunt ultimatum to the world body—to either support
Israel‘s cause or the cause of Israel‘s enemies.
For the UN Secretary General, the deliberation with which respected Western
powers associated their own interests with multilateral interests was intolerable. In his 31
October speech to the Security Council, Hammarskjöld admonished any effort to
circumvent the principles of the UN Charter. The head of the United Nations had no
alternative other than to assume that all member states agreed to and abided by the
principles. Governments that abused that assumption or used the means of UN principles
to secure nationally-interested ends threatened the UN‘s purpose as well as its legitimacy.
Fortunately, Hammarskjöld‘s warning was heeded. The Yugoslavian delegation‘s
recommendation to move debate to the UN General Assembly under the ―Uniting for
Peace‖ resolution helped the organization to retain the initiative. Though limited in
scope, Henry Cabot Lodge‘s draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire was
popular but unattainable without significant changes to the status quo ante bellum. Lester
Pearson‘s draft resolution calling for insertion of a UN Emergency Force addressed the
dire need for greater border security between Egypt and Israel. Arthur Lall‘s proposed
resolution for Hammarskjöld to organize the UNEF helped ease skepticism regarding the
force‘s objectivity.
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Peacekeeping strategies developed and implemented over the next several days in
early November 1956 bridged several divides simultaneously. First, it tempered the
reluctance of those UN members who questioned the limits of the American proposal.
Creating new structures to guarantee peace encouraged more genuine support for the
cease-fire. The war signified a changing status quo and a new approach addressed those
changes. Second, the influx of more multilateral input responded indirectly to British,
French, and Israeli skepticism of, if not down-right loathing for, international action.
While still difficult for these aggressors to digest, UN-led peacekeeping remained a
benign instrument that helped diffuse tensions.
Interestingly, numerous sources credit various national leaders with these
innovations. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden commends himself. Others praise the
Eisenhower administration. Indeed, in at least one particular meeting with Arab
ambassadors, U.S. leadership in resolving the Suez crisis was considered to be
imperative. Yet, lingering questions undermine the extent of the Eisenhower
administration‘s involvement. For example, if U.S. officials had proposed creation of the
UNEF in private consultations, why would America‘s Ambassador to the UN, Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr., propose superfluous UN resolutions that could potentially compete with
the UNEF for legitimacy and funding? If this idea was central to American policymaking, why would Lodge jeopardize the UNEF‘s popularity by following up with two
highly-unpopular draft resolutions of his own? Also noteworthy are the differences in
postwar structure between the UNEF and Lodge‘s second of two proposals. Where
administration of the UNEF rested with UN officials directly, Lodge‘s securing of the
Suez Canal involved the creation of a three-nation panel reminiscent of recommendations
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harkening back to the London Conferences. Lodge‘s ideas lacked the broad consensus
that Pearson‘s and Lall‘s proposals enjoyed. The Arab world, as well as more
dependable allies such as the Philippine delegation, frowned on Lodge‘s agenda.
The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 4 November led the European powers to
a similar, albeit more severe, repudiation. Within Eden‘s own government, consensus
disintegrated. Opposition came from those most responsible for spear-heading the
invasion, including Cabinet-level Naval and Air Force ministers, Eden‘s political
opposition also mobilized. Hugh Gaitskell torpedoed any and every attempt Eden made
to justify armed intervention. Doubts also surrounded the legal authority Eden had in
upholding international law in the Canal Zone.
Contrary to these developments, various international officials recognized the
need for prompt UN action and endorsed Hammarskjöld‘s philosophical approach. UN
Ambassadors including Karl Eskelund, Arthur Lall, Joza Brilej, and Tingfu Tsiang
adhered to the sacrosanctity of the UN Charter and helped provide UN officials with the
authority necessary for reestablishing peace. Dag Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche, and
General E.L.M. Burns moved rapidly to facilitate the UNEF‘s success. In doing so,
Hammarskjöld negotiated with Nasser directly and enacted the ―good faith‖ agreements.
Perhaps more than any other single event throughout the Suez crisis, these agreements
represent the unassailable value of multilateralist diplomacy. Hammarskjöld honored
Egyptian sovereignty. Nasser respected UNEF‘s peace-keeping mission and the General
Assembly‘s jurisdiction over determining when that mission had been accomplished.
Sadly, multilateral consensus began dissolving shortly after the deployment of
UN peacekeepers to the Canal Zone and the Sinai Peninsula. The Soviet Union crushed
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Hungarian opposition within roughly forty-eight hours after renewing attacks on Nagy‘s
government. Despite a new round of debate and activity in the UN General Assembly,
the speed with which the Red Army accomplished its mission left no doubt as to the fate
of Hungarian sovereignty or Soviet dominance. On the contrary, Soviet leaders had
learned valuable lessons from the Suez crisis and their own experiences following
Khrushchev‘s ―secret speech.‖ Rather than fight to define their unilateral legitimacy, the
Soviet leaders created a rival Hungarian government challenging Nagy‘s claim of
representing the will of the Hungarian people. In doing so, the Kremlin devised more
effective strategies for fusing multilateral diplomacy seamlessly with national interests.
After the Suez crisis abated, Arab and Western leaders enacted similar strategies of their
own.
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Chapter V

The Image of Inclusiveness: Responses to Multilateral Diplomacy
and its Effects on International Relations, 1956 to the 1960s

In 1958, Hannah Arendt, one of the world‘s leading political theorists, published a
book that examined the precarious status of humanity. The sum of all human
―experience,‖ she declared, can be understood so long as it can be shared. 650 During the
perilous days when the Suez crisis reached its crescendo, the international community
had shared in successfully resolving the immediate conflict. The multilateral measures
taken through the UN General Assembly established a more viable sense of international
security. Unfortunately, this sentiment began dissipating almost as soon as Dag
Hammarskjöld and his staff began acting on General Assembly recommendations. Many
delegates interpreted the resolution of the Suez crisis as justification for the continued
pursuit of national interests that had done so much to escalate the crisis. Paralleling the
developments of the nineteenth century, the national leaders of 1956 and beyond sought
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new avenues through which unilateral interests could become synonymous with a greater
sense of multilateral legitimacy. As experienced during the Suez crisis, attempts to use
national interests as a basis for multilateralism intensified international crises that the
United Nations was charged with resolving. Investigation of the immediate aftermath of
the Suez crisis, the policies implemented, and the long-term consequences demonstrate
how UN influence and prestige declined as governments began pursuing their interests
through other international organizations.
Analyzing these new patterns not only adds to the historical significance of the
Suez crisis, but it also helps broaden understanding of the increased reliance on various
institutions in international affairs. As International Relations specialist John Ikenberry
put it, ―international institutions [act as] constraining and connecting mechanisms
between states.‖651 Charles Maier, a specialist in European Studies, shares the contention
that those state officials who contribute to and instill faith in ―transnational values and
morals‖ develop a more reserved set of foreign policies. 652 Indeed, there is a degree of
validity in these assessments. During the Suez crisis, the United Nations served as the
ideal example of the prudent restraint international organizations contributed to resolving
crisis. Reasons for constraint revolved around the UN‘s impartiality as international civil
servants attempted to address multiple interests without allowing any single national
interest to dominate.
Instead of recognizing this new, highly effective role for which the United
Nations was ideally qualified for resolving international crises, some scholars have
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explained how individual states began addressing this new dimension in international
affairs. Ikenberry articulates how ceaseless quests for world power detract from the true
value of international organizations. ―Because power is the ultimate determinant of
outcomes in international relations,‖ Ikenberry insists, ―institutions do not matter.‖653
Developments occurring within the international system following the Suez crisis reveal
a more complex relationship between institutions and governments.
Rather than abandon organizations such as the UN, policy-makers worldwide
sought to create institutions to rival the UN‘s multilateral legitimacy. Government
officials devised strategies that used private organizations, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and quasi-governmental
organizations not to restrain states but to more convincingly camouflage national interests
in order to gain greater international clout.654 For U.S. officials, this effort represented an
entirely new objective in the country‘s ―grand strategy.‖ Historian Paul Kennedy notes
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how the Eisenhower administration, in particular, developed this ―very American‖
concept to balance domestic demands with international security concerns. 655 While
taking the lead on creating the United Nations following the Second World War,
American policy-makers also established a more homogenous global economic order.
According to economic historian Diane Kunz, ―the capitalist economic system [the
Bretton Woods system] depended on the United States—as provider of gold, lender of
last resort, and, crucially, military protector.‖ In return, Kunz continues, ―Bretton Woods
furnished the United States multilateral cover under which to run the Western economic
order.‖656 Over the course of the intervening decades, the scope of institutional collusion
has become the accepted practice.
International institution experts Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker make a more
explicit connection between state and non-state actors. While not originally created to
work with governments, NGOs and the like ―have become exponentially more visible
precisely in connection with governments.‖ Several scholars of NGO activities concur.
According to John Clark, ―Many liberal governments are co-opting NGO leaders on to
various official bodies or commissions.‖ P.J. Simmons argues that ―the growing
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influence of NGOs are not in the field but in the arena of public opinion and the corridors
of power.‖657 The United Nations was not one of these beneficiaries.
In the wake of the Suez crisis and the extended emergency session debates, the
UN‘s corps of international civil servants competed more aggressively with the
governments of the world for distinction as curators of multilateral legitimacy. Officials
of virtually all nationalities launched various campaigns to mobilize broader international
opinion in order to suit their own purposes. Some Arab governments continued operating
through the UN General Assembly, turning it into their own soapbox. During the
Lebanon Crisis of 1958, the United States encouraged this type of activity to warrant
direct U.S. intervention. As Britain aligned itself more closely with the United States,
French officials moved to expand a supranationalist agenda and thus minimize the need
for appealing to the United Nations. Nasser‘s creation of the United Arab Republic
(UAR) paralleled those actions taken by the French government. By the time of the
Congo Crisis, beginning in 1960, the UN‘s ability to impose itself as an international
arbiter was extremely limited. The member states‘ various attempts to manipulate public
opinion and power hurt more authentic opportunities for advancing multilateral
diplomacy. The process was a slow one whose origins emerged as the Suez crisis began
to abate.
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I

Delegates of particular UN member states interjected exclusive interests
throughout many of the emergency-session UN General Assembly debates pertaining to
the Suez crisis. As delegates from Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador,
Ethiopia, and Sweden set forth a draft resolution to grant Hammarskjöld the authority to
create the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), other members embarked on their own selfaggrandizing campaigns. 658 Lebanese and Libyan delegates credited Arab unity with the
political victory that the United Nations—as a whole—had formulated. Speaking for
Lebanon, Edward Rizk applauded pan-Arab resiliency in the face of imperialist
aggression and equated Egypt‘s domestic solidarity of spirit with that of American
revolutionary Patrick Henry. Not content with proclaiming Arab resolve, Rizk dismissed
the General Assembly‘s contribution to ending the crisis. ―The success the Assembly has
had so far,‖ Rizk declared, ―is very limited indeed and does not go beyond putting an end
temporarily to the senseless fighting.‖659 Libya‘s Fathi Abidia agreed with Rizk‘s
assessment of Arab courage and righteousness, portraying Arabs as the agents of peace
while casting ―colonialism and Zionism‖ as the culprits of conflict.660
Meanwhile, British and French delegates as well as their supporters associated
UNEF‘s deployment with their own operational success. Members of the British
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Commonwealth, including British Ambassador to the UN, Pierson Dixon, praised Eden‘s
decision for creating conditions that allowed the UNEF to ―establish itself in the area.‖
Once UN forces were in place, British and French contingents could be relieved.
Australia‘s Ambassador to the UN, Sir Ronald Walker, deflected attention away from
Western European intervention by blaming the Soviets and their Czechoslovakian arms
deal for triggering the Suez crisis. French Ambassador to the UN, Louis de Guiringaud,
pointed out that the French government had originally proposed the idea of creating an
―international army‖ as early as 1919 at the Paris Peace conference. 661
These efforts to be counted among the multilaterally-minded had their limits,
however. French, British, and British Commonwealth responses to an Asian-African
draft resolution calling for the immediate extraction of French and British forces from
Egypt were less enthusiastic. 662 Dixon, Walker, and de Guiringuad argued that the
proposal was redundant. Hammarskjöld‘s creation of the UNEF implied removal of all
other combatants. Dixon and de Guiringuad went on to question the General Assembly‘s
jurisdiction over peacekeeping operations. As representatives of two of the world‘s great
powers, these two ambassadors said that such matters should be debated in the Security
Council. 663 The trend towards restricting debate over the peacekeeping process mirrored
that of the diplomatic maneuverings that occurred in late October 1956 as the same
delegates labored to keep debate from spilling into the General Assembly in the first
place. Dixon and his French colleague were also loath to acknowledge any gap between
their countries‘ unilateral intervention and the installation of the UNEF.
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The same day that these exchanges took place in the General Assembly, Israeli
Prime Minster David Ben-Gurion began his own public relations campaign. During a
speech before the Knesset, Ben-Gurion described Israel‘s military dominance as
beneficial not only for the country‘s ―security and internal tranquility,‖ but also for ―our
external relations on the world scene.‖ ―Israel,‖ he continued, ―has confined itself to
safeguarding its rights in the international waterway and world public opinion has
supported this demand.‖ Moments before associating Israel‘s national interests with
world opinion, however, Ben-Gurion criticized Britain, the United States, and the Soviet
Union for appeasing Egypt‘s ―Fascist‖ regime. 664 Outbursts such as this one weakened
the already feeble influence Israel held with the United States, Soviet Union, and United
Nations.665 Ben-Gurion continued the perplexing practice of chastising members of the
international community for their timidity while simultaneously fusing Israel‘s national
aspirations together with the interests of the international community.
Interestingly, both Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and President
Eisenhower developed similar attitudes in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. Nasser
interpreted Arab ―victory‖ in the crisis as justification of his authority over Egypt and
throughout the Arab world. As political scientists Adeed Dawisha and William Zartman
put it, ―Through skillful and effective use of his propaganda machine, Nasser created in
the minds of his people an image of himself as the first genuinely local hero who not only
had dared to defy the might of the West, but had actually won.‖ ―From then on,‖
Dawisha and Zartman argue, ―Nasser‘s legitimacy as Egypt‘s president, and the
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legitimacy of the political order which he had created were not to be questioned.‖666 As
discussed earlier, Nasser‘s control of universities by the mid-1950s silenced ―the
country‘s leading source of opposition activism.‖ By 1958, board members of Egypt‘s
professional associations were required to become members of Nasser‘s ruling political
party.667 Nasser hoped that such unanimity of opinion would spread to encompass
regional ethnic loyalties, too.
Almost precisely when Nasser presumed to speak for his fellow Arabs, his appeal
was beginning to erode. Nasser‘s claim to represent pan-Arab interests encountered
turbulence as the Arab League convened in Beirut on 13 November 1956. The League‘s
agenda at this meeting covered the Suez crisis, Arab concerns regarding increased Soviet
influence in the Middle East, and the need for increased Arab unity. As historian Richard
Miller argues, some attendees understood the last point of discussion as a ―backhanded
slap‖ at Nasser‘s snubbing of the pan-Arab community when he nationalized the Suez
Canal. 668 The Arab community was caught in a frustrating conundrum between not
wanting to endorse Nasser‘s unilateral means to achieve pan-Arab ends and not wanting
to miss an opportunity to humiliate Western imperial powers.
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II

The Eisenhower administration faced a similar situation. On the international
stage, Eisenhower advocated an expanded role for the United Nations. During a 14
November press conference, he seemed receptive to the prospect of using the United
Nations as an independent institution not only in preserving Arab autonomy from threats
of Soviet subversion, but also in assuming a larger role in world affairs. Later, however,
a White House official amended the president‘s remarks saying that the United States
should remain at the forefront of containing communism. By implication, this single
exception nullified any potential opportunity for expanding the UN‘s role. 669
With regard to the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration had little need for
the United Nations. In a 27 November letter to England‘s (iconic) former Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, President Eisenhower revealed the depth to which national interests
pervaded his thinking. First, Eisenhower focused attention on communist infiltration as
―the real enemy‖ upon which all other factors in the Middle East were measured.
Second, he hoped to rehabilitate ―British prestige‖ in the region to assist in curtailing
communism‘s appeal in Arab countries. Lastly, he wanted to cushion Britain‘s energy
and economic upheavals resulting from the Suez Canal‘s closure. 670 Aided by fears of oil
shortages in Western Europe, the Suez crisis debased the value of the British pound as
investors sought safety in the more stable U.S. dollar.671 Motivated by his own agenda
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and encouraged by his British allies, Eisenhower disregarded Arab sentiments and risked
re-igniting the conflict that UN peacekeepers were in the process of mediating. The
president‘s obsession with communism led him to endorse an ill-fated policy of siding
with a one-time imperialist power in a region that despised not only the Western
imperialist legacy, but also any unwelcome intervention from foreign countries.
The multilateral factors that had helped resolve the Suez crisis yielded to the
prevailing mindset through which crisis and conflict had intensified. As UNEF troops
began arriving in Egypt to physically diffuse the situation, the key participants
responsible for escalating the crisis had already begun ignoring the UN‘s efforts that had
led to the deployment of the peacekeeping force. The insensitivity Israeli, Egyptian, and
American officials exhibited towards international diversity both between and within
blocs, as well as towards the accomplishments of pluralistic peace-making, meant that
one of the most valuable lessons emerging from the crisis went unheeded.
Fear of threats to America‘s national interests in the Middle East following the
Suez crisis led Eisenhower to pursue an increasingly interventionist policy. According to
historians Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Eisenhower and Dulles were
determined to thwart any Soviet infiltration into the Middle East ―‗vacuum‘‖ following
the exit of British and French forces by 27 December 1956. Ambrose and Brinkley note
how the term used to describe the situation in the region ―infuriated Arabs.‖672 Depicting
the Middle East as a political void served as another example of the West‘s disregard for
Arab nationalist sentiments. To prevent communist exploitation, White House officials
of [American] support were often incompatible with [British] ambitions.‖ Michael J. Hogan, ―The
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drafted and edited what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine in December
1956. Two days before its public unveiling on 5 January 1957 before a joint session of
Congress, Eisenhower shared his doctrine with Saudi Arabia‘s King Saud signifying his
elevated status as the West‘s newest ally in the Middle East. The doctrine declared that
communist subversion in the Middle East ―would undermine the foundations of
international peace and hence the security of the United States.‖ To bolster the region‘s
sovereign countries and protect them against communism‘s spread, Eisenhower asked
Congress to extend economic and military aid to states looking to stimulate development
and strengthen self-defense.673 Though more subtle in its approach, the Eisenhower
doctrine followed a similar course to that of early American policies attempting to
incorporate Middle Eastern countries into a defensive pact arrayed against communism
and receptive to Western influence.
Nasser remained skeptical. Within days of hearing the president‘s speech, Nasser
derided the Eisenhower doctrine as a veiled attack on Arab nationalism because
international communism was nearly non-existent in the Arab world. Adding to Nasser‘s
concerns, Harold Macmillan succeeded Anthony Eden as Britain‘s Prime Minister on 9
January 1957.674 Under Macmillan‘s leadership, Britain supported American foreign
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policy objectives more readily. Some historians argue that American officials
―indirectly‖ influenced British politics making Macmillan prime minister and thus
making Britain a ―junior partner‖ in fulfilling U.S. interests in the Middle East.675 By
early February 1957, U.S. officials including Secretary of State Dulles fed Nasser‘s
suspicions by broadening President Eisenhower‘s initial proclamation to guard against
any ―type of nationalism which would lead to a loss of independence [in the Middle
East].‖676 For close to the next decade and a half, writes historian Douglas Little, U.S.
foreign policy ―hoped to exorcise the demon of Nasserism and shield pro-Western
regimes from revolutionary change.‖677 Instead of ameliorating these tensions, Nasser
and Eisenhower used the conditions in the region to justify their own mutually exclusive
and antagonistic courses of action. Eisenhower‘s policy of intervention provoked Nasser
into reiterating calls for Arab solidarity against non-Arab incursions, which amplified
America‘s need more for direct regional involvement.
Some politicians and scholars picked up on the disconcerting effects the
Eisenhower doctrine could have on the international system. As Congress debated
Eisenhower‘s new Middle East policy, Representative Stewart Udall (D-AZ) read a
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published critique of the doctrine into the congressional record. Authored by esteemed
scholar and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the article criticized the president‘s policy for
its ―moralism‖ and ―vagueness‖ and for the corrosive influence these factors had upon
global realities. Niebuhr argued that Eisenhower‘s ―grand solution‖ favored the ―power
and comfort of [the United States]‖ at the expense of ―the troubles and turmoils of the
world at large.‖678 Throughout its long history, the Suez Canal symbolized the mistaking
of national interests for global interests. As the world emerged from the Suez crisis,
according to Niebuhr, the United States seemed poised to repeat the error. Niebuhr also
took his assessment a step farther by implying that this misrepresentation became the
basis for constructing, in this particular case, American foreign policy.
Eisenhower‘s policy ignored more pressing matters facing the international
community. Socio-economic development, national self-determination, and nonalignment provided the context through which many leaders, such as Nasser, understood
the international arena. Yet, America‘s Cold War context and attempts to associate the
needs of the developing world to it undermined the very nature of the challenges facing
countries attempting to plot an independent course in world affairs. With regard to the
Middle East, the Eisenhower administration created its own context for foreign policymaking rather than basing its actions on the immediate concerns that faced the region and
its population.
A similar mindset beset the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During
the NATO Council meetings of 1956 and 1957, members agreed to consult with their
allies within the organization to coordinate responses pertaining to ―out-of-area
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issues.‖679 NATO scholar, John Milloy contends that ―When a dispute arose between
two or more members that could not be settled directly, they were obligated to involve
NATO before submission to any other international agency.‖ 680 Developments such as
these did not bode well for the United Nations‘ ability to maintain multilateral diplomacy.

III

Independent of NATO, European leaders also began defining in greater detail the
context by which they would interact with the rest of the international community. In
comparing British and French foreign policies, historian William Hitchcock contends that
France favored plans for supranational integration. Prior examples include the Marshall
Plan‘s creation of regional institutions to organize Europe‘s economic recovery efforts in
1948 and the European Coal and Steel Community‘s (ECSC) synchronization of
economic interests for France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries in 1951. 681
Throughout the 1950s, French officials came to understand that their national security
and economic recovery lay in reconciliation with Germany more than associating with
the United States.
Soon after the Suez crisis, French and other European officials rededicated
themselves to European integration. The 1957 Treaty of Rome expanded commercial,
social, and cultural collaboration among ECSC members by establishing the European
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Economic Community (EEC). The central focus of the EEC, or ―Common Market,‖
promoted the free flow of goods among its members at the expense of those states outside
the community. The treaty created ―Trans-European Networks‖ that integrated the
EEC‘s ―transportation, telecommunications, and energy infrastructures.‖ Additionally,
the six European states sought closer social and cultural ties. Socially, the community
sought improved labor and educational opportunities. Members looked to raise living
standards and improve employment opportunities through contributions made to ―a
European Social Fund.‖ In education, exchanges of information and experience
combined with greater student mobility were designed to enhance the ―European
dimension in education.‖ Greater social cooperation meant the ―cultural heritage of
European significance‖ would be preserved.682 Matters involving ―international
organizations‖ were referred to the EEC Commission which served as an intermediary on
behalf of its member states. Where self-interest prevailed, a paradox soon followed.
While EEC members banded together for mutual benefit based on exclusion, on
the one hand, they professed continued support for the international community as a
whole. For example, members encouraged the economic and social ―integration of the
developing countries into the world community.‖683 Yet, EEC members remained
determined to dictate the terms by which this was to happen.
Like the British involvement in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, where London officials
looked to retain some degree of influence in Middle Eastern affairs and do so at the
expense of the U.S. and its interests in facilitating a collective security agreement to
contain communism, French officials sought to use the EEC in a similar way. According
682
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to John Hargreaves, author of Decolonization in Africa, ―[although] the expenses of aid
and commercial preference were diffused among France‘s partners in the EEC, the franc
zone was preserved and substantial credits distributed through the [EEC‘s] Ministry of
Co-operation [were manipulated by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
French President.]‖684 Specifically, the French government benefited from EEC funds
devoted to the development of non-self-governing territories. While responsible for
contributing nearly thirty-five percent of the total sum, French dependencies received
over eighty-five percent of the outlays. Other members of the EEC accepted these
conditions in exchange for French concessions on other matters.685
The anti-colonial faction of the international community was less compliant.
Beginning in October 1957, the UN General Assembly debated the potential effects the
Treaty of Rome could have on the process of decolonization. The Afro-Asian bloc
within the UN worried that the Common Market would hamper efforts encouraging
African industrialization in both dependent territories and independent states. These
delegates also expressed concern over the potential eclipsing of African economic
interests by those of the European-dominated Common Market.686 Much like Nasser‘s
fear of ―collective colonialism‖ regarding international control of the Suez Canal, similar
concerns arose over African integration into a European economic order.
Delegates from EEC countries and the United States attempted to allay these
apprehensions. As they did so, however, they undermined the integrity of the United
684
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Nations as a forum for multilateral diplomacy. Western delegates argued that the
Common Market would promote ―‗economic development of the African territories‘‖ and
thus promote ―mutual interest.‖ Betraying their own concerns about the setting of these
debates, Western delegates questioned the UN‘s authority as a forum for such
discussions. The U.S. delegation stated that debates pertaining to ―the operation of the
Common Market [should be left to] the GATT organization.‖687
This mentality reflected the West‘s growing discontent with the United Nations
and initiatives taken to circumnavigate its jurisdiction. For example, while the Treaty of
Rome promised to comply with UN principles, the treaty reserved the right ―to promote
[the Community‘s] overall harmonious development . . . leading to the strengthening of
[the Community‘s] economic and social cohesion.‖688 As NATO members established
guidelines that orchestrated decision-making and policy-making in matters of Western
security concerns, members of the EEC took parallel steps in matters of commerce,
education, labor, and culture. Such structures parallel those that already existed within
the United Nations. With such redundancy, nations could challenge more inclusive
organizations such as the UN while continuing to represent a broader, international
interest.
Put another way, individual heads of state may have been committed to UN
principles, but they reserved the right to construct their own policies to enforce these
687
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principles. Leaders often justified an unpopular course of action by presenting it as a
defensive measure. The prime ministers of Britain and France invaded Egypt to protect
international trade. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion justified the invasion of
Egypt in part by calling it a preemptive defensive measure taken against the fedayeen.
The Eisenhower Doctrine was the latest manifestation of this trend of rationalizing
unilateral national decisions as necessary defensive measures to protect peace.
When President Eisenhower deferred to UN principles, he did so only in so far as
the principles remained beholden to an American context. One example of this involved
Israeli policies put into effect in early 1957. As the UNEF established a buffer between
Egyptian and Israeli forces, a majority of Israelis resented withdrawing back across the
Sinai Peninsula and returning to their original borders. Reluctant to give up their gains,
Israeli policy-makers sought to exchange territory for unobstructed maritime passage
through the Strait of Tiran and security concessions that protected Israel‘s administrative
interests in the Gaza Strip to thwart future fedayeen attacks.689 Negotiations between the
United Nations and Israel stalled in early February 1957 when Israeli forces refused to
evacuate from these two areas considered so vital to their security concerns. As General
Burns, commander of UNEF put it, ―Israel thus defied the opinion of the world, as
expressed by the General Assembly.‖ 690
Although substantial numbers of Americans and their elected representatives
sympathized with Israel‘s security concerns, the Eisenhower administration kept its
dispassionate distance. During a 20 February speech, Eisenhower made his perspective
clear. ―Britain and France have withdrawn their forces from Egypt. Thereby they
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showed respect for the opinions of mankind.‖ Later in a televised address, the president
declared the following:
If we [Americans] agree that armed attack can properly achieve the
purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of
international order. . . . If the United Nations once admits that
international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have
destroyed the very foundation of the organization, and our best hope for
establishing a real world order.691
While Eisenhower‘s expression of support for UN principles was valuable, it was
compromised by the Chief Executive‘s new Middle East policy. The Eisenhower
Doctrine‘s heavy emphasis on military aid helped facilitate the use of force to maintain
international peace acceptable to U.S. security concerns. This kind of logic paralleled the
thinking of British and French officials who had made similar proclamations in an effort
to legitimize their intervention in Suez.
The double standard developing between multilateral ends and the unilateral
means used to achieve those ends ignored the conditions that make ―armed attack‖ more
likely. Similar to the Soviets‘ Czech arms deal of 1955, the introduction of U.S. weapons
under the Eisenhower Doctrine stood poised to re-ignite a regional arms race. Dulles‘s
expansion of the doctrine to include not only communist threats, but also Arab nationalist
actions meant that the chances for greater volatility grew exponentially. Future
instability in the Middle East would no longer be relegated to an Arab-Israeli dispute. In
essence, Eisenhower and several other world leaders cloaked their own national security
interests in UN principles, which undermined the legitimacy of the United Nations. John
Ikenberry‘s concept of international organizations acting as institutions of restraint was
waning in the months and years following the Suez crisis. While Eisenhower deserves
691
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some credit for recognizing the importance multilateral diplomacy played in the Suez
crisis and weighing the alternatives stemming from it, the conclusions he drew remained
self-serving. Eighteen months later the usurpation of multilateralism to reflect selfinterest contributed to a new crisis in Lebanon.

IV

Much like the Suez crisis, political tensions in Lebanon escalated as a result of the
excesses of competing national interests. By February 1958, Nasser‘s pan-Arab
philosophy spread to Syria culminating in an Egyptian-Syrian alliance known as the
United Arab Republic (UAR).692 News of this unified, supernationalist front split
opinion all across the Arab world. The Iraqis and Jordanians, grew apprehensive and
formed their own Arab Federation. Other Arabs, from all across the Middle East
including many Lebanese Muslims, rallied to Nasser‘s ideology. Within months,
regional political tensions accentuated Lebanon‘s domestic political problems which
pitted the country‘s Christian President and his supporters against the majority Muslim
populace. President Camille Chamoun rejected allegiance to either of these new panArab unions and, instead, re-affirmed his country‘s commitment to principles found in
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both the United Nations and Arab League Charters.693 These perspectives and
Chamoun‘s efforts to extend his term as president upset the country‘s pro-Nasser
supporters.694 Civil war erupted in May 1958.
Instability in Lebanon cascaded throughout the international community. Despite
its preference for a diplomatic solution to the Lebanese crisis, the Eisenhower
administration voiced its willingness to intervene militarily if the crisis escalated.
Eisenhower‘s senior staff reached this consensus as early as 13 May 1958. 695 Historian
Erika Alin argues that the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to use the Eisenhower
Doctrine as the basis for intervention in Lebanon and attached certain ―conditions‖
President Chamoun was to meet before American military deployment. Among these
criteria, the Lebanese government was ―to file an official complaint of its grievances
regarding [UAR] interference in its affairs with the United Nations Security Council.‖ 696
While seemingly altruistic, Eisenhower‘s deference towards the UN during the Lebanon
crisis actually undermined the integrity of the international organization by having the
world organization serve to legitimize America‘s unilateral intervention. After the Suez
crisis, American policymakers were becoming particularly adept at creating these
conditions. In essence, officials in Washington wanted the best of all possible worlds.
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Proceedings in the UN did not follow the Eisenhower administration‘s script. By
early June, both Lebanese and UAR officials turned to the United Nations to raise
awareness and garner support for their respective positions. Dr. Charles Malik,
Lebanon‘s Foreign Minister, appealed to the UN Security Council for help in neutralizing
rebel support from the UAR. Reports of cross-border infiltrations and gun smuggling
from neighboring Syria turned the civil war into a regional conflict undermining
Lebanon‘s national sovereignty. In presenting the UAR‘s argument, Egyptian Foreign
Minister Omar Loutfi accused the Lebanese government of attempting to distract
domestic and world public opinion from Chamoun‘s political power-grab.697 At the
conclusion of these UN Security Council hearings, members agreed to a Swedish
proposal calling for the secretary general to send an observation team to Lebanon to
investigate reports of outside interference and deliver its findings to the Security Council.
Tensions increased dramatically when pro-Nasserist forces in Iraq seized control
of the country in mid-July 1958. According to historian L.J. Butler, this revolution posed
an even greater threat to British and, more broadly, Western interests in the region than
did the Suez crisis. Strategically, the Baghdad Pact was subject to dissolution.
Economically, the generous oil concessions that Western interests had established with
the Iraq Petroleum Company could be subject to nationalization. 698 British and American
officials feared that Iraq‘s revolution was the start of a pan-Arab domino theory. 699
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The next day, 15 July, American Marines landed in Lebanon. President
Eisenhower began his address to the American people by clarifying that American
military forces were deployed at President Chamoun‘s request. In notifying Congress,
Eisenhower said that American motives showed ―concern‖ for Lebanese independence
―which [the U.S.] deems vital to the national interest and world peace.‖ 700 In addition to
perpetuating the tendency to unite national interests with international harmony, the
president‘s unilateral action rested upon the general premise of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
According to one anonymous U.S. government official, legal justification for intervention
in Lebanon lay in the Mansfield Amendment inserted into the doctrine‘s preamble. The
amendment credited to Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) stated that ―the United States
regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the
independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.‖701 In many respects, this
amendment reflected the sentiments expressed in Dulles‘s corollary to the Eisenhower
Doctrine, which authorized implementation of the policy if either communist or Arab
nationalist threats interfered with American interests in the region. Yet, as historian
Richard Miller points out, ―the intervention could not be justified under the provisions
spelled out in the operative sections of the Doctrine.‖ Only proof of armed interference
from states compliant with international communism could justify the deployment of
American forces.702
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Unconcerned with these discrepancies, the Executive Branch moved ahead with
building consensus for military intervention in Lebanon. President Eisenhower and his
senior staff sought endorsement, not dialogue. Although the president met with
Congressional leaders the day before the landings took place, Eisenhower and his
advisors did so to garner support for their decision rather than engage in debate. Where
Senators Mike Mansfield, William Fulbright (D-AR), and Speaker of the House Samuel
Rayburn (D-TX) distinguished between pro-Nasser and communist influence, the
president and Secretary of State Dulles considered the two linked. By the meeting‘s
conclusion all agreed that Eisenhower‘s actions were ―generally approved . . . as the
best.‖703
Leaders of the House and Senate demonstrated their compliance soon thereafter.
During an exchange in the House of Representatives, one Congressman asked to address
his fellow members, to which Rayburn replied, ―Not if it is controversial. The Chair is
not going to recognize Members to talk about foreign affairs in this critical situation.‖ 704
Contrast this mentality with the extensive debate that occurred during the Suez crisis and
one begins to appreciate the role that the United Nations played in resolving conflict.
Where participants at the United Nations achieved consensus through the exchange of
viewpoints, leaders interested in protecting national interests demanded consensus
through conformity.
As the Lebanon crisis escalated, enlisting the United Nations to endorse a
particular perspective proved hazardous to multilateral diplomacy. When Eisenhower
explained America‘s intervention to an American audience, U.S. Ambassador to the
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United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., presented the country‘s case to the Security
Council. Lodge looked to transfer the matter from the U.S. to the UN as quickly as
possible by expanding the UN‘s presence in Lebanon to include a police force. Lodge,
along with British and Jordanian officials, described threats to Lebanon and other
sovereign Arab states if the United Arab Republic consolidated its gains. 705
Reports from the UN‘s own observers were less dire. In presenting the observer‘s
findings to the Security Council, as required, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld stole
momentum from Lodge‘s call for urgent action. 706 Swedish delegate Gunnar Jarring
criticized America‘s intervention so much so that he proposed suspending UN operations
in Lebanon. Koto Matsudaira, Japan‘s UN representative, shared similar regret and
believed that any compromise was the sole responsibility of the United Nations. Soviet,
Asian, and African officials also denounced America‘s move. 707
Within two weeks, the Security Council became mired in deadlock. Draft
resolutions such as America‘s bolstering the UN‘s mandate in Lebanon and the Soviet‘s
call for America‘s immediate withdrawal reflected the unimaginative efforts of
attempting to divert multilateral diplomacy to suit national interests. The Swedish and
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Japanese proposals fell victim to the permanent members‘ veto. Motivated by public
relations maneuvering, world leaders tried to plan an international summit on their own,
but it too failed.
A greater and more genuine appeal to multilateral diplomacy combined with
political transformation within Lebanon itself helped end the crisis. The untenable
political climate in Lebanon meant that new elections were held almost immediately.
General Fuad Chehab replaced Camille Chamoun as Lebanon‘s elected president on 31
July 1958.708 In early August, debate within the United Nations shifted from the Security
Council to the General Assembly under the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution. Similar to the
Suez crisis of 1956, the Lebanon question of 1958 found an eager audience focused on
compromise. Hammarskjöld took the initiative by agreeing to have the UN observers
play a more flexible role in Lebanon, requesting mutual re-assurance of non-aggression
within the Arab world, and expressing support for the UN‘s involvement in Arab
economic development. On 21 August amidst a flurry of draft resolutions, delegates
from the ten Arab members of the UN issued their ―Good Neighbor Resolution.‖ In
exchange for the removal of foreign troops, Arab leaders agreed to respect Lebanese and
Jordanian sovereignty as well as UN principles. The General Assembly passed the
resolution unanimously. While critiquing these events in a news conference, New
Zealand‘s Sir Leslie Munro proclaimed that Arab consensus emanated from ―the
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harmonizing influence of the Assembly itself.‖ 709 By October 1958, the 14,000 U.S.
troops deployed to Lebanon were removed. While it is true that negotiations took place
privately, the appeal to and expression of the General Assembly contributed to a more
resilient agreement based on a more authentic attempt to engage in multilateral dialogue
rather than imposing a prefabricated solution grounded in an ideological mindset.

V

The dichotomy existing between multilateral diplomacy and unilateral interests
clashed again during the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. Like much of the rest of the
African continent, the Congo and its population were wrestling with attempts to transition
from colonial rule to independence. The Congo‘s Belgian colonial government made
tentative gestures towards Congolese autonomy by studying possible constitutional
reforms and allowing for ―limited municipal elections‖ by 1958. Headway was slow and
cumbersome at best and counter-productive at worst. Throughout the 1950s, Congolese
social and cultural groups served as centers for directing nationalist ideology. As African
specialist Edgar O‘Ballance explains, these associations served a dual purpose because
―all political activity was banned in the Congo and the only Congolese groups that were
permitted were those with social, cultural, or study objectives, plus low-level advising
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committees.‖710 The restrictions conveyed the sense that Belgians in the Congo were
sympathetic to independence so long as they directed its course.
As seen so often throughout world affairs during the 1950s, governments sought
to co-opt domestic organizations to create the illusion of a diversified society while
maintaining a high degree of hegemony. Similar to the shah‘s consolidation of political
power during 1953 in Iran, and Nasser‘s Egyptian revolution of 1954, the restriction of
civic associations in the Congo was the latest attempt to contain socio-political
pressures. 711 Because of the colonial government‘s repressive legacy in the Congo,
however, the double standard by which it pursued decolonization undermined the
Belgians‘ legitimacy as stewards of Congolese soveregnity. Organizations such as the
Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO), led by Joseph Kasavubu; the Confederation des
Association Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) led by Moise Tshombe; and the
Mouvement National Congolias (MNC), led by Patrice Lumumba, challenged Belgian
rule. In 1958, Lumumba‘s MNC represented Congolese interests at the All-African
Peoples‘ Conference in Ghana. Early the following year, rioting erupted in the Congo
capital of Leopoldville as a result of a volatile mix of fervent nationalist ideology and a
two-year old economic recession that left as much as twenty-five percent of
Leopoldville‘s workforce unemployed. 712 The combination of a discredited government
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and social unrest reduced the Belgian plan for a transition of power from several years to
a matter of months.
The Congo gained its independence on 30 June 1960. The MNC won majorities
in the newly created Senate and central assembly, guaranteeing Lumumba‘s becoming
Prime Minister. Joseph Kasavubu became the chief executive and head of state. 713
Tragically, Congolese leaders and the polity were ill-prepared for independence, leaving
a tremendous vacuum of power. According to Political Scientist David Gibbs, although
nearly three-quarters of Congolese society benefited from some measure of primary
education, only thirty people graduated from universities in the Congo in 1960. Gibbs
also mentions that by 1960 one person in the whole of the Congolese population had a
law degree.714 These statistics did not bode well for a society that was now placed in
charge of its own bureaucracy.
The rush towards independence in addition to an over-burdened central
government created severe political rifts between Lumumba‘s MNC and its rivals. Moise
Tshombe‘s organization, based in the Congo‘s Katanga province, was established to
consolidate interest groups within Katanga in order to represent a more unified whole.
As a result, Tshombe‘s ―federation of tribal and professional groups‖ felt no loyalty
towards Lumumba‘s government. Kasavubu also wrestled with Lumumba for greater
control. Distrust between these two leading governmental figures led to fissures that
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pervaded all levels of the bureaucracy. 715 By 5 July, various factions in the Congo sensed
the weakness gripping the central government and began acting on their own impulses.
More than simply devolving into a civil war, the conflict between Tshombe,
Lumumba, and Kasavubu bordered on anarchy. As one historian described it, Belgian
colonial officials returned to their homeland, ―leaving a crossfire among various groups
struggling for the succession.‖ 716 Mutineers in the Congolese National Army targeted
Belgian nationals and army officers who had remained in the Congo.717 The legacy of
colonial exploitation as well as economic frustrations and political factionalism
contributed to Congolese recriminations. The sense of ill-will spread despite the efforts
of both Lumumba and Kasavubu to address the overwhelming sense of injustice that
many Congolese felt. The government‘s inability to restore order held severe
consequences for both the Congo and the international community.
Lumumba‘s government was also hampered by the sheer logistics of governing.
The Congo was colossal in size. It measured over nine hundred thousand square miles,
making it larger than Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway combined. The
nearly non-existent infrastructure meant that urban centers and provinces were isolated.
As a result, efforts to establish a cohesive sense of national unity were particularly
daunting.
Eager to assert his own autonomy at his rivals‘ expense, Moise Tshombe issued
―a unilateral declaration of independence‖ for Katanga province on 11 July 1960.
Katanga possessed a wealth of natural resources. The province held significant amounts
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of copper, uranium, cobalt, radium, germanium, zinc, and industrial-grade diamonds.
The mining giant, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (U.M.K.), sold $200 million worth of
Katanga‘s minerals per year and supplied ten percent of the world‘s copper, sixty percent
of its cobalt, and most of the world‘s radium. The company‘s annual revenues profited
Belgian bankers, who owned approximately forty-two percent of U.M.K.‘s shares. 718
The breakdown of law and order in the Congo threatened U.M.K. operations. Tshombe
understood these economic factors and asked Belgian officials for political recognition
and military support.
Although Western powers were hesitant to recognize Katanga‘s secession
officially, Belgian, Western European, and American policy-makers reacted positively to
Tshombe‘s unilateral declaration. The reintroduction of Belgian troops to the Congo
eased the concerns of panicked U.M.K. investors, Western European consumers of
Katanga‘s resources, and America‘s Cold War security interests in sub-Saharan Africa.719
According to a 9 April National Security Council report, continued exertion of Western
European influence in West Africa remained vital to America‘s security interests
throughout the Congo crisis and much of the process of decolonization in the early
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1960s.720 Yet, the return of Belgian forces on 12 July transformed the scope and severity
of the Congo crisis. 721
Lumumba countered Belgian intervention with his own calls for international
support. As with many events surrounding the Congo crisis, this appeal was not as
straightforward as may have seemed. Anxious for immediate support, some members of
Lumumba‘s government requested direct American military intervention. At the moment
when Lumumba needed to present himself as the executor of Congolese sovereignty, he
was distracted by the rampant lack of political discipline originating from within the
ranks of his government‘s bureaucracy. Undaunted, Lumumba‘s messages to UN
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld addressed the destabilizing effect Belgian troops
were having in the Congo. Lumumba blamed the Belgian government for masterminding
Katanga‘s secession. In a second message, Lumumba stipulated that UN forces would be
deployed ―not to restore [the] internal situation in [the] Congo but rather to protect
national territory‖ from Belgian encroachment. An additional clarification stated that
only neutral countries were to contribute to the creation of a UN force, thus eliminating
direct American participation.722
The Eisenhower administration helped Lumumba save face by denying direct
intervention and deferring to the United Nations. Christian Herter, the new United States
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Secretary of State, explained to Hammarskjöld that ―‗the United States believes that any
assistance to the government of the Congo should be through the United Nations and not
by any unilateral action by any one country, the United States included.‘‖ 723 Like
Congolese policy-makers, American officials also had to address their own selfconflicted policies. On the one hand, officials in Washington supported exercising
influence through trusted Western European allies, such as the Belgian government,
which saw a need for unilateral intervention the Congo. On the other hand, President
Eisenhower endorsed UN resolutions calling for the insertion of UN peacekeepers into
the Congo, thereby disposing of the need for unilateral action. Much like America‘s
strategic interests in the Middle East during the early to mid-1950s, policy-makers along
the Potomac River cloaked the execution of their own unilateral interests in Africa in
multilateral terms. Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon expressed these quirky
sentiments during an 18 August National Security Council meeting. While responding to
a series of policy questions regarding American interests in Africa, Dillon supported ―the
decision to provide aid to the Congo through the UN.‖ Moments later, however, as he
assessed America‘s continued reliance on Western European nations to serve as proxy
powers in Africa, Dillon admitted that ―it was still [America‘s] objective to get the
Belgians back into the Congo, but whether this was practical we do not know.‖724
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VI

Seizing the opportunity to capitalize from the turbulence created by contradictory
policies such as these, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations took immediate action
during the UN Security Council debate on 13 July. After the Tunisian delegate proposed
a draft resolution calling for the removal of Belgian forces from the Congo and insertion
of UN peacekeepers, the Soviet representative accused the United States of interfering in
the Congo‘s domestic affairs and employing the services of United Nations‘ personnel
including Undersecretary of the United Nations Ralph Bunche to advance Western
interests in the region.725
Several historians specializing in the Congo crisis make similar arguments.
According to David Gibbs, Hammarskjöld became a puppet of Western interests.
Additionally, Hammarskjöld‘s subordinate Andrew Cordier maintained strong ties with
the U.S. State Department.726 Other scholars criticize Hammarskjöld for sacrificing his
status as an impartial international civil servant. Once the UN peacekeepers began
arriving in the Congo, Hammarskjöld argued for a weak Congolese government that
would remain dependent on the UN forces. Edgar O‘Ballance describes the deployment
of UN forces as ―Hammarskjöld‘s empire-building project.‖727 Given the international
community‘s convincing mandate authorizing UN intervention and the chaotic conditions
enveloping the Congo, these assessments seem excessive.

725

―Text of Notes from the Congo and Excerpts of U.N. Security Council Debate,‖ 14 July 1960, NYT, p. 4.
Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, p. 93. See also Stephen Weissman,
American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974) pp. 90-92;
and Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 47.
727
O‘Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998, p. 33.
726

305
Reminiscent of the organizational agility Hammarskjöld displayed during the
Suez crisis, the Secretary General maneuvered UN policy between ideological loyalties
that infiltrated the Congo crisis. As witnessed during the Security Council deliberations
of 13 July, the Soviet delegation linked UN activities to Western interests. Yet, when
voting on the resolution to create a UN peacekeeping force, also referred to as the
Organizations des Nations Unities au Congo (ONUC), the U.S.S.R. approved the
resolution along with the United States. Regardless, the Cold War divide widened as
both Katanga‘s leader, Moise Tshombe, and Belgian government officials warned of
communist plans to exploit the anarchy engulfing the Congo. Tshombe portrayed
Lumumba as a puppet of Soviet and Communist Chinese regimes. 728 Indeed, Lumumba
had appealed to the Soviet leadership for military aid, shortly after making a similar
request to the United States government.729 Intending to represent himself as a nonaligned nationalist and play the Superpowers off against one another, Lumumba‘s actions
backfired. His opportunistic gamble weakened rather than strengthened his position.
Congolese relations with the United Nations were somewhat better, although not
without misgivings. Regarding the issue of Katanga‘s independence, UN officials
refused to recognize the province‘s sovereignty. As King Gordon of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace put it, ―The mandate of the United Nations Force . . .
would apply to the entire Congo. Belgian troops would have to withdraw from the
Congo, including Katanga, and the [ONUC] would have the right of deployment in all six
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provinces, including Katanga.‖730 The UN‘s selective recognition buoyed Lumumba‘s
political fortunes as a Congolese leader, but he began squandering his advantage soon
thereafter. By August 1960, Lumumba demanded that non-African ONUC troops, who
were believed to be motivated by ulterior, imperialist motives, be withdrawn from the
Congo. The next month, as Lumumba‘s political legitimacy declined, the Congo‘s
President, Joseph Kasavubu, and the newly-appointed commander of the Congolese
Army, Colonel Joseph-Desire Mobutu, wanted Ghana and Guinea troops expelled from
the ONUC. Smelling the political ―blood in the water,‖ Kasavubu and Mobutu protested
the pro-Lumumba sympathies of these ONUC contingents. 731 While Hammarskjöld
respected Kasavubu‘s right to contest Lumumba‘s legitimacy, Hammarskjöld ignored
proposed changes to the ONUC‘s composition.

VII

Additional efforts to compensate for any perceived complicity with Western
interests included Hammarskjöld‘s charting a more independent course for the ONUC in
early September. The secretary general began by appointing Rejashwar Dayal as the
UN‘s Special Representative in the Congo. Dayal was an ardent anti-colonialist and
supporter of Lumumba‘s nationalist agenda.732 Although Lumumba‘s grip on power was
slipping, UN officials continued to recognize him as the legitimate ruler even as other
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Western powers sought to replace Lumumba. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
drafted plans to assassinate the Congolese leader and supported Mobutu‘s 14 September
military coup. Lumumba was removed from office and retreated to his residence, where
ONUC forces surrounded Lumumba‘s compound and prevented Mobutu‘s forces from
arresting the former Prime Minister.733 Thus, the UN‘s intervention upset Mobutu‘s
efforts to consolidate political power and frustrated American efforts to establish a
Western-friendly regime in the Congo. Vindication of Hammarskjöld‘s handling of these
events came on 17 September, when the UN General Assembly rewarded him with a vote
of confidence.
During the General Assembly‘s emergency session, the scope of the crisis became
nearly incomprehensible. Deadlock beset the Security Council over a draft resolution
commending the UN‘s efforts in the Congo and imploring UN member states to
appropriate the funds necessary for continued UN activities while requesting that
members ―refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and
order [in the Congo].‖734 Sensing an opportunity to outmaneuver the Soviet delegation
and its Security Council veto of the proposed draft resolution, the U.S. delegation evoked
the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution to take the matter before the General Assembly. The
United States representative, James Wadsworth, reiterated the proposed Ceylon-Tunisian
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resolution. As he did so, Wadsworth spoke out against any ―unilateral action‖ that would
―obstruct the United Nations effort in the Congo.‖ The introduction of ―personnel or
equipment . . . [by] any power,‖ Wadsworth continued, ―would be particularly
dangerous.‖735 Wadsworth was referring to the deployment of Soviet aid to the
Congolese government, but his statement rejected any unilateral intervention. The CIA‘s
plot against Lumumba and support for Mobutu as well as the Belgians‘ support for
Tshombe were equal if not greater transgressions.
Wadsworth‘s approach was the latest in a long series of diplomatic maneuvering
during international crises. Rather than objectively pursue multilateral diplomacy,
American officials simply relied on the traditional practice of seeking the ―multilateral‖
label to condone the application of a particular agenda. ―Unilateralism,‖ writes historian
Melvyn Leffler, ―is quintessentially American.‖ 736 However, the masquerading of these
selfish ambitions also characterized American diplomacy. The Soviet delegation played
into its adversary‘s scheme by openly criticizing Hammarskjöld and the UN organization
for supplanting Belgian colonialism with other forms of Western imperialism. 737
Sensitive to their own national interests and equally eager to disguise them, the Soviet
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delegates decided to make the United Nations the scapegoat for the Congo‘s political
disintegration. Yet, lampooning Hammarskjöld deflected international attention in a way
that hurt Soviet prestige. By doing so, Wadsworth and many of his fellow UN
representatives sympathized with the secretary general and commended him on his
efforts and his impartiality. Thus, the Americans successfully shifted international focus
away from criticism of the West, and they looked good doing so.
Wadsworth and his contemporaries in the Eisenhower administration did not stop
with blaming the Soviets for obstructing world peace. Privately, American officials in
Washington criticized the Belgian government for supporting ―anti-Lumumbist‖ factions
in the Congo that conflicted with the UN‘s agenda. These abrasive policies helped
legitimize Soviet and Afro-Asian claims of imperialist interference. During the same
closed-door meeting, the American advisers credited the UN with maintaining its
impartiality in the Congo as well as ―preventing unilateral interventions‖ while
simultaneously providing an adequate degree of ―law and order.‖738
As witnessed in previous international crises, American policy-makers were quick
to identify the self-interests of other countries and the detrimental effects these policies
had on crisis resolution, but the same officials remained oblivious to their own
government‘s role in the crisis. Scholars such as David Gibbs argue that American and
other Western support for Katnaga‘s succession in July 1960 was ―highly
destabilizing.‖739 The CIA‘s plans to assassinate Lumumba, whom the UN peacekeepers
protected, also prove America‘s penchant for acting unilaterally. Blind-spots such as
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these convey the hypocritical nature of American foreign policy-making. The fact that
these unilateralist activities were ubiquitous among all the major powers involved in the
Congo crisis made the United Nations‘ own intervention imperative.
Once again, however, self-interest prevailed. By mid-February 1961, Lumumba
was caught, imprisoned, and killed after attempting to rally his remaining pockets of
support. On 21 February, the UN Security Council allowed the ONUC ―to use military
force, if necessary, to prevent civil war.‖ 740 Safeguards against the UN interfering in
domestic matters were removed, which upset some members of the international
community. After Lumumba‘s death, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt (UAR), Ceylon,
Indonesia, and Yugoslavia made preparations to withdrawal from the ONUC. Reasons
included the loss of the legitimate Congolese ruler and a lack of legitimacy in having the
UN participate in the domestic affairs of any state.
Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche, and other UN officials persevered. For the next
three years, they continued to stitch together the fabric of Congolese sovereignty. The
world organization paid high price for its efforts. Hammarskjöld‘s death in a plane crash
en route to cease-fire negotiations between Congolese and Katangan representatives
threatened to leave the UN leaderless and adrift at a time when it needed Hammarskjöld‘s
sense of visionary purpose. UN officials remained vigilant, however. By 1963, Bunche
and 20,000 peacekeepers negotiated Katanga‘s return as a province of the Republic of the
Congo and aided in returning stability and prosperity to the country. 741 The following
year, UN peacekeepers ended their mission and withdrew.
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VIII

Spanning roughly the same period of time in which the United Nations was
engaged in rehabilitating the Congo, the blending of non-governmental and quasigovernmental organizations continued unabated. One of the newest incarnations
emerged in 1960 with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As
salvage crews labored to clear the Suez Canal of debris in the spring of 1957, Nasser
hosted a conference intent on enhancing Arab influence in the oil industry. One of
several recommendations called for establishing an international organization to oversee
Middle Eastern oil production. Little came of this idea until 1960 when massive oil
reserves flooded the market triggering a price crisis. Plummeting revenues drove
Western-owned oil companies British Petroleum and Standard Oil of New Jersey to cut
fixed rates upon which they had agreed to divide profits with their Arab partners.
Without changes to this ―posted price,‖ oil companies would have to bear the brunt of all
profit losses resulting from falling crude oil prices. 742 A month after Standard Oil‘s
announcement in August 1960, Arab oil producers retaliated by forming OPEC.
The move symbolized a broader, post-Suez crisis trend towards creating exclusive
organizations representing national interests. Overnight, OPEC acted on behalf of
countries controlling eighty percent of the world‘s crude oil exports while consisting of
only five founding member states: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran.
Similar to the Western-dominated oil consortium established in Iran after the 1953
revolution, OPEC differed only in scale. Where British, French, American and Iranian
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interests had divided Iran‘s oil revenues among themselves to maintain the status quo of
international exploitation, OPEC coordinated oil policies among its members to exert
their own leverage within the international community. More generally, the founding of
OPEC paralleled Europe‘s Treaty of Rome in that they both created more exclusive subdivisions within the international community. While perhaps constructive in providing a
greater degree of international networking and institutionalism, the potential for creating
new and more complex threats to the international system remained.
For example, although Venezuela‘s participation provided a modicum of
international legitimacy, OPEC cleaved the Arab world in two. In 1957, Nasser‘s
strategy aimed to assert Egyptian interests in Arab oil politics while overlooking the fact
that Egypt itself was not an oil producing country. As energy expert Daniel Yergin
phrased it, ―It was a case of a ‗have not‘ seeking to . . . arouse and shape public opinion .
. . of the ‗haves.‘‖743 By 1960, segregating Arab interests doomed Nasser‘s pan-Arab
ambitions. The United Arab Republic became a radical threat to Saudi Arabia‘s
conservative shift. Indeed, the feud boiled over during the 1962 Yemeni Civil War to the
point where Egyptians and Saudis engaged in a proxy war against each other. Some
scholars argue that OPEC replaced the Arab League as the ―most important consultative
forum‖ in the Middle East. Yet OPEC remained a consultative arena for the haves at the
expense of the have-nots.744
Like the Treaty of Rome, OPEC‘s statute shared a paradox by espousing
international integration on the one hand while maintaining an exclusive membership on
the other hand. Under Article 31 of OPEC‘s guidelines, those who serve the organization
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are ―international employees with an exclusively international character.‖ As such, staff
must act independently of any government. In his assessment of the organization, Issam
Azzam describes OPEC employees as ―international civil servants‖ making them
professional equivalent of UN employees despite their representing a much smaller
constituent group.745 Yet, according to the statute‘s preamble, the organization is defined
as a ―permanent intergovernmental organization‖ committed to ―coordination and
unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the
best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.‖ 746
Contradictions such as these plagued governments and the institutions they created to suit
all sorts of interests. Europe sought greater economic and social association. Petroleum
producers wanted to synthesize distribution of a single commodity. By the mid-1960s,
the United States moved to institutionalize its ideology and cultural identity.

IX

With an appropriate measure of irony, American policy-makers opened a new
effort to spread their interests via private institutions when President Lyndon Johnson
proclaimed 1965 the ―International Cooperation Year‖ in celebration of the United
Nations‘ twentieth anniversary. Beginning in January, Representative Dante Fascell (DFL) framed debate by quoting excerpts from Richard Gardner‘s book In Pursuit of World
Order. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
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Affairs, advocated the proliferation of ―international institutions‖ where national interests
intersected with pragmatic foreign policy-making. 747 Fascell‘s own participation on the
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs placed him at the forefront of the trend towards greater institutional
networking. By June, Facell and his subcommittee colleagues, Frances Bolton (R-OH),
Donald Fraser (D-MN), and Peter Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) introduced a resolution
rededicating Congressional support for UN principles while simultaneously promising
further ―growth of institutions of international cooperation.‖ 748
Controversy followed weeks later when some Representatives questioned the
value of the UN‘s place in world affairs. Harold Gross (R-IA) labeled the organization a
―wind palace that has no principles‖ and credited the United States with forcing British,
French, and Israeli compliance during the Suez crisis. Representative Claude Pepper (DFL) expressed how ―high hopes [for the United Nations] have turned into
disillusionment.‖749 One of the major criticisms was the escalating cost UN members
bore for prolonged peacekeeping efforts. 750
Speaking on behalf of the subcommittee, Representative Frelinghuysen offered a
thoughtful and eloquent rebuttal. He used his opponents‘ objections as examples for
strengthening the UN rather than weakening it. 751 In some ways reminiscent of
Hammarskjöld‘s 1953 Annual Report to the General Assembly, Frelinghuysen
commended the organization‘s inclusiveness:
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The UN is a genuine international organization which does not separate
the ―have‖ countries from the ―have nots‖ or the big from the small, strong
from the weak, or the developed from the underdeveloped, or the capitalist
from the Socialist or even Communist. The United Nations has refused to
become a handmaiden of any particular alinement [sic] or ideology. This
is its strength.752
Built upon the exchange of interests, the UN occupies a unique and essential position in
the international system. Although Frelinghuysen and others on the subcommittee tried
to transplant this sentiment, their efforts had unintended consequences.
Rather than cultivate a more multilateral perspective to temper the nation‘s
interests, the subcommittee‘s initiative slowly manifested itself into a partnership
between the national interest and the agendas of private organizations. On 22 October
1965, Fascell presented a provocative report to Congress laying the foundation for future
foreign policy decision-making. The report‘s conclusions proved somewhat paradoxical.
On the one hand, surveys of the country‘s private international organizations revealed
that they wanted to remain independent of ideological or political influence. On the other
hand, these institutions supported government involvement in coordinating programs
among various private institutions and ―enhancing their effectiveness.‖ The report went
so far as to suggest establishing a federal umbrella agency to direct private
organizations. 753
While Fascell‘s dream of creating such an agency failed, the desire for increased
institutionalization of American foreign policy making persisted. In 1967, Representative
Gilbert Gude (R-MD) advocated a similar viewpoint when he addressed the Capitol Hill
Kiwanis Club. With regard to foreign aid specifically, Gude argued that ―the growth of
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intermediate institutions [expanded] the decision making process‖ while contributing to a
sense of ―national consensus‖ and more responsive governance.754 While enticing,
Gude‘s conclusions, as well as those of many of his colleagues, failed to address a
growing dissatisfaction with a single, unitary consensus.
Political conservatives and liberals expressed their concern over a monolithic
perspective. The notion of there being an attainable ―national consensus‖ proved illusive
at best, and highly-improbable at worst. Quoting from the venerable Walter Lippmann, a
young Representative named Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL) exploited what Lippmann
described as ―the great consensus‖ and its being mistaken for ―the false consensus[,]
which is achieved by manipulating opinion in order to erase opposition to the will of the
leader.‖755 Rumsfeld used Lippmann‘s article as cheap political capital for criticizing the
Johnson Administration; but the accomplished journalist had tapped into America‘s
underlying domestic tension of the age.

X

Leading scholars also observed similar disquieting trends. In her book The Human
Condition, Hannah Arendt believed that the most serious problem facing society was an
individual‘s political isolation from effective governance. Experts, political operators,
and insiders held such an advantage in information and resources that individuals could
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not voice or spread their own opinions successfully. 756 Instead, as historian Daniel
Boorstin argues in his book The Image, first published in 1961, American society
manufactured ―extravagant expectations . . . of [the American people‘s] power to shape
the world‖ which generated a false sense of the real world and the problems affecting it.
Like Lippmann‘s ominous proclamation of a ―great consensus,‖ Boorstin described how
Americans had mastered the ability ―to fabricate national purposes when [Americans]
lack them, to pursue these purposes after [Americans] have fabricated them.‖757 The
Charter statements of the nation‘s youth movements during the early 1960s reinforce this
general sense of misguided malaise. The Students for a Democratic Society Port Huron
Statement of 1962 warns of the resulting demoralization:
The American political system is not the democratic model of which its
glorifiers speak. In actuality it frustrates democracy by confusing the
individual citizen, paralyzing policy discussion, and consolidating the
irresponsible power of military and business interests. . . .
Even students of the ideologically opposed Young Americans for Freedom believed that
democracy had somehow gone astray. As a result, these young conservatives believed
that greater individual freedom required less government.758 By the 1960s, politicians
worldwide endorsed the expansion of non-governmental and quasi-governmental
organizations to spread their interests abroad.
Both Fascell and Gude argued that this very threat justified the need for a more
inclusive foreign-policy debate, but the participation of private institutions faced daunting
challenges. According to one 1969 study of State Department sub-culture, government
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officials considered ―independent outsiders‖ as a threat to the Department‘s monopoly on
foreign policy making. 759 Fascell‘s proposal for government coordination of private,
non-government organizations was one way of easing these tensions, but this did not
occur until the 1980s. Once it did, scholar Akira Iriye argues, a ―kind of symbiosis
existed between governmental and non-governmental activities, the former focusing on
state-to-state aid and the latter on marginalized segments of recipient populations.‖ 760
Yet, even with the input of private organizations, foreign policy activities retained a high
degree of conformity. Simply incorporating private organizations into the decisionmaking process did not necessarily mean adopting a more universal approach. Many
scholars such as Iriye and others applaud the new role international organizations created
for themselves.761 Unfortunately, the United Nations was not one of these beneficiaries.

XI

Throughout the 1960s, the United States and other Western governments
marginalized the role of the United Nations in international affairs as decolonization
expanded the number of UN member states. According to one-time UN civil servant,
Brian Urquhart, U.S. officials grappled with a paradox where the superpower‘s majority
in the General Assembly was to oversee decolonization, which in turn destroyed the
majority that the U.S. once enjoyed. The efforts of the U.S. and other Western powers to
control the pace of decolonization via the UN soon gave way to a more independent
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inertia. From 1947 to 1967, ninety-four independent countries joined the United
Nations.762
Instead of leading these efforts, the West either observed passively or pursued
their own controversial strategies for managing these dramatic changes. Having helped
establish the European Economic Community, the French government attempted to reign
in its colonial possessions by organizing a new federation that was to replace the
dilapidated imperial model. Under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, the French
Community called for independent home-rule for French colonies, while France retained
control over the colonies‘ defense, fiscal, economic, and foreign policy as well as the
judicial system. 763 This type of independence without sovereignty was met with mixed
reactions. A referendum among French African colonies in the late 1950s endorsed the
proposal. 764 Yet, as historian Tony Chafer describes it, French efforts to ease the
transition from colonization to independence proved inadequate for ―African
aspirations.‖765 French disingenuousness contributed to fourteen African states
proclaiming their independence in 1960. Meanwhile, French military forces continued to
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protect vital areas of economic and political importance in countries including Senegal,
Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Madagascar. 766
Divisions between independent African countries and the West continued into the
1960s and beyond. In addition to fostering intractable political instability in places such
as the Congo, African and Western interests encountered deadlock in economic matters
concerning the implementation of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).
African nations enlisted in this new framework as a result of economic hardships that
often accompanied independence. Richard Bissel‘s assessment of the NIEO and its
―institutionalization . . . in UN [and other] organs‖ demonstrates how negotiations broke
down. This methodical approach to economic revitalization, Bissel writes, ―was far more
useful for casting blame than for funding solutions, since most of the proposed solutions
involved the commitment of massive resources or compromising basic principles by the
West to such a degree that the NIEO solutions would not be implemented.‖ Interestingly,
Bissel identifies the OPEC oil shocks of the 1960s and 1970s and the resulting economic
stress Western countries felt as one reason for the repudiation of NIEO proposals. 767
Another, and perhaps the culminating, event that heightened Western
disillusionment with the UN General Assembly involved the seating of the People‘s
Republic of China. In Brian Urquhart‘s estimation, the UN vote in 1971 to recognize
Communist China‘s delegation, after twenty-one years of U.S. stone-walling, signified
―the end of the automatic U.S. majority.‖ 768 Chinese officials proceeded to use their new
position in the world to represent the interests of the developing world. Within roughly a
decade of Communist China‘s participation at the UN, the country‘s membership in other
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international organizations jumped from around ninety in 1976 to over three hundred by
the early 1980s. 769

XII

In the wake of the Suez crisis, members of the international community appeared
to be insulating themselves in increasingly myopic foreign policies. Once the UNEF
arrived in the Sinai and the war ended, delegates in the General Assembly began claiming
credit. Arab and Israeli attempts to do so resulted in glaring paradoxes. Enthusiasm
shown for pan-Arab solidarity actually fractured the region between Nasser‘s United
Arab Republic (UAR) and the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Federation. Israeli Prime Minster
David Ben-Gurion tethered Zionist interests to international interests while
simultaneously disparaging the international community for appeasing Nasser and his
ideology. British and French officials sought to rescue their international prestige by
yielding graciously to UNEF forces as they arrived while proclaiming, as the French did,
that an international peacekeeping force had been their brain-child.
Americans, meanwhile, prepared to fill a political void in the Middle East that
only they perceived. The unveiling of the Eisenhower Doctrine, originally designed to
prevent communist infiltration into the region, actually succeeded in upsetting Arab
nationalists who showed no communist affinities. Despite misgivings from international
relations theorists, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, the Eisenhower Doctrine enjoyed broad
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support in the Untied States. Yet, one of Niebuhr‘s main criticisms was how far removed
the doctrine was from the pressing realities that threatened the region more directly.
Interaction among policies of mutual exclusion contributed to a series of selffulfilling prophecies. For example, in its purest form, Eisenhower‘s Doctrine was
designed to quash any alternative ideologies that might threaten American interests in the
Middle East and authorized intervention should any threat emerge. Fed up with the long
history of Western policies that presupposed intervention, Arab nationalists united to
form associations like the UAR. These types of activities antagonized American policymakers and thus provoked a need for implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine. Roughly
two months after the Suez crisis was resolved, the same tensions that had instigated it
resurfaced to dictate national policy once again. Such activity served the paradoxical
purposes of reinforcing Nasser‘s calls for pan-Arab unity while simultaneously justifying
America‘s direct and indirect intervention in the region.
Within three months of Eisenhower‘s declaration, leading states of Western
Europe created the European Economic Community (EEC) to elicit greater integration
across Europe, thus creating a more formidable bloc in the international arena. Following
pan-Arab trends in the Middle East, the EEC created pockets of interdependency that
individual states could affect more easily. Although these alliances succeeded in
providing a greater sense of cohesion in a globalized world, the relations between the
United Nations and its members suffered.
By 1958, a new round of international crises was emerging in the Middle East and
other areas in various stages of political flux. The cleaving of Arab nationalism into two
rival camps, along with Christian-Muslim tensions, helped trigger the Lebanese crisis as
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Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun attempted to maneuver politically between
Nasser‘s UAR and the Arab Federation. Civil War forced Chamoun to request outside
intervention. Interest in quarantining Nasser‘s ambitions led Dulles and others to expand
the Eisenhower Doctrine to include threats from pan-Arab fanatics. During
Congressional deliberations over the application of the president‘s new Middle East
policy, some reservations were expressed in smaller private gatherings, but debate in
larger chambers was curtailed on the eve of American Marine landings in Lebanon. The
absence of genuine debate was a common characteristic of American foreign policy
during this period of time. In the case of the Lebanon crisis, defenders of American
intervention may argue that Iraq‘s revolution made action imperative. Yet, resolving the
crisis occurred when the UN General Assembly convened and endorsed the Arabinspired ―Good Neighbor Resolution.‖ Foreign forces would exit Lebanon in exchange
for Arab assurances respecting the sovereignty of other Arab nations.
Two years later, the circumstances that led to the Lebanese crisis reappeared in
the Congo during its traumatized transition to independence. Belgian insistence on
directing the process left the Congolese isolated without any measurable visceral or
intellectual investment. The few Congolese social organizations, permitted by the
Belgians, served as the stewards of Congolese political identity. Independence in 1960
left the leaders of these organizations to govern from an almost untenable situation.
Internal instability in the Congo fed the competing national interests of not only Belgium,
but also the Soviet Union and the United States. As a result, the Congo crisis erupted
into yet another international situation demanding UN involvement.
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Hammarskjöld‘s abilities as an impartial international civil served admirably once
again. The ONUC peacekeeping forces sought to achieve three objectives. First, keep
individual countries from acting unilaterally in the Congo. Second, keep the Congo
united. Third, respect Congolese sovereignty by refusing to intervene in domestic
matters. UN officials did well in maintaining these standards of conduct by refusing to
endorse any particular agenda that favored one set of interests over another and expanded
ONUC objectives only when instructed to do so by the General Assembly.
Specific national interests included Belgian interests in reasserting colonial
control in the Congo, as well as Cold War interests of the Superpowers. Mining interests
in the Katanga province left many Belgians supporting Katanga‘s independence.
Unofficial though it was, such support hampered UN efforts to maintain the Congo as a
whole. American interests supported UN intervention in addition to devising strategies
intent on having the Belgians return to the Congo. Like earlier instances during
implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958 or the numerous examples in the
escalation of tension precipitating the Suez crisis, American policy-makers operated from
a monolithic mindset. ―Overall,‖ writes David Gibbs, ―the relative absence of
bureaucratic rivalries during the Eisenhower administration was notable. Officials in the
Eisenhower administration with rare exceptions assented to the dominant pro-Belgian,
pro-Katanga policy.‖770 As the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba associated with the
Soviet Union, American officials drafted assassination plans and supported a military
coup in the Congo. All of these unilateral activities worked against the United Nations
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and its peacekeepers. The General Assembly‘s vote of confidence along with the
perseverance of UN officials, such as Ralph Bunche, played a pivotal role in salvaging
Congolese sovereignty.
The camouflaging of unilateral practices in multilateral contexts as witnessed in
the many dealings following the Suez crisis continued into the 1960s and beyond.
Employees at OPEC rivaled the international civil servant status of United Nations
personnel. In the United States, various Congressional representatives wished to create a
closer relationship between government and non-government organizations. In the case
of national security interests specifically, consensus and conformity characterized these
relations. These developments marginalized the role multilateral diplomacy could play in
conflict resolution.
In addition to stifling opportunities for broader multilateral dialogue, these trends
also contributed to rising consternation between and within societies. OPEC, for
example, crippled pan-Arabism by dividing the Arab world between those countries that
possess petroleum reserves and those that do not. American society was also divided
between those who monopolized power and those who felt increasingly alienated from
the decision-making process.
The combination of these outcomes following the Suez crisis and subsequent
crises meant that multilateral diplomacy was becoming the exception rather than the
norm. Hannah Arendt‘s desire for societies to participate in shared experiences was
being misconstrued. While the international community paid lip-service to the UN‘s
accomplishments in constructively facilitating conflict resolution, many of the same
officials undercut these successes by attempting to use multilateral means to achieve
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unilateral ends. Over the decades, the United Nations‘ identity suffered as these means
and ends, which had a long history of subtlety, became increasingly imperceptible.
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Conclusion
Understanding the Suez crisis from an internationalist perspective allows for a
more comprehensive analysis of the crisis and the central role the United Nations played
in its resolution. The proceedings that took place within the UN General Assembly in
early November 1956 offered a diplomatic alternative that provided the greatest chance
for successful mediation. The temporary ascendance of pluralistic diplomacy was due in
part to two key factors. The first factor was the relationship between national interests
and the international community as defined by the UN General Assembly. The second
factor was the influence exerted by key figures including UN Secretary General Dag
Hammarskjöld, Indian Ambassador to the UN Arthur Lall, Canadian Foreign Minister
Lester Pearson, and others.
For all its success in the fall of 1956, UN and its multilateral negotiations cannot
be segregated from the realist world of international relations entirely. Appeals to
national interests remained too seductive for commercial entrepreneurs, special interest
groups, and political leaders to ignore. From de Lesseps‘s dealings in the mid-nineteenth
century as he campaigned to construct the canal to the rise of Zionism to the national
security interests of the Cold War, various interests competed to represent a broader set
of international interests. De Lesseps‘s strategy inspired British policy makers and their
attempts to portray imperial interests as universally benevolent. The Zionist Theodore
Herzl modeled his ―Jewish State‖ on de Lesseps‘s Universal Company of the Maritime
Suez Canal. These events played a fundamental role in the escalation of international
tensions throughout the Suez Crisis of 1956.
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Since its inception, the United Nations wrestled with these two developments and
responses to them as characterized by the Arab-Jewish dispute and the decolonization
movement. UN negotiator Ralph Bunche gained a first-hand understanding of the
brewing Arab-Jewish conflict resulting from Israel‘s independence in 1948. Like
Hammarskjöld, Bunche‘s experience as an international civil servant provided him with a
diplomatic awareness that would prove indispensable during the Suez crisis. Both men
maintained a sense of objectivity and impartiality at a time when national interests were
at their most myopic. Bunche‘s role in UNSCOP and Hammarskjöld‘s handling of
Senator McCarthy‘s investigation of U.S. employees in the UN as well as the issue of
U.S. prisoners of war in China testify to the new role to which UN staff laid claim. This
role was based on using the United Nations as an independent alternative in the pursuit of
multilateral diplomacy as expressed in Hammarskjöld‘s UN address in 1953.
The emphasis on independence was emblematic of the burgeoning non-aligned
movement too. Meetings such as the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) and the
Bandung Conference defined the principles of non-alignment which endorsed greater UN
involvement as an honest broker in resolving international disputes rather than act as an
instrument in the service of the great powers. Although this sense of deference to the UN
could be interpreted as simply the most efficient way for newly independent nations to
maximize their leverage in international affairs, influential voices from within the nonaligned camp held conflicting views on the matter. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru and the Prime Minster of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, supported a more genuine
internationalist perspective. Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai were among those that wished not only to manipulate the UN, but
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also to monopolize non-aligned gatherings and portray themselves as the movement‘s
leader.
While the proceedings at Bandung were not eclipsed by Nasser‘s and Zhou‘s
agenda, their efforts were indicative of international relations of the 1950s. Examples
preceding Bandung include Iran‘s Western-supported coup d‘etat in 1953 and the
subsequent creation of a ―multilateral‖ oil consortium whose membership included
Britain, the United States, France, and Iran. For many non-aligned nationalists, these
brazen acts by Western powers justified their suspicions of engaging with Europe and the
United States. Additional evidence came in 1955 when British officials began divesting
themselves of their imperial holdings in Egypt and Iraq only to reverse course and
participate in the Baghdad Pact. France‘s imperialist war in Algeria had a similar affect.
U.S.-Arab collective security negotiations and the highly-conditional terms American
officials attached to them also disregarded Arab concerns regarding anti-imperialist and
Zionist ambitions.
Between the autumn of 1955 and the autumn of 1956, the inability of individual
states to engage in multilateral diplomacy grew more acute. The collapse of collective
security negotiations, and promise of Western munitions that the agreement would have
included, left Nasser to negotiate an arms deal with the Soviets. To combat their fears of
communist influence in Egypt, Western powers appealed to Nasser‘s socio-economic
needs in an attempt to win Nasser‘s loyalty. The U.S. and British Aswan Dam loan
proposal, however, with its stipulations regarding World Bank management of Egyptian
finances, remained insensitive to Nasser‘s commitment to national self-determination.
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Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal and the impasse resulting from the two
London conferences led to the further deterioration of multilateral discourse.
Amidst this vacuum of legitimate multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations
played a pivotal role in crisis and conflict resolution. Hammarskjöld rebuffed efforts
intended to manipulate the UN into condoning military intervention. Moving debate to
the General Assembly provided a greater degree of pluralism that remained focused and
effective. Pearson‘s call for deployment of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
to separate the belligerents and re-establish peace combined with Lall‘s proposal that
Hammarskjöld take charge of the UNEF‘s creation and administration helped implement
a cease-fire that created a new, peaceful status quo.
Hammarskjöld‘s ―good faith‖ agreement with Nasser also aided in UNEF‘s
success. The deployment of an international peacekeeping force on Egyptian soil
threatened to draw Egyptian sovereignty into question. Where foreign intervention had
elicited an immediate and negative response by Nasser in earlier situations,
Hammarskjöld the UNEF would be responsible in part for protecting Egyptian
sovereignty once the force took up its final positions along the Egyptian-Israeli border.
In return, Nasser was responsible for the nearly uninterrupted flow of international
commercial goods through the Suez Canal. This ―good faith‖ agreement made each party
responsible for protecting the interests of the other. As a result, UN sponsorship of
multilateral diplomacy helped secure the national interests of individual nations by acting
independently of any one set of interests. Egypt got the sovereignty it desired. Western
European commercial traffic could navigate the Suez Canal without fear of being seized.
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Israel had a protected border with one of its strongest regional adversaries. The United
States got at least a temporary reprieve in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
In the weeks and years following the Suez crisis, much of the international
community took extraordinary steps to insulate national interests from international
interference. Strategies adopted included more traditional methods of making national
interests representative of a broader international agenda. The formation of the European
Economic Community (EEC), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), and the meetings occurring within NATO stressed the need for greater
uniformity. The Eisenhower Doctrine targeted communist expansion in the Middle East
and was even expanded to include any threats against U.S. interests in the region,
including Nasser‘s pan-Arab sense of ethno-nationalism. Nasserism, as it came to be
known, was another example of usurping an inclusive agenda to serve a single purpose.
In doing so, the escalation of international crisis intensified once again.
For example, competition between supporters of Nasser‘s United Arab Republic
(UAR) and the Iraqi-led Arab Federation precipitated the Lebanon Crisis of 1958.
Lebanese Prime Minster Camille Chamoun‘s efforts to remain independent of these rival
factions were futile. His only recourse was to call on the United States for assistance.
Eager to gain international legitimacy for military intervention in Lebanon, U.S. officials
deferred to the United Nations not to lead the international community in another round
of multilateral diplomacy, but instead to endorse the U.S. course of action as established
by the Eisenhower Doctrine. International tensions subsided, however, after the UN
General Assembly supported the ―Good Neighbor Resolution,‖ which removed U.S.
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forces from Lebanon in exchange for Arab promises to respect the sovereignty of Arab
states.
Similar circumstances affected Congolese independence in 1960 and the civil war
that ensued shortly thereafter. The UN‘s recognition of Patrice Lumumba‘s government
set the organization on a political collision course with U.S. and European leaders who
supported Lumumba‘s opposition. Belgian bankers supported Moise Tshombe and the
creation of an independent Katanga province, which held precious natural resources.
U.S. policy makers also supported for Katanga‘s secession and, later, Colonel JosephDesire Mobutu‘s coup against Lumumba. Despite these unilateral courses of action, UN
negotiator Ralph Bunche and the UN General Assembly carried on after Hammarskjöld‘s
death to enact a cease-fire that respected the Congo‘s sovereignty as a single state.
Multilateral diplomacy may not replace traditional diplomatic methods, yet,
during the course of events comprising the Suez crisis, UN-led multilateral initiatives
proved their value. Pluralistic diplomacy helped alleviate the escalation of tensions in the
international community. In dong so, the United Nations served the interests of various
nations without subjecting itself to the interests of any one nation. National leaders
respected the UN‘s legitimacy, but they recoiled from endorsing a more independent role
for the organization. Instead, much of the international community resorted to using
international organizations to advance a uniform sense of world order. Returning to more
genuine expressions multilateral diplomacy has a distinct place in international affairs
and may be necessary now more than ever.
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